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I. INTRODUCTION
Upon his capture in 1934, legendary bank robber Willie Sutton was asked
by FBI agents, “Why do you rob banks, Willie?” Sutton, regarding the question
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as rhetorical, replied, dryly, “Because that’s where the money is.”1 In other
words, Sutton understood the inquiry to be why he robbed banks rather than
homes, or gas stations, or church offering plates. Had he understood it as
intended—what was it about Willie Sutton that impelled Willie Sutton to crime
when others, struggling to survive the Great Depression, were not?—Sutton
could not have offered so pithy a response. This Article poses a similar
question—”Why do you rob corporations?”—to ten chief executive officers
(CEOs) ensnared in circumstances analogous to Sutton’s in the hope of
generating answers more useful to the explanation, prediction, and suppression
of corporate crime than “because that’s where the money is.”
In the last dozen years, scandals involving insider trading, accounting
fraud, fictional business entities, bribery, lavish perquisites, and outright theft
destroyed over $1 trillion in shareholder value, eliminated millions of jobs, and
felled corporate giants. Outrage at these breaches of the public trust prompted
prosecutors to imprison many executives and Congress to impose yet stricter
obligations upon public firms and the individuals who run them. The SarbanesOxley Act (SOX), enacted in 2002, enhanced civil and criminal penalties for a
wide array of corporate misdeeds and imposed duties of transparency, honesty,
and accountability upon key firm personnel. Each CEO and chief financial
officer (CFO) must certify the truthfulness of each financial report on pain of
perjury and disclose on a “rapid and current basis such additional information . .
. [as] is necessary or useful for the protection of investors[,] and in the public
interest,” in-house counsels must now report to CEOs and boards of directors
any evidence of a material violation of any Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) law or regulation as well as any breach of a fiduciary duty to
shareholders, and public accounting firms must certify the accuracy of financial
reports.2
Although SOX is associated with a sordid parade of handcuffed executives
“perp walking” to prison, it may come to be better remembered as the machine
that privatized public firms. As much as a quarter of every dollar a public firm
earns is consumed complying with a panoply of laws and regulations. SOX has
cost firms $4 trillion, driven capital away from riskier firms, deterred mergers
and acquisitions, and increased the compliance burden fivefold.3 While some
hail SOX as a significant weapon in the battle against corporate crime, others
believe its price for reducing managerial malfeasance is far too dear.
Other tools have been tried. Many post-“Enron Era” firms tout their
1

See WILLIE SUTTON, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1970).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), PUB. L. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002), at §§ 302,
309, 404(b).
3
David Henry, Will Directors Morph Into Corporate Constables?, BUSINESS WEEK, June 14,
2004, at 38.
2
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compliance management programs (CMPs), which consist of written codes of
ethics, protections for whistleblowers, and employee training, as proof against
future criminality. Regulators have encouraged this trend, reducing liability for
firms that implement CMPs.4 Still, many view CMPs as cynical attempts to
pose firms as corporate good citizens and reduce regulatory oversight without
requiring behavioral transformation. Indeed, many of the more egregious
offenders had robust CMPs in place. Other reform proposals, including
enhanced balance sheet transparency, ethics classes, and more independent
boards of directors, have been hastened into the breech, yet corporate crime
endures. This should come as scant surprise: over the centuries, commentators
have complained that “laws are like spider webs, which may catch small flies
but let the wasps and hornets break through.” Inducing compliance with the
legal regimes they craft has long been the thorniest problem facing legal
architects, as:
The mere existence of a rule, a law, a moral standard, a social norm, or
any other behavioral prescription does not guarantee that those subject to it will
actually comply with it . . . [and] [e]ven those who acknowledge the
authoritativeness and generally favor the existence of [laws] frequently find it
advantageous to violate them in practice.5

Indeed, noncompliance can be profitable.
Corporate executives
experience tremendous financial incentives to cheat. Managers feeling pressure
to produce results are perfectly positioned to cook the books and audits, thus
boards of directors and government regulators cannot hope to amass enough
timely information to identify and address every incidence of noncompliance.
Executives of U.S. firms operating overseas feel pressure to pay bribes lest they
lose business to non-U.S. rivals who are not prohibited from doing so. One
would be naïve to believe SOX or any other legislation could relieve these
pressures. One might conclude corporate criminality is eternal and recent
exemplars are remarkable only insofar as one beholds their magnitude.
Still, noncompliance is an ethical cancer that drives away investment,
destroys firms, and compromises sustained domestic growth. Simply put,
noncompliance is bad for business, for the firm, and for the nation. Yet, as
injurious as noncompliance is, and despite all the measures instituted to combat
it, the phenomenon is ubiquitous. At least two-thirds of public firms have
engaged in serious illegal conduct in the past decade.6 Is law simply

4

Ellen S. Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1523, 1534 (2009).
ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY, 1 (1979). “Compliance” refers to
adherence to and conformance by relevant actors with the prescriptions and proscriptions of the
behavioral regime established by the state in respect to a particular issue-area. Id. at 3.
6
Saul W. Gellerman, Why Good Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices, in LEADERSHIP AND
5
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epiphenomenal to firm behavior? Is illegality part of the business of business?
Or, can a well-designed legal regime induce a degree of corporate compliance
sufficient to protect the integrity of the market and the state? Why, and under
what conditions, will firms comply with the legal regimes governing corporate
conduct, particularly when rules run contrary to parochial interests? These are
among the most pressing questions in public governance.
Unfortunately, in subjecting these questions to empirical analysis, and in
redesigning legal regimes to enhance compliance, epistemological and
methodological problems abound. First, a paucity of empirical studies testing
general propositions regarding relationships between legal rules and firm
behaviors hampers investigation. The few existing studies of firm compliance
are insufficiently rigorous to offer deep insights. The field is a young, largely
descriptive discipline that has treated the firm itself as the level of analysis; few
testable hypotheses or nomothetic propositions are offered in the literature. As
such, compliance with the legal regime governing public firms remains a largely
idiopathic phenomenon. Second, compliance is not typically an “on-off switch,”
and a particular issue-area within a broader regime may present no clear
demarcation. Compliance may be a matter of interpretation, negotiation, and
contestation between firms, regulators, and prosecutors. Therefore, any theory
must operationalize compliance by specifying objective criteria for rendering a
determination of the obligations created by complex and ambiguous sources of
law. Third, firm misconduct occurs clandestinely, and firms have incentives to
self-report better compliance records than they in fact earn. Investigators must,
therefore, pre-establish protocols to guide interpretation of partial or
unintentional compliance and give direction when reliable information is
unavailable.
Even more crucially, the study and regulation of firms per se as agents of
compliance may be misguided. Firms are abstractions that exist only in the
legal, and not the natural, sense, and, as such, utterly lack decisional capacity.
Firms do not decide whether to comply with law; people, specifically officers
who exercise decisional authority on their behalf, do. Any theory that would
explain or predict firm compliance must account for the individual level of
analysis. However, most corporate legal compliance research minimizes the
salience of personality.7 Accordingly, Part II traces associations between
personalities of CEOs and firm compliance with obligations arising under
corporate law.8 Part III presents historical data to test heuristically the proffered
theory and offer explanations and predictions of firm behaviors regarding
GOVERNANCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 79 (Robert Gandossy & Jeffrey Sonnenfeld eds. 2004).
7
Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with
Law, 17 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 73 (2002).
8
See infra Part II and accompanying notes 11–98.
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corporate legal compliance (CLC).9 Part IV, followed by a Conclusion,
anticipates criticisms and suggests future research to build upon evidence that
selection of CEOs on the basis of CLC propensities bears on firm survivability
and prosperity, as well as on the orderly and legitimate function of the political
economy.10
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF CLC
A. Personality Theory
Personality theory (PT) posits the individual as not merely causally
significant but central to explanations and predictions of the “external” behavior
of collective entities. Individuals are not prisoners of fell circumstances, but
rather are capable of exerting positive influence on the world. Although
variables drawn from other levels of analysis factor into explanations of the
behavior of the sociolegal abstractions called firms, because individual corporate
elites, and not firms, develop and implement the policies that shape the business
universe, PT regards all firm behavior as subject to the influence of the complex
interaction of psychological phenomena in the minds of the individuals
responsible for those behaviors. Thus, the psychology of individual decisionmakers is the orienting focus for the study of CLC. Because the psychologies of
decision-makers have decisional correlates, and because each individual is
endowed with a unique personal psychology, PT explains how “who” the
decision-maker is translates into decisions he or she has made and will make.
Thus, a personality theorist models the causal relationship between relevant
psychological variables, decisions, and outcomes, and accounts for variance
across a range of decision-makers.
1. General Premises and Assumptions
“Personality” refers to all aspects of an individual qua individual that
influence his or her behavior. Within PT, each individual is an aggregate of a
unique complex of constructs that drive a constant process of selection from
among decisional alternatives. Choices are made to satisfy motivational,
evaluative, or attitudinal dispositions and preferences and to shape the
environment, and the decision-maker’s personality dictates the substance and
process of these choices and yields behavioral and consequential effects.11

9

See infra Part III and accompanying notes 99–607.
See infra Part IV, V, and accompanying notes 608–611.
11
DAVID O. SEARS & ROBERT JERVIS, EDS. OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
21 (2003).
10
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Although PT regards decisions as deliberate and conscious, it emphatically does
not presume rationality. In making decisions, individuals perform a series of
complex tasks, including the search for information, the ordering of preferences,
the development of alternatives, and the making of choices, and most are
incapable of absorbing sufficient information and undertaking adequate
evaluation to reach decisions that consistently maximize their welfare.12 The
human mind is a limited instrument; under conditions of uncertainty and
complexity, individuals simplify the decision-making process to avoid cognitive
overload and reach closure.13
To lighten their burdens, decision-makers unconsciously resort to
heuristics. Certain mechanisms—beliefs, images, values, motivations, attitudes,
perceptions, and traits—represent the basic constituents of personality and the
primary determinants of decisions. Identifying the relevant set of mechanisms,
or constructs, operative in the decision-making context facilitates explanation
and prediction of behavior. Establishing the process whereby these constructs
determine decisions generates testable propositions.
2. Personality Constructs
a. Beliefs
“Beliefs” are internalized scripts about reality and about expected or
preferred future outcomes that shape the manner in which incoming information
is processed and interpreted. Individuals acquire a systematic tendency to see
what they expect to see on the basis of the content of beliefs acquired early in
life. Beliefs exert great influence upon the individual’s interpretation of events,
and, thus, the individual’s identification of when there is a need or opportunity
for making a choice, the individual’s choice and use of information, the
individual’s definition of what constitutes realistic alternative courses of action,
and what values are considered in a choice between alternatives. Beliefs
“influence the actor’s definition of both the objectives and alternative courses of
action available to his [or her] opponent, and the actor’s perception of the likely
consequences of his [or her] own and his [or her] opponent’s actions.” 14
Individuals are systematically more receptive to information consistent
with their beliefs than to information that contradicts them and prone to process
12
YAACOV Y.I. VERTZBERGER. THE WORLD IN THEIR MINDS: INFORMATION, COGNITION, AND
PERCEPTION 21 (1990).
13
ERIC SINGER & VALERIE HUDSON, EDS., POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 96
(1992).
14
DANIEL HERADSTVEIT, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO
PEACE 11–20 (1979).
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information selectively so as to support their belief systems, particularly under
conditions of complexity, uncertainty, time pressure, and stress. Decisionmakers selectively ignore or fail to integrate information, building bias into their
decision-making.15 When confronted with repeated inconsistencies between
belief systems and the empirical world, individuals, to avoid cognitive
dissonance, must either modify their beliefs or disconfirm the validity of
inconsistent information. However, so powerful are beliefs in dictating
perceptions that individuals tend to resist adaptation and structure their
interactions with others consistent with the content of their beliefs regardless of
contrary empirical evidence.
b. Images
“Images” are the accumulated understandings about him- or herself and
the world an individual organizes into an affective and evaluative structure to
simplify decision-making. Although images may reflect empirical reality, they
are subjective: individuals “respon[d] not only to the ‘objective’ characteristics
of a situation, but also to the meaning the situation has for [the]m.”16
Perhaps the most relevant image is the stereotype, defined as:
[A] simplistic, unsophisticated belief about an individual or group that
can be used to determine the proper way to think about individuals or groups and
to enable decision[-]makers to fit a broad range of events into well-defined,
narrow categories, allowing speed and economy of mental effort . . . and
justifi[cation of] particular patterns of behavior and thinking.17

Stereotypes artificially rationalize decisions by attributing admirable
qualities to allies and venality to opponents, thus introducing bias and
increasing the likelihood of decisional failure.18 Patterns of behavior
directed toward a given individual or entity are congruent with images held
by the decision-maker about the individual or entity: a positive image
corresponds with friendly, cooperative behavior, whereas a negative image
corresponds with hostile, conflictual behavior.19

15
RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
16
JOHN C. FARRELL & ASA P. SMITH, EDS., IMAGE AND REALITY IN WORLD POLITICS 16
(1967).
17
VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 127.
18
IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 112 (1982).
19
WILLIAM O. CHITTICK, THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY OUTPUTS 52 (1975).
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c. Values
“Values” are normative statements about behaviors, objects, and situations
that are situated along a continuum, superimposed upon information, and used to
evaluate information.20
d. Attitudes
“Attitudes,” defined as ideational formations having affective and
cognitive dimensions that create a disposition for a particular pattern of behavior
toward categories of objects and social situations, are intimately connected to
images and beliefs.21 Individuals tend to discard information incongruent with
their attitudes and search for information that supports attitudinal proclivities,
particularly predispositions to feel or act positively or negatively toward peers.22
e. Traits
“Traits” are the observable consistencies of style that form first
perceptions, as well as the adjectives and adverbs of everyday language used to
describe an individual.
Traits such as energy level, self-confidence,
organizational capacity, impulsivity, sociability, emotional expressiveness,
intelligence, and sensitivity23 exert latent influence upon individual choices and
behaviors.24
f. Motives
“Motives” are latent dispositions that direct decision-makers to define
situations, make judgments, mobilize resources, and selectively pursue ends.25
g. Summary
Beliefs, images, values, attitudes, traits, motives, and other attributes
create mechanisms in the mind of an individual faced with uncertainty and time
constraints that filter, order, simplify, and explain the decisional universe while
20
21
22
23
24
25

VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 124.
ALAN C. ELMS, PERSONALITY IN POLITICS 11–14 (1976).
Id.
JERROLD M. POST, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS 31 (2003).
DAVID MAGNUSSON, PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 13 (1977).
JAMES N. ROSENAU, COMPARING FOREIGN POLICIES 248 (1972).
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facilitating identification, evaluation, and selection of alternatives.
For
simplicity, the term “personality construct” references each of these elements of
personality individually and collectively.
3. Measuring Personality
Problems with data access hamper development and testing of PT models
of decision-making. An attempt to specify the manner in which personality
translates into CLC decisions requires opening the black box of the firm to
ascertain precisely what senior decision-makers think, say, and do during
decision-making, yet this is possible only post-hoc. Moreover, firms tend to
zealously guard corporate secrets—particularly when facing legal exposure—
and what data does leak into media, public trials, memoirs, biographies, and
other secondary sources tends to be less than completely reliable.26 Similarly,
assessments of the link between personality and CLC decision-making that rely
on literature reviews, insider interviews, and biographies are subject to validity
problems due to temporal and spatial distance from the subject, deception, faulty
interview designs, and human fallibility. For these reasons, available data may
not perfectly reveal the true beliefs, images, values, traits, or motives of
decision-makers, and may thus fail to offer an unimpeachable accounting of
their personalities.27
Establishing the role of personality in decision-making requires a
measurement protocol. Direct measurement is possible through interviews,
observation, and psychometric testing, but otherwise personality must be
inferred from behavior. The psychobiographical approach gathers all available
sources, including letters, speeches, interviews, newspapers, autobiographies,
anecdotal evidence, and observation, to generate an explicit, valid, and reliable
assessment of personality.28 Psychobiographers engage in an iterative process of
data collection, aggregation, and testing, comparing sources to judge reliability
and validity.29 Psychobiographical data are used to “score” decision-makers on
personality constructs hypothesized to give rise to variance in the decisions
under analysis, with the ultimate objective the explanation of how particular
combinations of personality constructs, or “personality profiles,” cause specific
decisions and consequent outcomes.

26

SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 13, at 220.
LAWRENCE FALKNOWSKI, PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8 (1979).
28
Dean K. Simonton, Presidential Style: Personality, Biography, and Performance, 55 J. PERS.
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 928 (1988).
29
JEANNE N. KNUTSON, ED. HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 307–18 (1973).
27
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4. Conditionality and Contingency: Other Levels of Analysis
The relationship between personality and firm behavior is one of
contingency: assertions of causality are couched as true only in some cases and
under certain conditions, and caution must be exercised in generalizing from
their findings. Individuals are constrained and influenced by political,
economic, and social realities, as well as by the culture of relevant
constituencies and by public opinion. No firm, ergo no decision-maker, is
omnipotent. Still, the influence of exogenous constraints upon CLC decisionmaking is bounded. The role occupied by the individual is relevant to assessing
the weight attributable to personality. The closer the individual is to the apex of
the corporate hierarchy the more he or she is invested with the decisional
autonomy in selecting goals, committing resources, and ordering firm actions.
The most senior decision-makers (SDs)—CEOs, CFOs, and CLOs—are
invested with the greatest quantum of power relative to other employees, and, as
decisional freedom increases, exogenous constraints diminish.
Furthermore, situational context is crucial.
During situations of
ambiguity, instability, and uncertainty, PT accords greater causal weight to
personality than to other variables, and an absence of precedent, increased time
constraints, and emotional stress further diminish the theoretical significance of
other factors.30 Responsibility follows power, and SDs tend to rely less upon
external guidance when their firm is subject to threat or opportunity. Because
the role of firm constituencies and the influence of public opinion contracts
during conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, and because determinations of
whether to comply with ambiguous laws that hamper the immediate pursuit of
material self-interest and specify serious civil and criminal sanctions for their
violation implicate the highest of stakes and trigger great stress, the salience of
exogenous constraints is at a nadir and the role of SD personality in the chain of
causation resulting in firm behaviors is at a zenith in the issue-area of CLC.
Although PT does not advance the naïve view of decisions as the mere
projection of personalities, neither does it accept the simplistic view that
personalities have no effect. While the relationship between personality and
decision-making is contingent and conditional, it is positive, and firm behaviors,
including CLC, reflect the personality of the SDs at the helm.

30

JOAN OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, ED., POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1979).
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B. A Theory of CLC
1. Introduction
Personality theories treat empirical behaviors as the explanandum—the
things to be explained—and one or more personality constructs as the
explanans—the explanatory variables. In other words, firm behaviors are
dependent variables (DVs) that are the end result of a chain of causation running
through the personality of the individuals who set the course the firm will
follow, and the personality constructs that constitute this unique personality are
independent variables (IVs).
A theoretical model that allows for
psychobiographical measurement of policy-relevant personality constructs may
enable enriched explanations of CLC decisions while retaining parsimony. In
developing this model, efforts will be made to enumerate and define the
personality constructs operant in the personalities of CEOs responsible, via CLC
decisions, for particular outcomes; next, a set of preliminary hypotheses based
upon associative linkages between personality constructs and outcomes shall be
offered and heuristically tested.
2. Independent Variables: Personality Constructs
The proposed pre-theory of CLC hypothesizes that the presence or
absence of four constructs in the personalities of CEOs are responsible for firm
compliance with or violation of the legal regimes governing corporate behavior;
these personality constructs, which serve as IVs, are “militarism,” “anomism,”
“hostility,” and “adventurism.”
a. Militarism
“Militarism” is a global construct that taps a set of beliefs, values, images,
and attitudes. The militarist is more likely to consider forceful or anti-social
alternatives than his or her non-militarist counterpart, more prone to escalate
conflictual situations, and more likely to lead the firm to violate the law in
pursuit of his or her objectives.31 Nationalism and a favorable attitude toward
power have been identified as most predictive of the level of conflict associated
with decision-makers; nonetheless, all ten sub-constructs that typify the
militarist, specifically nationalism, a favorable attitude toward power,
aggression, authoritarianism, competitiveness, dogmatism, introversion,
isolationism, ambitiousness, and low self-esteem, are incorporated in the

31

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING 108–09 (Donald Sylvan & Steve Chan, Eds. 1984).
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theoretical model. The ideal-typic32 militarist scores high, indicating the
presence of the sub-construct in his or her personality profile to an extent
significantly greater than the average person, on each sub-construct.
“Militarism” does not imply a decision-maker who embodies these traits is
enamored of or has served in the military, nor does it necessarily imply he or she
believes imposing military solutions on problems is always desirable; rather, it is
an apt term for the global personality construct that captures the aforementioned
dimensions of personality.
i. Sub-constructs of Militarism
“Nationalism” is a belief that one’s nation is superior to other nations by
virtue of its culture, tradition, race, ethnic composition, philosophy of
government, or other characteristics,33 as well as the motivation to “develop,
protect, maintain, or refine” this culture, tradition, race, or philosophy.34
Nationalists are more prone to defend fellow nationals in word and deed and
more likely than non-nationalists to serve in the armed forces.35 On the other
hand, nationalists are less able to make subtle distinctions and gradations.36 The
behavioral outputs of nationalists tend to be more conflictual than those
associated with their non-nationalist counterparts, and these effects are
heightened by cultural dissimilarities between the nationalist and the target of
the behavior.
“Favorable attitude toward power” is a composite sub-construct, which
refers to beliefs regarding the desirability and utility of possessing and
employing force or coercion in the pursuit of objectives. “Throughout history,
[decision-makers] who attain legendary status often tend to be those who have
conquered other nations, won major wars, forcibly transformed their societies,
and imposed their own beliefs on their subjects[;]”37 decision-makers seeking
this status tend to have positive attitudes toward the military, nuclear weapons,

32
“Ideal types” are theoretical constructs that model selected aspects of the empirical world and
permit comparative assessment of the extent to which those aspects exist in a particular, real case.
Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A Finch trans. & eds. 1949).
33
Paul C. Stern, Why do People Sacrifice for their Nations?, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 217 (1995).
34
VAMIK VOLKAN, THE NEED TO HAVE ENEMIES AND ALLIES 88, 94–95 (1988).
35
Hank Denker, Darina Malova & Sander Hoogendorn, Nationalism and Its Explanations, 24
POL. PSYCHOL. 345, 350 (2003).
36
David Winter, Margaret G. Hermann, Walter Weibtraub & Stephen G. Walker, The
Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits, and Policy, 12
POL. PSYCHOL. 215, 231 (1991).
37
A. LUDWIG, KING OF THE MOUNTAIN: THE NATURE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 3–4 (2002).
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war, and control over others—the instrumentalities that achieve status.38 The
decision-maker with a favorable attitude toward power believes power, rather
than reason, is essential to preserving order.
“Aggression” is the trait that directs an individual to engage in selfassertive, self-protective, domineering, hostile, and/or violent interactions with
others.39
“Authoritarianism” is the belief that unquestioning obedience to authority
is superior to freedom of judgment and that credibility of information is a
function of the authority of the source, rather than its factual reliability.40
Authoritarians rigidly adhere to conventional values, condemn violators of
social tradition as threats, and preoccupy themselves with hierarchies and social
cohesion.41
“Competitiveness” is the drive to struggle against others for satisfaction of
wants and needs.42
“Dogmatism” is the degree to which an individual cannot identify or use
conceptual linkages, tolerate and assimilate contrary beliefs, analyze
contingencies, adapt to ambiguity, generate alternatives, perceive shades of
grey, and think abstractly.43
“Introversion” describes an attitude and trait in which an individual directs
attention inward to his or her own thoughts and experiences rather than toward
objects or people.44
“Isolationism” is the negative value attached to establishing and
maintaining emotional relationships with others.
Isolationists lack a
predisposition to seek approval and to limit the type or degree of conflict, and
they tend to be overly self-reliant.45
“Ambitiousness” is the value attached to personal accomplishment, and
ambitious individuals are predisposed to strive for success in tasks involving
leadership and the demonstration of intelligence.46
“Low self-esteem” is the absence of a belief in one’s own capability,

38
DENNIS J.D. SANDOLE, CAPTURING THE COMPLEXITY OF CONFLICT: DEALING WITH VIOLENT
ETHNIC CONFLICTS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 24 (1999).
39
MAGNUSSON, supra note 24, at 165.
40
VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 172.
41
See T. ADORNO, E. FRANKEL-BRUNSWICK, D.J. LEVINSON & R. NEVITT SANFORD, THE
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950).
42
Joseph Badaracco, Jr., We Don’t Need Another Hero, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept. 1, 2001, at 1–12.
43
MILTON ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND 62 (1960).
44
VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 173.
45
DAVID DOTLICH & PETER CAIRO, WHY CEOS FAIL: THE 11 BEHAVIORS THAT CAN DERAIL
YOUR CLIMB TO THE TOP AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM 64–65 (2003).
46
MAGNUSSON, supra note 24, at 412.
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worth, and entitlement to respect; individuals with low self-esteem are not selfconfident, patient, or likely to perceive themselves as competent and wellregarded by peers,47 but are more prone to violent behavior than those with high
self-esteem and more likely to suppress constructive conflict.48
ii. Summary and Operationalization: Militarism
The ideal-typic militarist is a nationalist with prior military service who
views the use of power favorably, is an aggressive competitor and keenly
ambitious, and is authoritarian and dogmatic yet introverted, isolated, and beset
with low self-esteem. While the pure ideal-typic militarist may exist only in
theory, militarists score high, indicating the presence of the sub-construct in his
or her personality profile to an extent significantly greater than the average
person, on a majority of the sub-constructs.
b. Anomism
“Anomism” consists of five sub-constructs—disregard for law, disregard
for legal authorities, amoralism, ignorance of law, and ignorance of corporate
law—that tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, and attitudes
regarding the rule of law. The anomist has little regard for law or legal
authorities, lacks moral or ethical qualms about violating law, and knows little
of the substance of law generally and less about corporate law. In brief, the
anomist is a serial and unrepentant lawbreaker who holds dear no superordinate
moral principles. The ideal-typic anomist scores high on each sub-construct.
i. Disregard for Law
Although “[e]veryone breaks the law sometimes, and some people break it
often[,]”49 for many individuals law is an object of reverence and obedience a
quasi-religious duty.50 Many, and perhaps most, people quite simply believe
law must be obeyed for the simple reason that it is law.51 The anomist, in

47

LINDA O. VALENTY & OFFER FELDMAN, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FOR THE NEW CENTURY:
PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR AMONG AMERICAN LEADERS 73 (1999).
48
DOTLICH & CAIRO, supra note 45, at 128–30.
49
TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 3 (1997).
50
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a PreferenceShaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1990).
51
H.R. Rodgers Jr. & E.B. Lewis, Political Support and Compliance Attitudes, 2 AM. POL. Q.
61 (1974).
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contrast, accords no independent normative value to legal obligations and
regards legal obedience in purely instrumental terms: if obeying the law suits his
self-interest, he or she does so, but, if obedience thwarts the pursuit of his or her
ends, law is but another objective impediment that must be overcome or
negotiated away.52
ii. Disregard for Legal Authorities
Regard and respect for legal authority is widely diffused across
demographic, cultural, and geographic domains. Most people accord legal
authorities, including the police and the judiciary, the presumption of integrity,
competence, and legitimacy, and as a consequence cooperate and comply with
them in their official capacities.53 By contrast, anomists treat legal authorities as
inherently unworthy of respect or obedience and as constraints to be factored
into calculations of how best to pursue self-interest.
iii. Amoralism
“Amoralism” refers to an absence of absolutism in the evaluation and
judgment of character, conduct, ethics, and values. Most people “d[o] not
simply act in pursuit of gains[;] rather, their own personal sense of right and
wrong influence[s] their behavior. . . [and] [t]hey . . . engage in the behavior that
they think is morally right.”54 Such people consider non-compliance morally
unjustifiable, and many consider the moral evil occasioned by noncompliance to
be greater than the evil of obeying a law with which they disagree.55 The
amoralist, however, accords no moral virtue to compliance and is agnostic, and
thus amoral, regarding right and wrong. Moral judgments are less consequential
to the anomist than the perceived certainty or threat of punishment.
iv. Ignorance of Law
“Ignorance of law” is the absence of formal legal education—not the
absence of legal knowledge. Those with legal training may be more likely to
regard legal obligations as binding. Although legal training “does not assure

52
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIOA CHAYERS, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 117 (1995).
53
TYLER, ET. AL., supra note 45, at 38–39, 45.
54
Id. at 116.
55
IRVING JANIS & LEO MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT,
CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 28 (1977).
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that [decision-makers] will cast their votes for law observance, . . . some
knowledge of the law, some appreciation of its significance, and some attitudes
and habits of respect for the law find a place in the process of decision.”56
Although most decision-makers may know little about law, it stands to reason
that the less ignorant a decision-maker is as to legal obligations the more likely
he or she will be to comply with them.
v. Ignorance of Corporate Law
“Ignorance of corporate law” references the absence of training in the
legal regime governing corporations. Knowledge of corporate law is a
determinant of CLC: the less a decision-maker knows about corporate law the
less likely he or she will comply with it.
vi. Summary and Operationalization: Anomism
The ideal-typic anomist is ignorant of the law, regards compliance with
legal rules and authorities in purely instrumental terms, and complies only where
it serves self-interests; morality does not factor into the analysis.
c. Hostility
“Hostility” consists of nine sub-constructs that tap a set of intercorrelated
beliefs, values, images, and attitudes regarding human relationships. The idealtypic hostile scores high, indicating the presence of the sub-construct in his or
her personality profile to an extent significantly greater than the average person,
on each sub-construct.
i. Distrust
“Distrust” refers to a belief in the inherent badness of human beings.57
Individuals with a high degree of distrust are more likely than those who are less
distrusting, or more idealistic, to over-perceive, and overreact, to threats.58 The
most distrustful decision-makers can be termed “paranoid,” defined as intensely
suspicious of others, convinced that others are scheming to cause them harm,

56

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 65–66 (1979).
JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION: NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 47 (1973).
58
Michele G. Alexander, Marilynn B. Brewer, & Richard K. Hermann, Images and Affect: A
Functional Analysis of Out-Group Stereotypes, 77 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 78, 80 (1999).
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forceful responses to perceived threats.60

357

Paranoids resort unnecessarily to

ii. Narcissism
“Narcissism” is the belief one is endowed with great power, physical
appeal, and the right to exploit and dominate others.61 Narcissists crave
attention and need to be perceived as powerful, appealing, and worthy of love
and admiration; they are preoccupied with pathologically grandiose fantasies of
wealth and fame, devoid of conscience or remorse, envious, spiteful, greedy,
vindictive, and willing to use force to achieve goals.62 Malignant narcissists, or
“antisocial personalities,” are reckless, sadistic, suicidal, and prone to
depression.63 Narcissists are not possessed of deeply-held beliefs about the
external world: their images of others are flexible, and other actors are of value
only to the extent they enhance self-interest or present them in a good light. For
the narcissist, what is good for him or her is good for his or her firm and nation,
and decisions are reducible to considerations of how results advance his or her
concept of self. Because they are detached from reality to the extent of their
self-absorption, narcissists are systematically inclined to overestimate their
capabilities and underestimate external constraints.64
iii. Cynicism
“Cynicism” is the belief others are self-interested, insincere, and
motivated primarily by material considerations, and the corresponding negative
general image of humanity.65 Cynics expect the worst of others, and
consequently are more likely to perceive threats than are individuals who view
others as inherently cooperative, sincere, and motivated by ideals.66
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iv. Misanthropy
“Misanthropy” is a generalized dislike, and even hatred, of human beings.
Simply put, misanthropes are antisocial, do not seek or enjoy the company of
others, and actively seek to avoid or, in the alternative, to cause harm to other
persons.
v. Ethnocentrism
“Ethnocentrism” is the belief one’s ethnic, racial, or cultural group is
superior to others and association with persons of one’s ethnic, racial, or cultural
group is preferable to association with other groups. Ethnocentrics project their
preference outward, and the degree of their cooperation and positive interaction
with others is, to some extent, determined by the degree of ethnic, racial, or
cultural similarity.67 Accordingly, justification for hostility is available to the
ethnocentric who identifies dissimilarities between his or her own group and the
target of his or her decision-making and attributes hostile intent on this basis;
greater vigilance is required to protect against this threat. Taken to extremes,
ethnocentrism creates a culture of fear that rationalizes infliction of harm on outgroups.68
vi. Hostility
“Hostility” is the perception others hold highly negative images of—and
have strongly negative intentions toward—one’s self or group. It is an
assessment of the degree of distrust operant in the calculus of external actors.
The greater the perception of hostility, the less likely a decision-maker will be to
recognize disconfirming information and the more likely to perceive external
actors as aggressive, to escalate threats, and to meet perceived aggression with
force.69 Although heightened perceptions of hostility may correspond to
empirical realities, most individuals can distinguish immediate and genuinely
hostile out-groups without detecting hostility from the entire world. Clinically
hostile individuals are caught in a “siege mentality” that persists independently
of reason.70
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vii. Machiavellianism
“Machiavellianism” is a set of values that denies the relevance of morality
and embraces deception, stealth, and manipulation in the pursuit of power.71
The Machiavellian is ruthless, devious, and amoral, and neither norms nor laws
stand in his or her way.
viii. Lack of Empathy
Empathy is the capacity to project one’s own personality into that of
another to understand him or her better and share in another’s emotions or
feelings. Empathy disposes an individual to seek out the views, interests, and
values of others, ameliorate self-interest, and consider the consequences of his
or her decisions for others. “Lack of empathy” is the incapacity to form
accurate perceptions and judgments of others and give regard to the concerns
and interests of others.72
ix. Selfishness
Altruism is the value placed upon aiding others despite risks and costs and
without expectation of external reward.73 The paradigmatic example is the selfsacrifice of the soldier who saves his or her comrades from certain death by
throwing him- or herself upon a grenade in their midst, absorbing the blow but
ensuring his or her own demise. “Selfishness” is the antithesis of altruism.
x. Summary and Operationalization: Hostility
The ideal-typic hostile is a self-absorbed, delusional, amoral individual
who is deeply distrustful and suspicious of others and sees threats lurking
everywhere. He or she bears an animus toward humanity mitigated only in
regard to in-group persons and is prepared to do anything and everything to
defeat the omnipresent threats posed by out-groups about whom he or she knows
and cares little.
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d. Adventurism
“Adventurism” consists of seven sub-constructs—risk tolerance, internal
locus of control, impulsivity, anxiety, optimism, stress, and maleness—that tap
intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, attitudes, and traits regarding tolerance of
uncertainty. The ideal-typic adventurist scores high on each sub-construct.
i. Tolerance of Risk
Risk is an immutable characteristic of the universe, and certain individuals
are cognitively disposed to greater tolerance of it than others.74 “Tolerance of
risk” is a measurement of the degree to which an individual will choose courses
of action that, while they may offer the prospect of gains, carry with them
significant possibilities of injury, damage, or loss. Risk-tolerant individuals are
more likely to expose themselves and their firms to danger than are risk-averse
individuals, who seek the decision that satisfies minimal policy objectives with
the least possibility for loss.75
ii. Internal Locus of Control
“Internal locus of control” is the belief one can exert positive influence
over the world to bring about a future favorable result. For individuals whose
locus of control is external, the belief their destiny is preordained leads to
decisional paralysis. Individuals with an internal locus of control attribute
causality of their behavior to themselves (Will) rather than the external world
(Fate) and are more likely to challenge environmental constraints and less likely
to remain passive or compromise.
iii. Impulsivity
“Impulsivity” is the trait characterized by the inability to self-modulate
sensory input, inhibit sensation-seeking behavior, or consider the consequences
of actions.76 Impulsives frequently make suboptimal decisions because they do
not allow themselves time to think clearly and deliberately, seek advice, or

74
Yaacov Vertzberger, Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 347, 368-69 (1995).
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employ moral reasoning.77
iv. Anxiety
“Anxiety” is the trait that makes an individual prone to evaluate stimuli as
dangerous and to experience concomitant feelings of worry, distress, and panic.
Anxious individuals are more likely than non-anxious individuals to perceive
and react to threats.78
v. Optimism
“Optimism” is the belief the future will produce preferred outcomes
regarding people and events.
vi. Stress
“Stress” is the aggregate response produced in unconscious adaptation to
environmental stimuli. Individuals vary in their ability to preserve cognitive
functioning as stressors mount, yet all experience degradation in their ability to
generate alternatives and choose optimal courses of action under threats to core
values and interests.79
vii. Male Sex
Although sex-role differences may be socially constructed in part, rather
than biologically determined by testosterone,80 men are more likely to be
competitive, aggressive, ethnocentric, Machiavellian, distrustful, ambitious, and
lack empathy.81
viii. Summary and Operationalization: Adventurism
The ideal-typic adventurist is an impulsive gambler so optimistic he or she
can assert his or her will that he or she risks all for the sheer thrill of pursuing
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victory no matter how small or unlikely. He or she resolves tremendous anxiety
and stress by trusting blindly and rolling the dice.
3. Dependent Variables: Decisions and Outcomes Regarding CLC
a. Introduction: Corporate Law and Major Sub-regimes
The current pretheory of CLC regards the presence or absence of the
personality constructs of militarism, anomism, hostility, and adventurism in the
personalities of CEOs as IVs that determine firm compliance with corporate law.
The theory treats these decisions and the resulting consequences as dependent
variables.
“Corporate law” is a complex amalgam of federal and state laws,
regulatory rules, and judicial and agency opinions interpreting and applying
these sources to the governance of firms. Various substantive sub-regimes
specify obligations in issue-areas ranging from the formation and dissolution of
commercial entities; contracts; rights and duties of shareholders, managers, and
directors; mergers and acquisitions; free competition and trade; securities;
taxation; employment; industrial espionage; and environmental protection.
Seven sub-regimes serve as the foundation for the study of CLC:
• financial accounting and reporting;
• securities regulations;
• market behavior;
• corrupt practices;
• labor law;
• environmental protection and social responsibility; and
• cooperation with regulatory authorities.
b. Dependent Variables (DVs)
Fifteen DVs are organized around and tap compliance with the seven legal
sub-regimes:
(1) whether the firm violates financial regulations through fraudulent
accounting practices,82 such as the creation of fictional business entities, failing
82

The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) prescribe rules and regulations to
which public corporations must adhere in the recording and reporting of financial information. See
http://www.fasab.gov/currenttext.html. Despite the comprehensive regulatory regime, managers
have considerable latitude in the financial assumptions and accounting decisions they make. This
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to record material transactions, stating fictitious or fraudulent earnings, delaying
or prepaying invoices to meet budgetary goals, booking operating expenses as
capital expenses, intentional misclassification of transactions as to accounts,
departments, or periods to misrepresent earnings,83 treating stock options or
other liabilities as undisclosed or off-balance sheet entries or footnotes rather
than as expenses, misstating option vesting dates to artificially inflate value, or
any other false, artificial, or intentionally misleading statements of financial
condition84 [hereinafter violate financial regulations] (sub-regime a);
(2) whether the firm engages in misconduct by undisclosed insider trading
in the firm’s securities or in other firms’ securities, by permitting trading by firm
employees in puts and calls of the firm’s stock or short sales of the firm’s
stock,85 or by illegally disclosing confidential information about movement in
the price of the firm’s shares86 [hereinafter violate securities regulations] (subregime b);
(3) whether the firm lavishes senior managers with compensation,
bonuses, or perquisites that are indefensible in reference to the market and
unsupported by sound business judgment87 [hereinafter inflate compensation]
(sub-regime a);
(4) whether the firm engages in competition in violation of antitrust laws,
including collusion with other firms to allocate territories or markets or
customers or to fix price or production levels to drive competitors from the
market,88 acquiring trade secrets or other privileged information through deceit
or misrepresentation or in any other way constitutive of industrial espionage,89

to be violations of financial regulations to be examples of noncompliance; only manifestly unlawful
attempts to deliberately and materially deceive investors and regulators are treated as violations of
law, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1351 et seq. (2012), and C.F.R. 240.13b22.
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of directors against liability for breach of duties of care, loyalty, and good faith to the shareholders.
See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
88
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
89
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839, criminalizes information
theft for economic gain.
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dumping,90 rigging of bids, or in any other way manipulating the free market
[hereinafter manipulate the market] (sub-regime c);
(5) whether the firm engages in corrupt business practices by accepting or
offering cash, services, or gifts of greater than nominal value to customers,
suppliers, or government officials to influence business decisions [hereinafter
engage in bribery] (sub-regime d);91
(6) whether the firm allows funds, facilities, or services to be used to
support political candidates or parties in violation of state or federal law, or
requires employees to make personal contributions to candidates or PACs
[hereinafter buy political influence] (sub-regime d);92
(7) whether the firm is in breach of federal, state, or local employment
laws, including the Civil Rights Acts, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), human rights provisions, and whistleblowing statutes
designed to protect employees who report noncompliance93 [hereinafter violate
labor law] (sub-regime e);
(8) whether the firm is deliberately noncompliant in its adherence to laws
and regulations governing environmental protection94 [hereinafter violate
environmental standards] (sub-regime f);
(9) whether the firm resists regulatory authorities in the implementation
and enforcement of corporate law by failing to (i) enact, implement, and train
employees in a comprehensive CMP;95 (ii) employ a dedicated corporate legal

90
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, vol. 6
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
91
The U.S. bribery statute imposes criminal penalties for offering to or accepting from a public
official any material inducement to influence the performance of any official act. 18 U.S.C. §
201(a). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 105 Stat. 366 (1994), criminalizes bribery in
international commerce.
92
Political contributions from employees are not presumptively unlawful but must be made in
compliance with applicable state and federal laws. The presumption here is the most elite rule
breakers are also those most likely to cultivate the rich and the powerful.
93
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (Dec. 15, 1967); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191(c) (2012); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (1935).
94
“Violate environmental standards” means the firm has, more than the national average of
firms of similar size, industry, and market capitalization, been successfully sued civilly or criminally
for violations of laws or regulations aimed at the protection of the natural environment against
despoilment.
95
Simply drafting a code, without subsequent implementation, can actually enhance the
penalties to which a firm is subject for violations of corporate law. See 2006 U.S. Federal
Sentencing Guideline Manual, Ch. 8, Section B2.1 UNITED STATED SENTENCING COMM’N
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2006/2006-federal-sentencing-guidelines-manual
(last
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compliance officer with substantial independent oversight authority, (iii) subject
senior management to the same obligations as other employees, (iv) enable
confidential reporting of illegality by protecting whistleblowers,96 (v) retain
business records if litigation, investigation, or audit is pending or imminent, and
(vi) make reasonable efforts to provide accurate and complete information to
auditors, regulators, and investigators97 [hereinafter obstruct justice] (sub-regime
g);
(10) whether, prior to discovery of substantial violations of law, the firm
or its CEO have a reputation with employees, investors, lenders, customers,
vendors, communities, or regulators for unethical or unlawful business
practices98 [hereinafter earn bad reputation] (sub-regimes a–g);
(11) whether, as a result of having engaged in any of the practices outlined
in (1)–(9), the firm has had to restate earnings [hereinafter restate earnings]
(sub-regimes a–g);
(12) whether, as a result of having engaged in any of the illegal practices
outlined in (1)–(10), the firm or its CEO are subpoenaed to testify before
Congress [hereinafter subpoenaed by Congress] (sub-regimes a–g);
(13) whether, as a result of having engaged in any illegal practice outlined
in (1)–(10), the firm or its CEO have been subjected to civil or criminal
penalties [hereinafter incur legal penalty] (sub-regimes a–g);
(14) whether, as a result of having engaged in any of the illegal practices
outlined in (1)–(10), the firm has had to declare bankruptcy or has otherwise
been liquidated [hereinafter suffer legal death] (sub-regimes a–g);
(15) whether, after being penalized for wrongdoing, the CEO expresses
the belief he or she did nothing wrong, blames others, declines to express
remorse or make apologies, and neglects to offer restitution [hereinafter deny
wrongdoing and blame others] sub-regimes a–g).
c. Operationalization
Many of the statutes, rules, and regulations that constitute the corporate

visited Feb. 2, 2014).
96
Many firms retaliate against those who report legal violations, and, thus, the act of reporting
such violations requires tremendous courage.
97
The dependent variable “obstruct justice” contemplates situations where firms resist
enforcement or commit perjury by providing false information to regulators and investigators
examining firm compliance. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012) (criminalizing obstruction of justice); 18
U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (criminalizing knowing misrepresentation of a material fact when under a duty
to disclose the truth).
98
See Christopher W. Morros, What is this Thing Called Reputation?, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 87
(1999) (providing a discussion on the subject of corporate reputation).
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legal regime are sufficiently complex and susceptible to interpretation that the
legality or illegality of any particular business decision may be difficult, even
for trained legal counsel, to discern. A gray area between what is clearly
permitted and what is manifestly unlawful complicates operationalization of the
lawfulness of firm decisions, particularly at the margins. Consequently, CLC is
almost invariably appraised in light of, and following, specific applications in
practice. Moreover, many firm decisions are shielded from external scrutiny
and, thus, emerge as subjects of investigation only after they are framed by selfinterested parties. Operationalizing particular CLC decisions requires subjective
judgments and interpretations, and it can be difficult to adjudge a particular CLC
decision as illegal ipso facto, such as proffering a gift of relatively modest
material value to a long-term customer in a culture that embraces gift-giving as
part of its business identity. On the other hand, certain CLC decisions—the
statement of earnings from a non-existent business entity or the shredding of
documents to obstruct justice—are manifestly unlawful. Most cases fall
between these polar extremes and must be judged casuistically. Subject to these
caveats, it is feasible to establish associative linkages between personality
profiles and CLC outcomes. Accordingly, each DV is dichotomized and scored
as either “yes” for the presence of the outcome or “no” for its absence.
d. Preliminary Hypotheses and Associative Linkages
Linkages between IVs and DVs proposed at this juncture as preliminary
hypotheses (PHs) are established by positing that the more each and every IV
finds expression in the personality of a given decision-maker, the more likely
will be the occurrence of each DV. In other words, the more militaristic the
decision-maker, the more likely he or she will be to manipulate or misrepresent
the financial performance of his or her firm and the more likely to violate
securities regulations, accept inflated compensation and so on for each DV. The
same relationship holds for each IV; thus, the more anomistic, hostile, and
adventuristic the decision-maker, the more likely he or she will be to reject
compliance with law as measured by each of the fifteen DVs. These sixty
hypothesized relationships are expressed in the following form: “1. The more
militaristic the CEO the more likely he or she will be to violate financial
regulations.”
III. PERSONALITY AND CLC: HEURISTIC TESTING OF THE THEORY
A. Data
The nature of the inquiry is such that there is bias in favor of CEOs whose
decision-making resulted in violations of CLC. Scandal, not successful
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governance, sells. We know much less about firms that have better compliance
records than Enron, WorldCom, and other certified corporate miscreants.
However, at this stage, it is infeasible to attempt to do more than sample the
most accessible data, which necessitates a focus upon corporate scandals and the
CEOs who initiated them. While recognizing the universe of firms and CEOs is
broader than what is possible to examine in this phase, and conclusions are
contingent and tentative pending further research, this study employs heuristic
testing to analyze available psychobiographical data concerning prominent
CEOs who made verifiable CLC decisions. Availability of data restricts
analysis to ten CEOs and the firms they led.
1. Enron
a. CEO Jeffrey Skilling99
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
Although shyness, loneliness, and poor self-esteem remain from an
emotionally “tortured” childhood, Jeffrey Skilling (JS) is an “incandescently
brilliant”100 person who acted out his grand ambition to “change the world”101 as
CEO of Enron. For JS, deregulation of the natural gas industry was a superior
philosophy of government and markets that required him to institute “brutal
competition” inside and outside Enron to “make the world a fairer place.”102 To
achieve what was at least as much an ideological crusade as a business goal
required merely the application of brains: for JS, the world has a right and
wrong answer to every question,103 and intelligence leads ineluctably to the
proper solution.
However, colleagues, noting JS’s ambition and zeal, were quick to
identify his enlarged self-confidence, saying privately he was “[s]ometimes
wrong, but never in doubt.”104 His intelligence, coupled with enormous risk
99
Although Kenneth Lay was “Enron’s founding father,” he ceded his role as de facto CEO to
JS as early as 1997, and “[m]ore than anyone else, [JS]…personif[ied] the Enron scandal.”
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM xix (2004).
100
See id. at 105 (describing JS as a “nerd,” insecure about his body image and appearance); Id.
at 28–29 (describing JS’s intelligence).
101
See LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 35 (2003) (reporting JS “wanted…
recogni[tion]…as someone…who had changed the world”).
102
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 419.
103
Id. at 58.
104
Id. at 35.
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propensity, fostered arrogance105 and compromised creative dissent:
[JS] used his brainpower not just to persuade but to intimidate . . . [He] had
dangerous blind spots. His management skills were appalling, in large part
because he didn’t really understand people. He expected people to behave
according to the imperatives of pure intellectual logic, but of course nobody does
that . . . [JS] also had a tendency to oversimplify, and he largely disregarded—
indeed, he had an active distaste for—the messy details involved in executing a
plan. What thrilled [JS], always, was the intellectual purity of an idea, not the
translation of that idea into reality . . . Over time his arrogance hardened, and he
became so sure that he was the smartest person in the room that anyone who
disagreed with him was summarily dismissed as just not bright enough to “get
it.”106

Moreover, although JS presented himself as an ideological purist
committed to deregulation and to creating a “well-oiled machine that generated
steadily growing profits[,]” the difference between this and the Enron JS
actually built and managed was vast:
[I]n reshaping Enron[,] [JS] turned it into a place where financial
deception became almost inevitable . . . because there were so many other kinds
of deception taking place. [JS] created a freewheeling culture that he touted as
innovative—but didn’t rein in the excesses that came with it. He preached the
gospel of intellectual capital, claiming that it was critically important to give
smart people the resources and freedom to let creativity flourish[] but looked the
other way when this became a license for wastefulness and self-indulgence. He
bragged about Enron’s sophisticated controls but undermined them at every turn.
He was openly scornful of steady, asset-based businesses that grew slowly but
generated cash—then swept them away to make room for a series of ever-bigger,
ever-riskier bets that brought in almost no cash at all. Worst of all, [JS] created
impossible expectations and unbearable internal pressures by holding Enron out
to Wall Street as something that it simply wasn’t.107

Whether out of cynicism or blindness, JS still clings to his idealized notion
of Enron.108
Furthermore, although JS was intensely loyal to his inner circle of
subordinates, rewarding them with enormous cash and other perquisites, he did
not foster loyalty or cooperation. Teamwork was disdained,109 as were
105
When asked by the Dean of the Harvard B-School whether he was smart, JS boldly replied,
“I’m fucking smart!” Id. at 31.
106
Id. at 28–29.
107
Id. at 114.
108
See generally id.
109
See id. at 55, 57 (“[JS] could care less whether people got along with each other. . . . In many
cases, he felt it was better if they didn’t get along, [because] it created a level of tension that he
believed was good for helping people come up with new ideas.”).
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friendships, and rewards were granted solely on the basis of individual
performance.110 JS deliberately set employees against each other and promoted
internal conflict in the belief disharmony and ruthless competition fostered
innovation and productivity.111 In his relations with peers, and in particular his
rival Rebecca Mark, JS demonstrated the same tendencies, fighting a “guerrilla
war” and employing devious tactics to undermine her and gain at her expense112
but distancing himself from others when not battling them for power and status.
JS was aloof and uncomfortable, preferring his inner circle or even solitary trips
to bars over the ceremonial aspects of life as a CEO.113
Although Enron “did strive for diversity” and welcome employees without
regard to race, religion, or other protected statuses,114 it was a “boys’ club”
under JS, where men earned more than female peers who performed the same
jobs as well and where sexual harassment was tolerated, even encouraged.115
JS’s Enron was a “hard place for a woman to work. It was like a boys’ locker
room.”116 Nothing in the literature addresses whether JS was a nationalist, yet
his ideological and dogmatic commitment to deregulation and competition,
favorable attitude toward the use of power, aggressive tactics in dealing with
peers, authoritarian style of management, hypercompetitive and ambitious
approach to business, and his natural introversion, isolationism, and low selfesteem result in a score of high on all but one of the sub-constructs of
militarism. JS is thus scored a militarist.
b. Anomism
For JS, law and rules were something to manipulate, and the Enron culture
he established encouraged an employee to play by his own rules. According to a
former trader, “We all did it. We talked about it openly. It was the school yard
we lived in. The energy markets were new, immature, unsupervised. We took
110

MIMI SWARTZ, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 59

(2004).
111
See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 66 (suggesting JS’s managerial style stems from
his experience as a consultant at McKinsey).
112
Id. at 110.
113
SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 223.
114
FOX, supra note 101, at 87. Enron’s commitment to diversity was likely motivated less by a
sense of moral or legal obligation than by a profit motive: “Enron cared only about performance, so
it didn’t matter if an employee had a nose ring or green hair, or was homosexual.” Id.
115
See id. at 93 (“Despite the company’s attempts to hire a mix of men and women, Enron had
within it a boys’ club…that reveled in rowdy times involving members of the opposite sex and
strippers. Not surprisingly, sexual hi-jinks resulted in rumored sexual harassment complaints from
some female employees.”). Pictures of female employees were posted on a “hottie board,” and
women who complained found threatening notes on their cars. SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 79.
116
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 123, 419.
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pride in getting around the rules. It was a game.”117 For JS, law was something
to be finessed if possible or outright ignored if necessary, and the successful
violation of the rules was a matter of personal pride. Indeed, it was a
fundamental constituent of Enron culture to be hostile to authority.118 Moreover,
JS personally introduced the concept of mark-to-market accounting, a violation
of existing laws,119 to facilitate earnings growth, and the massive accounting
fraud perpetrated by Enron actually stirred his pride:
[I]nterpreting the [GAAP] . . . has always been more art than science,
reliant in no small part on the good faith of those applying them in everyday
situations. For very smart people who saw the rules as something to be gotten
around, well, it wasn’t all that hard to do—in fact, some former Enron
employees argue that the rules themselves provided a road map. And[,] Enron,
which prided itself on employing only the very smartest people, took that view
further than any company that’s ever existed. “We tried to aggressively use the
literature to our advantage,” admits a former Enron accountant. “All the rules
create all these opportunities. We got to where we did because we exploited all
that weakness.” . . . And[,] there was the ultimate problem. With Enron’s
financial team working feverishly to exploit the rules, there was no one willing
to say that the duck was still a dog. Because they could come up with plausible
rationales for why a given structure was still technically valid, they believed they
were on the right side of the law.120

JS is hostile to authority as evidenced by his “harshly libertarian view of
business and markets” and his belief markets, and not laws backed by
government authority, were the only legitimate forms of social and moral
regulation.121 Moreover, JS was “remarkably disdainful” of Enron policies,
believing himself above and beyond regulation.122 Under JS, “We had the
authority to do anything and everything we wanted to do,” recalls one [JS
employee].123 “We thumbed our noses at any personnel policies that the rest of
Enron had.”124 JS, in effect, wanted not only to deregulate the gas market; he
wanted to “deregulate himself and his people from the rest of the company.”125
Furthermore, JS values little but money. Harvard classmates recall him

117

Id. at 275.
SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 274.
119
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 39 (noting JS urged mark-to-market accounting to
show profits even before the underlying assets had been sold and before their costs had been
recognized).
120
Id. at 185.
121
See SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 37 (describing JS as “hostile to the established order”).
122
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 57.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 59.
118
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expressing willingness to manufacture a product that might harm consumers on
the sole ground that it was profitable, and fellow Enron employees recall JS
saying on occasion, “I’ve thought about this a lot, and all that matters is money .
. . This touchy-feel stuff isn’t as important as cash.”126 Finally, JS’s lack of
formal legal training did not aid his unsuccessful criminal defense.
Thus, JS scores high on all sub-constructs of anomism and is scored an
anomist.
c. Hostility
To JS, potential rivals lurked in the halls of Enron, and he had to be on
guard to protect his position if he was to continue “doing the Lord’s work” in
creating a new kind of energy company.127 JS believes he is a special intellect
and has no patience for his intellectual inferiors. He believes human motivation
is triggered strictly by material considerations and is disinterested in others
unless they are instrumental in advancing his interests.128 JS is not ethnocentric—he dislikes most people regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity—yet he tends
toward sexism129 and is decidedly hostile: in a conference call with analysts in
2000, when pressed for information by an analyst who suggested Enron was
“the only financial institution that [could not] produce a balance sheet or cashflow with their earnings,” JS lashed out and called the analyst an “asshole,”130 a
position from which he did not retreat even when implored to.131 Finally, when
Enron began to implode, JS sold vast shares of stock while falsely assuring
shareholders of the financial soundness of Enron.132 JS has expressed no
concern that reliance on his deceptive assurances cost thousands of shareholders
their life-savings. In sum, JS scores high on all sub-constructs of hostility save
for ethnocentrism, and, thus, is scored a hostile decision-maker.

126

Id. at 43, 55.
Id. at 71.
128
See id. at 55 (JS…”used to say that he liked to hire ‘guys with spikes.’ By this, he meant that
if an executive had a singular narrow talent—a spike—[JS] was willing to bring him into Enron and
lavish him with money, no matter what his other shortcomings. Egomaniacs, social misfits,
backstabbers, devotees of strip clubs: [JS] didn’t really care about their foibles so long as they had a
skill he needed.”).
129
When it appeared Rebecca Mark might be awarded the job as COO in 1997, JS threatened
Kenneth Lay “if that bitch gets it, I’m outta here.” Id. at 355.
130
Id. at 325–26.
131
JS, a natural misanthrope, “liked to say that he never wanted to be in any business where the
customer had to like him.” SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 279.
132
See FOX, supra note 101, at 300.
127
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d. Adventurism
For JS, “should” and “would” are “pretty much the same[,]”133 and he
believes that he can accomplish objectives through force of will, no matter how
risky or unlikely these objectives. Perhaps his most obvious personality
characteristic, evident even as a child,134 is his appetite for large risks. “For all
his analytical abilities, he was a gambler at heart and had been from an early
age. He always assumed that he could beat the odds . . . [T]hat was [JS]’s most
dangerous blind spot of all.”135 Although JS claimed to have created a
sophisticated risk management unit that allowed Enron to safely and profitably
assume more risk than other firms, in fact, the unit and its leadership simply
pressured deal makers to set “absurdly optimistic assumptions for the complex
models that spat out the likelihood of various outcome for a transaction.”136 In
practice, these deals often lost money, and JS simply quit and dashed into other
deals that promised excitement, believing this time he could will risk away.
Each year, JS would run NCAA betting pools of over $100,000, which he
claimed to be part of an “intellectual exercise designed to teach young traders
about risk and reward.”137
Risk-seeking behavior did not come without a price: by 2001, many
observers believed JS had become depressed and mentally unstable. When an
employee almost struck his car in the Enron parking lot, JS gave him the
finger—an act completely outside the parameters of what is expected from the
CEO of one of the nation’s largest companies; others report spotting him
sprawled across numerous seedy bars in bad parts of Houston, drunk.138 During
this period of time, JS was wildly optimistic the increasingly perilous position of
the firm would improve, yet he was privately so anxious he could not sleep,139
and on more than one occasion he stated that he “hated” his job and was
thinking of retirement.140
To summarize, JS is a highly risk tolerant, impulsive, anxious man whose
overly-optimistic belief in his capacity to manage risk caused him to make poor
decisions under great stress. He thus scores as an adventurist on each subconstruct of adventurism.
133

SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 27.
FOX, supra note 101, at 33 (noting JS performed dangerous stunts as a child and chose
dangerous recreation as an adult).
135
Id. at 28–29.
136
Id. at 116.
137
Id. at 215.
138
Id. at 338.
139
SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 13, 272.
140
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 338.
134
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e. Summary of Independent Variables: Jeffrey Skilling
JS is scored as a militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic decisionmaker.
ii. DVs: CLC and Enron
By the late 1990s, Enron had become the one of the world’s leading
energy companies, with a market capitalization of nearly $70 billion, yet it rose
to prominence through systematic illegality perpetrated at the very highest levels
of the firm.141 The “free-for-all” culture established by JS contributed to his
decisions, as charged and proven by indictment and conviction, to commit,
authorize, or approve illegal accounting measures, creation of special purpose
entities designed to hide debt and inflate earnings,142 fraudulent inflation of the
price of the firm’s stock and other acts of securities fraud,143 money laundering,
and other financial and securities crimes.144 As CEO, JS oversaw the
manipulation of energy markets in California by Enron traders who were taught
to use the firm’s near-absolute control over information to “force” vulnerable
markets and generate monopoly prices on energy contracts.145 Foreign
governments were bribed to facilitate deals,146 and politicians and parties were
very generously endowed to curry favor.147
141
Robin Sidel & Mitchell Pacelle, J.P. Morgan Settles Enron Lawsuit, WALL. ST. J. (June 15,
2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111878962274259649.
142
Enron created over 2800 SPEs to hide its financial conduct from investors and from the SEC.
NOMI PRINS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: THE CORPORATE MUGGING OF AMERICA (2004).
143
Gellerman, supra note 6, at xv.
144
See United States v. Causey, Cr. No. H-04-25 (S-2) (S.D. Tex., Jul. 7, 2004), Indictment.
The indictment resulted in conviction in May 2006 on nineteen counts of conspiracy, fraud, and
insider trading and a sentence of twenty-four years in prison. Id. Months earlier, CFO Andrew
Fastow pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud and agreed to pay
$30 million in fines and cooperate with investigators, making the following admission with his plea:
“I and other members of Enron’s senior management fraudulently manipulated Enron’s publicly
reported financial results. Our purpose was to mislead investors and others about the true financial
position of Enron, and…to inflate artificially the price of Enron’s stock.”). See United States v.
Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665, Plea Agreement, Jan. 14, 2004, at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/enron/usafastow11404plea.pdf.
145
FERC found in 2000 that Enron had imposed “unjust and unreasonable” interference with the
market in California and that there was “clear evidence of market manipulation” on the part of
Enron, increasing the price of power and resulting in rolling blackouts. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra
note 99, at 276. In 2000, Enron paid a fine and agreed not to “engage in substantially the same
conduct” as it had previously, including market manipulation in California energy. Id. at 269.
146
Gellerman, supra note 6, at xiv.
147
SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 225 (reporting Enron donated $300,000 to the inauguration of
President George W. Bush in 2000 and this was but a small fraction of the contributions to
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Moreover, rather than discipline executives whose legal transgressions
violated the Enron CMP, JS lavished them with grossly excessive compensation
and perquisites, including millions of shares of stock and options. In 2000, even
as the financial health of the firm declined precipitously, the top 200 Enron
executives earned an average base salary of $720,000, and twenty-six earned
over $10 million each.148 JS’s Enron was not nearly so gracious to all
employees; the firm had a decided preference for young over old, and each year
the 15% it deemed least productive were terminated.149 Those who remained
were subjected to a vulgar environment in which sexual harassment was
common. Worse, whistleblowers with the temerity to alert top management to
illegality within the firm were not protected: Sherron Watkins, a senior manager
whose efforts to expose violations of law earned her public acclaim for her
courage, was subjected to an internal investigation, and Enron’s external legal
counsel suggested one possible response to her claims might be to termination to
silence and discredit her.150
Under JS, Enron was ideologically resistant to cooperation with
regulatory authorities. Although Enron developed a robust and holistic code of
ethics to which the firm ostensibly expected all of its employees to adhere, JS
developed a culture of noncompliance in which employees were rewarded,
albeit indirectly, in proportion to their violations of that very code.151
Employees received no specific training beyond the occasional public platitudes
in favor of ethical conduct offered by senior executives, and the firm’s own inhouse legal department was at worst a co-conspirator and at best a grossly
negligent party.
All employees profited from lawbreaking, but senior
management hatched the conspiracy and claimed the greatest rewards from
noncompliance.
As evidence of its legal violations mounted and its stock price plummeted
in 2000, investment banks became concerned about the “reputational risk”
involved in “aid[ing and] abet[ing] Enron income st[atement] manipulation”
through the use of SPEs, and rumors of the impending implosion of the firm
began to circulate.152 Although JS ordered the restatement of the firm’s earnings
in an attempt to mitigate the loss of investor confidence and to forestall
regulatory investigation,153 once Enron’s noncompliance could no longer be
politicians and parties made as a matter of course).
148
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 240.
149
Id.
150
SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 291.
151
See id. at 14 (stating the its rampant noncompliance has rendered the firm’s name “Enron”
into “shorthand for the excesses of American business.”).
152
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 208.
153
See SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 330 (reporting Enron filed an 8K restatement of earnings in
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concealed and litigation was impending, the firm ordered Arthur Anderson, its
external auditor, to destroy incriminating business records.154 However, in short
order Enron could no longer service its debt, and the firm filed bankruptcy on
December 2, 2001.155 Enron executives, including JS, were subpoenaed by
Congress, sued by shareholders156 and employees, and prosecuted.
Upon resigning, JS denied any responsibility for the death of Enron,
stating instead the following: “I deserve a break. If people come back and write
the history of Enron Corporation, they’ll look at my tenure as CEO. It was not
great for the stock price . . . It is what it is. I think what I would . . . hope people
would look at, is what earnings did.”157
In a 2001 interview, JS continued to withhold contrition, adding: “In the
last two months, I’ve gone through everything in my mind that was done when I
was here that could have been related to this . . . After much soul searching, . . . I
would not have done anything different.”158 In his congressional testimony, JS
claimed, as he was not an accountant, he could not have known Enron had
violated GAAP by using its own stock to generate a gain and avoid a loss on its
income statement and the failure of Enron was simply a liquidity problem
similar to that which caused bank failures in the 1930s:
Enron’s failure was due to a class run on the bank, a liquidity crisis spurred by a
lack of confidence in the company. At the time of Enron’s collapse, the
company was solvent, and the company was highly profitable[] but apparently
not liquid enough. At the time I left the company, I . . . did not believe that the
company was in any imminent financial peril.159

In 2006, JS began serving a twenty-four-year sentence for conspiracy,
accounting and securities fraud, and insider trading.160 Enron exists only as a
legal fiction to pay creditors, and yet JS continues to admit no fault, insisting
that “they killed a great company.”161

2001).
154
155

MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 381.
See In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG), 2006 WL 898031 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,

2006).
156
157
158

See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. H-03-3624 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 350.
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Former Head of Enron Denies Wrongdoing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,

2001.
159

SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 351.
David Teather, Skilling to Report to Prison, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.theguard
ian.com/business/2006/dec/13/corporatefraud.usnews.
161
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 419.
160
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2. WorldCom
a. CEO Bernard Ebbers
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
WorldCom (WC) founder and CEO Bernard Ebbers (BE) is a
hypercompetitive162 former athlete who hails from humble origins in rural
Canada163 yet leveraged his work ethic and ambition to build one of the world’s
largest and most profitable telecom firms.164
While not of an academic or formal disposition, and despite a tendency
toward shyness, BE cultivated a congenial public persona that motivated his
employees to want to work hard for him in spite of the seemingly decentralized
environment he inspired.165 As a result, employees and outsiders alike all
wanted to be an “FOB—a friend of Bernie.”166 BE embraced one and all, with
friendship and with money, and WC’s color-blind generosity extended far and
wide across Mississippi.
Despite his public image, however, BE had a strong need to accumulate
and use power, and WC was not nearly the unstructured, unsupervised
environment it appeared. “Power was the drug of choice for [BE],”167 and his
constant deal-making kept him supplied with control over the
telecommunications industry. With his taste for power came a tendency to
authoritarianism. WC was a hierarchical organization, and employees did the
bidding of the boss. One former employee compares WC culture under BE to
her experience with that of a competitor as follows:
MCI was much more open and willing to take chances, to let people propose an
idea and move forward with it, or as we used to call it, the Catholic way of doing
business—do something and then ask for forgiveness later—but at WC, it was
not that way . . . If the idea didn’t come down from the top or one of the favored

162
AMY JETER, DISCONNECTED 61–62 (2004) (“In competition, he is fierce and… he’ll cut your
heart out.”).
163
Id. BE, a Canadian by birth, did not acquire U.S. citizenship and does not evince particular
patriotism in regard to his land of origin or his adopted country. Id.
164
Id. at 3–10.
165
Id. at 47
166
Id. at 147.
167
Id. at 154.
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people, it didn’t happen. Thinking was not encouraged.168

Nothing suggests BE was aggressive, dogmatic, or low in self-esteem, and
his social adroitness indicates he overcame childhood introversion. Even after
his resignation from WC, he remained engaged in the civic life of Mississippi,
rather than slipping into isolation as do many fallen CEOs. BE thus scores high
on four sub-constructs of militarism and is scored a non-militarist.
b. Anomism
BE came from a devoutly religious family and, as WC CEO, liked to
preach that “doing the morally right thing happens to be good economics.”169
He opened every WC meeting with a prayer, worshipped at area churches, and
publicly testified on many occasions to his deep Christian faith.170 Despite these
affirmations of commitment to a moral code as the foundation for his life and
work, however, BE spent many nights drinking and often attended board
meetings under the influence, and he took his marriage vows rather lightly,
engaging in numerous and publicized extramarital affairs.171
BE extended a general pattern of nonconforming behavior to his and his
firm’s relationship to law. BE had no legal training and no specific knowledge
of corporate law, but neither would have attenuated his willingness to permit
employees, particularly his accounting and financial teams, to blur legal lines to
serve his material objectives. As a WC insider recalls, BE tacitly approved
noncompliance as a “remedy” to unfavorable business information: “When
everything was going well, which it did for a very long time, Bernie was happy .
. . When it didn’t, Bernie didn’t want to hear about it.”172 When the Justice
Department intervened to block the proposed WC-Sprint merger, BE’s vicious
lambasting of FCC Chairman William Kennard and the Assistant Attorney
General earned him no favors, and, when the SEC and other agencies later
focused their attention on corporate illegality at WC, BE’s disregard for legal
authorities manifested yet again in harsh public commentary.173
In sum, although it is difficult to score him high on amoralism, BE scores
high on disregard for law and legal authorities, ignorance of law, and ignorance
of corporate law and, thus, is scored an anomist.

168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 87.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 37, 91.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 120–24.
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c. Hostility
BE is a study in contrasts and in the duality of personality. Beneath the
easygoing, God-fearing cowboy facade, he is a deeply moody and distrustful
person who demands extreme loyalty from his employees and flies into fits of
rage if he does not receive that loyalty or is otherwise denied his desires.174 He
fired executives who sold WC stock, whatever their motivations, yet he would
go out of his way to help troubled but loyal employees.175 Although he
presented himself as a simple man who did not “put on airs” to impress
others,176 he hobnobbed with celebrities and grew jealous of fellow executives
who earned accolades or friends in high places, believing they were scheming
against him.177 He had many “friends” yet kept an enemies list to remember
petty slights that required redress and “was always somewhat confrontational,
and in-your-face, compared to most . . . in the Deep South.”178 Although not
ethnocentric or racist—he is comfortable with African Americans and Hispanics
and spent time living on a Native American reservation179—he imagined
enemies where none existed and enjoyed using power to intimidate those who
were not useful to him.180
Moreover, although BE fancied himself a master puppeteer in total control
of a corporate giant, he vastly overestimated his ability to run WC; as one
observer notes:
Bernie was out of his league . . . He wasn’t qualified to be the CEO of a global
telecom company. You can try to spin it any way you want, but the bottom line
is that he’s a peddler. He likes to peddle and make deals. But[,] when it came to
actually organizing, operating, and managing a major corporation, he didn’t do
very well.181

When his power was challenged, as when the Justice Department denied
his planned WC-Sprint merger, he could not temper his anger as good strategy
174
See id. at 92 (“At least a dozen people who dealt closely with [BE] mentioned that he seemed
to have a dual personality.”).
175
Id. at 40, 104. BE treated others according to a “pecking order” measured by how useful they
were or could be to him and WC. Id. at 92.
176
See id. at 46 (recounting an episode when BE was mistaken for a “fax salesman” due to his
unassuming manner and dress).
177
Id. at 98.
178
Id. at 60–62.
179
Id. at 92 (“‘[BE] wasn’t prejudiced against race [or] religion,’ said a former employee. ‘It
simply depended on how important you were to his agenda.’”).
180
See, e.g., id. at 61 (reporting, when a colleague mentioned a favorable article about BE
written by a Newsweek reporter, “before I even finished the sentence, [BE] cut me off. He said,
‘Never met the son-of-a-bitch in my life.’”); id. at 98 (reporting his intimidation of others).
181
Id. at 161.
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dictated, and, when WC collapsed under the weight of the illegality he permitted
during his tenure, his reaction was to ensure his own financial future, rather than
preserve the value of the firm for its shareholders. He continues to show no
remorse.182 Beneath the veneer of sociability and compassion, BE is a
distrustful, narcissistic, cynical Machiavellian lacking in empathy who scores
high on eight sub-constructs and is scored as hostile.
d. Adventurism
BE took great risks in starting WC, and he never missed an opportunity to
buy an asset, whether hindsight determined that decision to be sound or not. His
business character is best described as wildly optimistic and impulsive, and this
combination led WC to wealth and then into bankruptcy. In the words of U.S.
Bankruptcy Court examiner Dick Thornburgh:
Few companies in the annals of American business have grown so large and so
fast in such an intensely competitive marketplace. WC did not achieve its
growth by following a predefined strategic plan, but rather by opportunistic and
rapid acquisitions of other companies.
The unrelenting pace of these
acquisitions caused the company constantly to redefine itself and its focus. The
company’s unceasing growth and metamorphosis made integration . . . much
more difficult.183

In essence, BE was overly optimistic about his ability to exert positive
control of external events, and his optimism and preference for risk simply
lacked an objective foundation in business reality. This overconfidence, coupled
with impulsivity that even in his late fifties reportedly impelled him to engage in
fistfights in bars,184 led him and his firm astray. Although the available evidence
does not compel the conclusion BE made decisions during periods of heightened
anxiety, at the very least BE scores high on every other sub-construct of
adventurism and, thus, is scored an adventurist.
e. Summary of Independent Variables: Bernard Ebbers
BE is a non-militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic decisionmaker.

182
BE drove his Mercedes to self-report to Oakdale (Louisian) Federal Correctional Institution
on September 26, 2006. CLARION LEDGER, Sept. 26, 2006.
183
JETER, supra note 162, at 27, 202.
184
Id. at 147.
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ii. DVs: CLC and WorldCom
Prior to its demise in bankruptcy in 2002,185 WC was the largest U.S. long
distance telephonic service provider and the world’s largest Internet carrier,
providing a ten-year annual rate of return on equity of 53% and enjoying a
reputation as a friendly, clean, good employer and neighbor.186 BE denied
unwarranted perquisites to WC executives and further restricted them after the
failed merger with Sprint.187 Although WC, a major contributor to both political
parties and to candidates for the Public Service Commission charged with its
regulation,188 forestalled official scrutiny for a decade, a planned merger with
Sprint, blocked by the Justice Department Antitrust Division on the claim the
merger would “undermine the competitive gains achieved since the department
challenged AT&T’s monopoly of the telecommunications industry [twenty-five]
years ago[,]”189 opened the doors to a more thorough examination of WC’s legal
compliance. With WC stock price falling on news of the failed merger, a
chastened BE stated as follows:
We recognize that we, as a company, have let you down . . . We certainly don’t
look at this as the best day of our life. [The attempt to acquire Sprint] ended up a
mistake—and I am certainly accountable for that mistake . . . I’m sure with the
recent performance of this stock, people have a legitimate right to ask if I have a
right to lead this company.190

If the statement implied contrition on the part of a firm caught attempting
to manipulate the market by achieving monopolistic power, BE’s and WC’s
subsequent strategies belied this conclusion. BE began borrowing what would
amount to more than $408 million from WC to avoid selling his personal shares
to meet margin calls—a decision that upon disclosure would lead to his
resignation191—and, lacking sufficient cash reserves, WC began to engage in a
185
WC declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11 on July 21, 2002. Luisa Beltran, WorldCom Files
Largest Bankruptcy Ever, CNN MONEY (July 22, 2002, 10:35AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/
2002/07/19/news/worldcom_bankruptcy/.
186
JETER, supra note 162, at xx, 70.
187
See id. at 51 (writing executive perquisites were contrary to BE’s philosophy, which stressed
cost-cutting to support the stock price); id. at 96–97, 127 (reporting, after the failed Sprint merger,
BE eliminated perquisites such as first-class airplane seats, limousine service, four-star hotels, and
high per diems).
188
WC—in its corporate capacity—was convicted of a felony for illegal contributions to the
Public Service Commission in 1995. Id. at 57. There is no information to suggest WC engaged in
direct bribery.
189
See United States v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 1:00CV02789 (RWR) (D.D.C., filed Nov. 17,
2000), at Complaint.
190
JETER, supra note 162, at 182.
191
See id. at 127. This practice is now prohibited under SOX. See SOX supra note 2, at 1.
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series of fraudulent accounting and securities-related practices, including double
bookings of revenue; failure to report over $600 million in uncollectible
accounts receivables; delayed payments to vendors; recording of capital
expenses where operating expenses were required by law; and deliberate
understatement of costs—all designed to illegally boost earnings and profits to
compensate for the loss of the benefit of the merger.192 In 2002 the SEC, Justice
Department, and the Mississippi Attorney General began investigating and
eventually uncovered the world’s largest accounting and securities scandal.193
Although WC hastened to restate and reduce past earnings by $7.8 billion,194 it
was too late to stem the investigative tide. The House Financial Services
Committee issued subpoenas to top executives, including BE, even as the
financial collapse of the firm destroyed the retirement plans of thousands of
employees and investors.
WC’s reputation—sterling prior to its slide into bankruptcy—suffered
damage, leading some to brand it “WorldCon,” yet many held the view that it
was a time to “circle the wagons, because Bernie’s a local guy.”195 During
congressional testimony, BE disclaimed any knowledge of or responsibility for
illegality at WC with the following statement:
When all of the activities at WC are fully aired and when I get the opportunity . .
. to explain my actions in a setting that will not compromise my ability to defend
myself in the legal proceedings arising out of the recent events, I believe that no
one will conclude that I engaged in any criminal or fraudulent conduct during
my tenure at WC.196

Indeed, many industry experts, analysts, and observers supported BE’s
contention that he had been a “hands-off” CEO who lacked knowledge of the
illegality that transpired at WC.197
However, as the government succeeded in wrangling plea bargains and
convictions against top WC executives on charges of conspiracy to boost
earnings reports, securities fraud, and filing false statements, the myth of BE as
wildly successful but out-of-the-loop corporate cheerleader crumbled, and he
was convicted in March 2005 of securities fraud, conspiracy, and filing false

192
See generally J. Randel Kuhn, Jr. & Steve G. Sutton, Learning from WorldCom: Implications
for Fraud Detection through Continuous Assurance, 3 J. EMERGING TECH. ACCT. 61–80 (2006).
193
Simon Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Overview; WorldCom Facing Charges of Fraud;
Inquiries Expand, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/27/business/turmoil
-worldcom-overview-worldcom-facing-charges-fraud-inquiries-expand.html.
194
JETER, supra note 162, at 203.
195
Id. at 176.
196
Id. at 183.
197
Id. at 190.
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documents with the SEC.198 He continues to deny any wrongdoing.
3. ImClone Systems
a. CEO Sam Waksal
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
Although CEO Sam Waksal (SW) possesses a powerful and creative mind
that inspired him into an academic medical career before his turn to business, he
is a “nebbish—a nerd—whose desperation to be part of the fast crowd” was so
apparent it became a running joke.199 His poor self-esteem magnified his
ambition to the point that he “is prepared to do whatever it takes, at whatever
cost, to become a ‘player.’”200 To wit, he has always felt the need to “improve
on the facts” by telling “half-truths or untruths”;201 out of self-consciousness
over his status as the child of immigrants, he told neighborhood playmates that
he had an older brother at the U.S. Naval Academy to appear more “middleAmerican.”202 The sense he lacked status, and the burning drive to achieve
admiration and respect, have motivated SW’s behavior since childhood.203
The need to match the accomplishments of his father, who escaped Nazi
death camps and spent World War II as a resistance fighter, triggered strong
ambition and competitiveness; in SW’s own words,
My father is such an incredible hero. I feel there is nothing I could ever do that
could match the things he did. My parents’ experience affects me every single

198
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Ex-WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers;
Former WorldCom CFO Scott Sullivan Pleads Guilty (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March04/ebbersindict2pr.pdf; Krysten Crawford, Ex-WorldCom
CEO Ebbers Guilty, CNN MONEY (Mar. 15, 2005, 4:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/
15/news/newsmakers/ebbers/ (reporting his conviction).
199
ALEX PRUD’HOMME, THE CELL GAME 156 (Harper Business 2004).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 26.
202
Id. His desire to seem more “American” cannot be conflated with “nationalism” as it
manifests a desire to belong but is lacking any other markers for nationalism. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text. The same is true of his pride in his Jewish heritage. Denker et al., supra note
35, at 352.
203
See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 199, at 65 (“Others say that while attaining wealth was
certainly important . . . [t]he primary motivator for Sam . . . was status.”); see also id. at 323 (“Sam .
. . was hideously superficial. . . . He wanted to be one of the boys so badly. . . . People would joke
about it—‘the nerd trying to be fast.’”).
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day of my life. It drives me. When you grow up in a home where the parents
survived a very terrible ordeal in world history, and a lot of other people didn’t,
then you look at the world from day one in a very different way . . . I look at the
world that way, too—in making sure one builds and creates. It’s a driving
force.204

This drive—which SW tasked toward the reaping of a vast fortune—
unleashed an authoritarian form of leadership. At ImClone, employees knew to
“play by his rules or else,” and those who remained with the firm toed the
line.205 A volcanic temper206 coexists uneasily with abundant personal charm
and extroversion that, when SW deployed them to convince investors to back his
work, was persuasive.207 The literature does not support the finding that SW
was a nationalist or a dogmatist, nor an introvert or an isolationist, but SW is a
competitive, aggressive, authoritarian figure with low self-esteem who
manipulates facts and uses power to control others in the service of his
ambitions. SW thus scores high on six of ten sub-constructs of militarism and is
scored as a militarist.
b. Anomism
SW, the classic scofflaw, had “a sense of urgency about life,” an old friend
observed.208 “[His parents’] survival had been so miraculous that they had a
different sense of how to live. The rules of society didn’t really apply.”209
Despite his pride in his Jewish heritage, the morality and ethics of Judaism
escaped him, and a sense of personal entitlement so strong it relieved him from
the obligations that bound lesser people has manifested in SW’s life.210 His
dissertation was reportedly written by his mistress—also his graduate
assistant—with whom he began consorting the first year of his marriage.211 He
actively seeks out opportunities to challenge public legal authority, perhaps to
fulfill a neurochemical need for conflict:212

204

Id. at 27.
Id. at 54.
206
Id. at 54, 358.
207
See id. at xvi (reporting SW’s persuasiveness convinced world-famous oncologists to join
ImClone’s drug development).
208
Id. at 26–27.
209
Id.
210
See id. at 342 (noting SW’s college roommate stated “[t]he stuff [SW] did was so not Jewish
. . . . He missed the part that could have saved him.”).
211
Id. at 30–31.
212
See id. at 28 (quoting a friend of SW) (“He loves to pull a rabbit out of a hat. He needs that
adrenaline rush.”).
205
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Once . . .he had been stopped from entering Egypt from Israel because he didn’t
have the proper visa. But[,] with a gale of protest and sweet talk[,] he managed
to wear down the guards and make his way across the border—an achievement
he was especially proud of . . . because he had used his quick mind and quick
tongue to “get away” with something forbidden.213

SW’s recurring refusal to respect legal rules and authorities and a deficient
moral foundation has caused him lifelong pain; a mistress used the phrase “Tall
Poppy Syndrome” to explain the pattern:
Sam is his own, special, unique human being . . . He doesn’t sit back and wait,
he plows straight through things. He breaks norms. And[,] society always
bashes down people who break rules. People love to hate him, and always have.
Like the tall poppy that stands above the rest, they always want to mow Sammy
down.214

SW has no specialized training in law and is a deeply amoral person who
lacks respect for law and for legal authorities. He scores high on all subconstructs of anomism and is scored as an anomist.
c. Hostility
SW did not trust others, nor did they trust him. He told lies “so well, and
so often, he actually started to believe them himself,” his college roommate
recalls.215 SW inflated his GPA, proclaimed the results of experiments he never
completed, and made unfulfilled promises to help others:
To gain social favor, [SW would] promise to help friends or sorority girls with
their term papers or class notes; sometimes he’d do what he promised, but often
he wouldn’t. He didn’t seem to understand, or care, about the anguish it caused
people who had counted on him. “He became known as a flake and a liar,” said
[his college roommate]. “A ‘star-fucker’—always trying to be near the [pretty]
people. In the end[,] he wasn’t a very popular guy. He burned through
people.”216

This burning through people, as well as SW’s public proclamations that he
would “win the Nobel Prize,” that the grand purpose behind ImClone was to
“make the world better,” and that those who interfered with him were
“allow[ing] evil to win,”217 are typical behaviors of narcissists and

213
214
215
216
217

Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 23–24, 157.
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Machiavellians, as are SW’s arrogance, abrasiveness, and rudeness. Moreover,
narcissism is evident in SW’s statement in a 2002 interview, that he believed he
“was the most honest CEO that ever lived . . . [and that consequently he] could
glibly do something illegal and rationalize it.”218
SW’s cynicism and, to a lesser extent, misanthropy, is evident in his
appeal to his sentencing judge for leniency on the grounds that he had
demonstrated good citizenship over the years through his charitable
contributions and had always shown “empathy for the underdog.”219 The judge,
while noting SW had indeed donated nearly $750,000 to charity in the preceding
three years, noted further in sentencing SW to the maximum term in prison that
SW’s contributions totaled less than one-half of one percent of his income over
the period of $132 million and that much of his ill-gotten gains had been
expropriated from underdog investors.220 Certainly, the argument could be
made that SW had labored hard over the decades to help humanity, yet a former
ImClone senior manager dispenses with this, stating SW was motivated solely
by greed devoid of any empathic impulse for the victims of the cancer he
pretended to care about curing: “I don’t think Sam gave a hoot what the
company did. He didn’t give a hoot about making ‘great scientific advances,’ or
‘saving people’s lives.’ . . . You know what Sam’s goal was? To build a
company, with himself as CEO, and get rich. Period.”221
Thus, SW scores high on all nine sub-constructs of hostility and is thus
scored as a hostile decision-maker.
d. Adventurism
SW was an “ideas man,” and a quick, rather than deep, thinker. His
impulsivity would lead him to “make messes” that his dutiful younger brother
would clean up.222 He was a “notorious spendthrift” and “always in financial
trouble,”223 and his impulsivity and indiscipline invited financial pain:
Sam would show up for class late and there’d be no parking places left, so he’d
just leave his car sitting in the middle of the street; he accumulated so many
tickets he set a new OSU record and the police hauled him in. But[,] “his father
always bailed him out,” said [his roommate]. He never worked. Never had
discipline. It’s really ironic—his parents tried to give him this great life, and

218
219
220
221
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Id. at 352.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 26.
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they unwittingly created a monster.224

SW was wildly optimistic. Although his grades were far below Ivy
League expectations, his college roommate recalls, “He applied to only one
medical school—Harvard. I warned him he didn’t have the grades, and he ought
to look around more. But[,] I think he’d convinced himself he’d get in.”225 Not
only was SW not accepted by Harvard Medical School, but also, in his
subsequent academic career, he established a pattern of promising paradigmrattling results only to fail—often dramatically—to deliver. SW continued,
despite contrary evidence, to believe he could impose his will upon the world.226
To make matters worse, SW was a risk-taker: he had a string of
extramarital liaisons with lab technicians; he raced motorcycles; he falsified
data; and he started a private biotech firm despite the great probability of
failure. 227 The only path to reward was through risk, and because SW sought
the greatest possible rewards he took the greatest risks. Nonetheless, risk was
something that did not stress SW or cause him anxiety: he, after all, was SW,
and the normal rules—and normal probabilities—did not apply.228
In sum, SW is a risk-tolerant, impulsive, optimistic decision-maker who
believed, despite risky and impulsive decisions, he would achieve the wealth
and fame he coveted. He is high on five of seven sub-constructs of adventurism
and is scored an adventurist.
e. Summary of IVs: Sam Waksal
Sam Waksal is a militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic
decision-maker.
ii. DVs: CLC and ImClone
In the late 1990s, ImClone, having failed to make good on SW’s
outlandish promises, was in financial and reputational decline, yet SW continued
to travel first-class, use limousines, and frequent the best hotels and restaurants.
229 Favored ImClone employees enjoyed open bars and restaurants at firm
expense, but employees who did not enjoy a close relationship with the CEO

224
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Id. at 35.
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were bullied, and sexism and xenophobia were a distinct part of firm culture.230
Somehow, ImClone not only survived but by mid-2001 had become the
“undisputed star of biotech,” armed with a license to produce and market “the
[biological] equivalent of ‘smart bombs’” against cancer.231 Erbitux was
expected to be worth $1 billion in annual profit if one could believe SW, who
promised investors that the cancer drug was a “miracle compound” that would
“save the lives of thousands of dying cancer patients, . . . change the very nature
of science[,]. . .[and] bring [] not only gold but glory[!]”232 All that remained
was to acquire the approval of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and
SW promised investors that the FDA had placed Erbitux on the “fast-track” to
approval.233
However, SW’s claims about the efficacy of Erbitux and its regulatory
status were wildly exaggerated. The precursor drug, C225, had been successful
in only 20% of test cancer patients, and major pharmaceutical firms were leery
of SW’s claims.234 According to a former ImClone employee:
It was all lies . . . I felt something important had been betrayed. . . . I asked
myself: What am I doing here? . . . Some people at ImClone thought I was crazy
to feel that way. They’d say, “What’s the big deal that the science wasn’t
right?”. . . The science didn’t matter there. What mattered was how fast Sam . .
. could make a buck.235

When ImClone refused to make C225 available through a compassionateuse program—a humanitarian method of helping suffering patients while
generating additional data that requires only a brief pro forma FDA examination
for approval—some observers took pause.236 Bristol Meyers Squibb (BMS),
however, banking on SW’s promises, negotiated a tender offer of $70 per share
that granted marketing rights to BMS and earned SW nearly $130 million.237
Although some BMS executives were concerned the valuable asset was actually
C225 and not ImClone, the BMS audit of ImClone’s data was executed with too
large a measure of faith in SW.238
230
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Immediately after the BMS-ImClone deal to market the C225 derivative
drug known as Erbitux, ImClone made risk-free “sweetheart loans” to SW to
allow him to purchase additional shares of ImClone at market price for sale at
the tender price.239 Wall Street questioned the timing and propriety of the deal,
suggesting there was “something questionable about these guys cashing out
before we even know if this drug is going to get approved.”240 Wall Street jitters
caused BMS to look more closely at ImClone’s clinical data, and BMS
discovered fundamental flaws—including omitted negative data, fudged efficacy
statistics, and an inadequate sample size—that would, when discovered by the
FDA, make approval for general use highly unlikely.241 ImClone and SW began
losing credibility, and the FDA asked ImClone’s regulatory affairs executives to
withdraw the application or amend its data.242
Yet, SW chose to believe the FDA would approve Erbitux because “[t]he
alternative was unimaginable.”243 Predictably, the FDA issued a Refusal to File
letter—a statement received in response to only 4% of applications, generally
those that are “‘scientifically incomplete’ and ‘filled with deficiencies’”—on
December 27, 2001.244 When news of the “RTF” letter leaked, SW lashed out at
the FDA and attempted to convince investors that data problems would be easily
remedied, but investors concluded ImClone was systemically flawed, SW had
intentionally misled them into believing Erbitux had been “green-lighted,” and
nothing now would prevent its disapproval by the FDA.245 What investors did
not know was that on December 26, 2001, anticipating the RTF letter and owing
$65 million on margin secured by ImClone stock, SW sold his ImClone shares
and advised family and friends246 to do the same before news became public.247
Although SW knew the SEC monitors insider stock trades:
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[H]e didn’t stop to think about what he was doing; he was just acting. For years
he had shuffled money offshore, or through an account he had secretly
established in [his daughter’s] name—he’d forged her signature—and he figured
it would all work out in the wash. He was doing good for humanity; his drug
was about to change cancer medicine. So what if he cut a few corners?248

In short order, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce issued a
letter that indicated an investigation of ImClone and SW over issues arising
from clinical trials of Erbitux had begun on January 18, 2002.249 On January 24,
2002, the SEC launched its own investigation “to determine whether there ha[d]
been any violations of the federal security laws,” and the next day the Justice
Department announced an investigation to determine whether ImClone misled
investors.250 The subcommittee subpoenaed SW, who during the course of the
investigation asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
offered only the following through counsel: “Dr. Waksal firmly believes that
any allegations against him are unfounded and that he did nothing improper.”251
Although it is doubtful that had SW been a more generous contributor to
politicians he might have avoided congressional ire, SW gave a total of only
$160,000 over the years in political contributions and, thus, had few, if any,
powerful friends in Congress.252 Representative Billy Tauzin (D-LA) was
clearly not one, and he offered a much more critical version of the events
surrounding Erbitux:
It appears . . . that ImClone[,] . . . excited by preliminary response rates in very
sick colon cancer patients, . . . tried to take a mediocre clinical trial and gussy it
up . . . But[,] when it came to crunch time to get FDA approval, the failure of
ImClone’s key executives to ensure the quality of its clinical trials collided with
the hype. And, all the while, ImClone’s insiders were lining their own pockets
with millions, as ImClone’s publicly traded stock soared on false, public
promises!253

Various investigations revealed SW had illegally failed to report fifty
trades of ImClone from 1992–2002, destroyed documents, and made false
statements to Congress.254 He was forced out as CEO in May 2002, and in June
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was arrested by the FBI on a charge of insider trading.255 In August 2002, SW
was indicted for destruction of evidence, perjury, obstruction of justice, bank
fraud, filing a false SEC report, and financial fraud;256 he pled guilty to six of
thirteen charges in October 2002 and was incarcerated.257 He has apologized,
accepted blame, and expressed remorse for betraying investors.258 ImClone
remains in operation, and the FDA has approved Erbitux for treating head and
neck cancer.259
4. AIG
a. CEO Hank Greenberg
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
At seventeen, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg (HG) lied about his age to join
the U.S. Army, and on D-Day, June 6, 1944, he landed with his Ranger battalion
on Omaha Beach.260 The next spring, his unit battled the Nazis to liberate the
Dachau extermination camp.261 HG is “notoriously impatient and shorttempered” and aggressive,262 and at the American International Group (AIG),
the insurance firm he served as CEO for thirty-seven years, a “cult of
Greenberg” arose from his “force of personality” and “fierce determination to
get his way.”263 HG is a demanding and explosive man, and an “archetypal
autocrat, one who knew every detail of [AIG’s] operations and, incredible as it
seems, persisted in trying to micromanage the business even as it grew to nearly
$100 billion in annual revenues.”264 As CEO of AIG, HG was a driven man,
determined to defeat competitors and lead AIG to preeminence in the global
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insurance industry. When presented with obstacles by foreign governments, he
drew upon extensive connections in Washington to “threaten trade sanctions, cut
off aid, and take whatever other dire actions it could find.”265
HG had great self-confidence as AIG CEO but has a “chip on his
shoulder” and has low self-esteem consequent to not having been accepted by
“the WASP establishment” or “upper-class Jewish circles.”266 He is neither an
introvert nor isolationist, and, although his leadership of AIG was oriented
solely towards profitability, no evidence suggests dogmatism. However, HG is
a nationalistic, competitive, ambitious, aggressive, authoritarian figure with a
favorable attitude toward power, and scores high on seven of ten sub-constructs
of militarism. Thus, HG is scored as a militarist.
b. Anomism
After World War II, HG earned a law degree and served in Korea as a
JAG prosecutor and defense counsel and, in the course of his training and
practice, was exposed broadly to an array of legal regimes, including corporate
law.267 Despite his significant legal training, however, HG, perhaps as a
consequence of AIG’s “intense political involvement, and of having to live in a
world defined by myriad rules,”268 developed cynicism with regard to law.
According to a biographer:
AIG shaped the rules to its interests; when not, it bent them to its purposes . . . In
many cases, it operated as close to the edge as it had [] to achieve its business
goals . . . [HG] may have pushed the envelope on finite insurance contracts or
stretched accounting principles to report the earnings he wanted. If someone did
object, the company could defend, rationalize, or explain away just about any
action. Greenberg would make his stock reply to just about every criticism
(“You just don’t understand insurance”), and then the lawyers and lobbyists
would make the problem go away.269

Indeed, over the years, HG taught his executives to “approach government
and regulatory problems in the same aggressive way they attack business issues
in general,”—to “persuade, cajole, or . . . intimidate officials at all levels
anywhere in the world.”270
Still, although he did not adhere as scrupulously to the letter of the law as
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regulators believed necessary, it is perhaps easier to cast HG as a director of
creative, albeit self-interested, legal interpretation than it is to brand him a
scofflaw disrespectful of law and legal authorities. That this is so is particularly
apparent when one compares HG’s stewardship to that of other CEOs:
[HG’s] actions were nothing like those of the other boardroom bad guys,
who tried to fool investors by grossly distorting their numbers. Instead, if
Greenberg did anything, he was simply injecting a little Botox into the balance
sheet and fine-tuning the earnings reports to maintain the kind of image he found
so supremely important. Not so long ago, that kind of earnings “management”
rarely brought more than a modest reprimand. The rules changed after Enron, of
course, but Hank must have assumed that the changes, like so many other
regulatory annoyances, weren’t really relevant, or[,] if they did apply to him, he
could bluff his way through them as he had so often in the past.271

Thus, while it may be fair to conclude HG scores high on amoralism, and
perhaps on disregard for legal authorities, it is less clear that he should be
regarded as disrespectful of law, and HG is a trained lawyer. HG thus scores
high on two of five sub-constructs of anomism and is scored as a non-anomist.
c. Hostility
HG was a celebrity CEO at a firm where the standing joke was that “AIG”
is an acronym for “All Is Greenberg.”272 He is a selfish master manipulator with
a “Jekyll and Hyde” personality273 and has a misanthrope’s touch for making
others feel ill at ease.
[W]hen you are with Hank, you are on edge. Even in a room full of
people where you are across the room talking to others, you can never quite
forget he is there. The force of his personality and the fear people have of him is
always present. . . . While it is mainly employees who are scared or at least
tense, it can also be directors, clients, officials[,] or casual acquaintances. . . .
Whether he could change his personality enough to put others more at ease, I do
not know. Whether he would want to, well, that I doubt.274

Under HG, executives joked that, while they liked to hold AIG stock, they
would never own a policy. AIG’s underwriting philosophy was, very simply, to
charge high premiums and pay as few claims as possible—a theory and practice
very profitable to shareholders but unfavorable to customers.275 Other
271
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stakeholders were subordinated to shareholders as well. Employees were afraid
of HG and his appalling temper, and few felt empowered to venture their own
opinions;276 furthermore, while AIG had a long history of hiring, training, and
promoting local nationals to managerial positions, “[t]here is simply not a
history of significant black participation in the company. A retired senior
personnel executive told me that in his experience insurance had never been one
of the industries where African-Americans saw opportunities. And[,] clearly in
AIG there was not an aggressive policy of recruiting them.”277
Only after HG resigned did AIG seriously begin to promote diversity in
hiring to U.S.-based positions. Although it is difficult on the basis of available
information to conclude HG is generally distrustful or ethnocentric—particularly
in light of his deep passion for China and its people and his friendships across
the globe278—there is reason to believe he lacks the capacity or the desire to
express an empathic understanding of and appreciation for other people. In sum,
HG scores high on seven of nine sub-constructs of hostility and, thus, is scored
as a hostile decision-maker.
d. Adventurism
Insurance is the applied study and management of risk, and the ultimate
financial risks—loan defaults and policy claims—cannot be perfectly predicted.
HG gets bored easily and likes to take risks, believing—usually quite
correctly—he can beat the odds.279 He calmly seeks and achieves unfair
advantage by rationally evaluating risk, and, although he has a temper, it is one
he controls and manipulates to suit his purposes.280 He manages stress well and
is described by many as unflappable.
HG scores high on only three of seven sub-constructs of adventurism—
risk tolerance, internal locus of control, and maleness—and, thus, is scored as a
non-adventuristic decision-maker.
e. Summary of IVs: Hank Greenberg
HG is a militaristic, non-anomistic, hostile, and non-adventuristic
decision-maker.
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ii. DVs: CLC and AIG
Under HG’s leadership, AIG grew to become the fourth largest firm on the
Forbes 500 list and the largest insurer in the world.281 In his thirty-seven years
as CEO of a global business, HG developed a “highly evolved culture of . . .
exploitation” that rested on cultivating relationships with political leaders and
regulators and, ostensibly, leveraging those relationships to gain favors for
AIG.282 While the ultimate leverage might well have been bribery, and,
although U.S. firms operating overseas “have no choice but to adapt to the
customs of the countries where they operate,”283 no allegation of political
corruption has been made against AIG. Rather, AIG was successful under HG .
. . because it “reward[ed] success, reward[ed] profit, ignore[d] background,
creed, nationality, and put[] up with a lot of individual idiosyncrasies as long as
[the performers] produce[d].”284 Although AIG rewarded performers with
salary and perquisites,285 these were limited by HG’s frugality. HG lives
modestly, although he enjoys a daily massage and comfortable travel
arrangements,286 and one of the greatest employee incentives might have been
the loyalty HG exercised in the company’s time of need: in the event of
employee abduction or arrest, “[n]o stone was left unturned, and money was
never an object” in securing their release and safe return.287 Although profits
were his lodestar, for HG the security and safety of his employees, if not their
enrichment, was his “first priority.”288
However, despite all its political capital and its concern for its employees,
cracks in the AIG armor began to appear in 2003, when AIG was forced to pay
$10 million as sanction for refusing to cooperate, under subpoena, with
authorities investigating accounting fraud involving illegal exchanges of cash
with Brightpoint, a cellphone manufacturer.289 In 2004, New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer brought bid rigging charges against AIG and a number of
executives, accusing the firm of issuing artificially high bids on one piece of
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business to cause its award to another insurer only to have the other insurer
reciprocate the benefit on future business.290 Four AIG executives pled guilty,
and, although no evidence implicated him, HG found a prime place on Spitzer’s
investigative agenda.291 The year 2004 brought more bad news when it was
revealed AIG had been forming SPEs to absorb $762 million in non-performing
assets and create a healthier balance sheet than the firm had earned.292 At the
eleventh hour, during the summer of 2004, HG rejected an agreement with the
Justice Department and SEC that would have settled the case and issued press
releases decrying these agencies’ investigations as unethical.293 However, when,
in October of 2004, the board of directors learned HG’s gambit had failed to
dissuade federal investigators and had instead increased the price of the
settlement from $20 million to $126 million, it called for his resignation, which
he tendered in 2005.294
In February 2005, AIG received subpoenas in an SEC accounting fraud
investigation, and two AIG executives negotiated guilty pleas.295 In March,
Spitzer subpoenaed AIG documents involving manipulation of financial
transactions to falsely add $500 million to AIG’s reserves while using Caribbean
subsidiaries as SPEs to keep debt off AIG’s balance sheet and understate the
leverage of its operations as well as the magnitude of the risks it had insured.296
When Spitzer discovered AIG executives were planning to move documents out
of U.S. jurisdiction, he threatened obstruction of justice charges.297 AIG fired
executives who planned to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination before the SEC, an invocation HG made on April 12.298 AIG
announced accounting errors stretching back fourteen years, and, on May 2, it
restated earnings for the 2000–2004 period.299 In May 2005, Spitzer, alleging
AIG executives had routinely engaged in financial and securities fraud from the
mid-1980s on,300 substituted civil for criminal charges against AIG and top
executives, including HG. More than $2.7 billion in income was removed from
290
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AIG’s books after improper accounting entries were reversed.301
HG denied the merits of all civil charges against him,302 although, in 2008,
he settled shareholder claims for $115 million,303 and, in 2009, he accepted a
$15 million fine in exchange for dismissal of SEC litigation.304 Although he
remains free, his reputation has been damaged, and “few executives have fallen
so far so fast.”305 AIG has fared even worse, although arguably because the firm
took risks against which HG repeatedly issued warnings.306
5. HealthSouth
a. CEO Richard Scrushy
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
Richard Scrushy (RS) is a self-described “good old boy” from Alabama
who began adulthood as a high-school dropout bricklayer living in a trailer with
his pregnant girlfriend.307 He was a loner who had few friends and participated
in few school activities, but, motivated by the addition to his family and the
desire for a better life, RS returned to school to earn a certificate in respiratory
therapy. Friends and co-workers describe him as a man with an abundance of
energy and “chutzpah,” and when new federal legislation passed in 1983,
changing the system of Medicare and Medicaid billing and resulting in greatly
reduced profits to hospitals, RS formed a company, which became HealthSouth
301
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(HS).308 By 2001, HS was the largest national operator of rehabilitation
facilities and outpatient surgery centers, treating 100,000 patients per day and
producing annual revenue of $4.3 billion.309
As CEO, RS’s monumental ambitions were set toward creating the
“biggest provider of surgery in the world,”310 and, to accomplish this, a good old
boy from Alabama morphed into an autocrat. HS surgeons were told that to
make the business “lean,” all their purchasing and recordkeeping would be
performed by headquarters, and HS would require conformity in all surgical
supplies, even if this meant surgeons would use unfamiliar equipment—a
condition that enhances risk to patients.311
RS was a “consummate
micromanager” who ruled lower-status employees with an equally iron-first: his
rules dictated everything from artwork—approved company posters and a
portrait of Richard Scrushy in every waiting room—to mandating that CocaCola be the only beverage allowed in the facility—and requiring all financial
records to be relocated from facilities to firm headquarters.312
Although he made passing attempts to elicit feedback from employees and
involve them in decision-making,313 RS’s micromanagement took bizarre twists
reminiscent of Captain Queeg:314
While he was lying in bed one night, [RS] decided that he must come up with a
plan to ensure that all HS facilities were pristine. He put together a [fifty]-point
checklist ([twenty-five] points on each page so that it would be easy to read) and
called in his top people. “We’re going to design [fifty] points,” [RS] told them.
“And[,] it’s going to start with picking up trash in the parking lot.” . . . [RS]
called it a “pristine audit” and hired an outside firm, Ernst and Young, to make
unannounced visits to evaluate facilities from the patient’s perspective . . . The
auditors measured everything, from the cleanliness of and neatness of the
parking lots, restrooms, carpets, walls, and equipment to the attitudes of the
receptionists and the taste of the food. If the auditors found anything amiss, they
reported to HS, and the company required that the facility immediately correct
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the problem.315

Apologists for RS suggested HS was fortunate to have a “person driving
this company who, to this day, outworks people with his intensity and
schedule,” and RS reassured shareholders by telling them HS was not merely
interested in becoming profitable or simply “America’s best-performing
healthcare company,” but rather “the nation’s best-performing company of any
kind. Period.”316
Nothing in the literature describes RS as a nationalist, and he is neither
aggressive nor beset with low self-esteem nor an isolationist, but he is plainly a
natural introvert who sees the world in black and white and an authoritarian who
relishes bending employees and rivals to his whims. As such, RS scores high on
six of ten sub-constructs of militarism and is thus scored a militarist.
b. Anomism
RS is a relatively uneducated man; he lacks formal legal training, even if
he clearly knew he was engaged in illegal conduct: at his trial on financial and
securities charges, the Justice Department alleged that RS told other coconspirators, “Ever get caught, you’re on your own.”317 The data suggest RS is
an amoral person motivated by money and power and not by superordinate
norms or principles. In response to employee concerns that a business strategy
RS had proposed—adjusting HS’s financial statements in light of earnings
shortfalls—would not pass legal muster, RS “simply said, ‘Fix it.’”318
When dealing with legal authorities, his response was identical. To build
a private rehabilitation facility in New Mexico required the approval of a state
board, and, when a board member asked RS whether HS had ever built such a
facility before, RS, who had only recently applied for a certificate of need to
convert a nursing home into a rehabilitation hospital, stated, “Sort of. We’ve got
one in South Carolina.”319 RS’s falsehood did not escape the attention of the
board member, who announced the HS gambit was “the biggest smoke-andmirror presentation I’ve ever heard, but you know what? I’m going to vote for
these guys because I like them.”320 In another instance, RS spent political
capital to allow HS to bypass state certificate-of-need laws and begin uncertified
operations. In sum, RS lies without qualms to regulatory authorities, even if he
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does so charmingly.
RS is an amoral decision-maker with no legal training who evinces
disregard for law and for legal authorities. He scores high on all five subconstructs and is thus scored an anomist.
c. Hostility
Although RS had a close relationship with the Birmingham AfricanAmerican community,321 and while he claimed to read every patient’s letter
personally to provide the best possible service,322 in reality RS viewed HS
customers and employees as “little people.”323 Willingness to create public
perceptions deeply at odds with reality typifies RS, and this cynical approach to
people and business did not escape all observers: Aaron Beam, an early recruit
by RS to his management team, reported that after his interview with RS “[he]
went home and told [his] wife that [he] just interviewed with the biggest con
artist [he had] ever met or the most brilliant young man [he had] ever met.”324
RS is clearly a narcissist who wildly pontificated to investors HS would
“get to where Coke [was] quicker than they did,” and claimed to have “visions”
at night when he would “close [his] eyes, and . . . see more HS facilities than
[he] could count, with people and patients walking in and out and being treated .
. . a sort of . . . spiritual thing.”325 Fortune magazine recognized at least a part of
his grandiosity, dubbing RS “The Insatiable King Richard” for his opulence and
his “seemingly paranoid behavior that would alternately alarm and annoy many
who worked at headquarters.”326 By the 1990s, RS traveled in a chauffeured
armored BMW complete with bodyguards and began building “vacation
mansions” in Florida and Alabama.327 Employees began to suspect—
correctly—RS had bugged their phone lines to ensure nothing was being said
against their “King.”328
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Id. at 206.
RODENGEN, supra note 313, at 41.
CAST, supra note 309, at 44.
RODENGEN, supra note 313, at 22.
CAST, supra note 309, at 55, 89.
Id. at 14, 24.
Id. at 29.
Section 37 of the 2003 federal indictment against RS charged as follows:
Richard Scrushy would and did seek to control his co-conspirators,
HealthSouth employees and Board of Directors by (a) threats, (b)
intimidation, and (c) taking various steps to monitor the activity of said
persons, including obtaining and reading their emails, placing them under
surveillance, and installing equipment that permitted him to eavesdrop on
electronic and telephonic communications.
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In fact, a sense HS’s financial house was not in order began to worry
investors in the early 1990s, when analysts suggested HS was too highly
leveraged as a result of its aggressive acquisitions policy.329 RS’s protestations
to the contrary, coupled with increasingly cozy relationships with political
cronies—board member Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio was chosen by
President Bill Clinton to serve as his congressional health care lobbyist, and RS
was part of House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s corporate kitchen cabinet, which
developed an alternative to the Clinton health plan330—assured investors for a
time. However, when HS shares fell on discovery of a train of illegalities, rather
than concede problems RS stated the shares were worth “north of $20” to assure
investors only to sell $70 million of his own shares to “diversify” before the
price dipped to $7.331
Although nothing suggests he is an ethnocentrist, and despite his
professions of concern for the wellbeing of people, RS is a deeply distrustful,
narcissistic, cynical, Machiavellian, and hostile misanthrope who lacks empathy
and is committed to personal aggrandizement. Thus, he scores high on eight of
nine sub-constructs of hostility and is scored a hostile decision-maker.
d. Adventurism
RS had enough business acumen to recognize opportunity in the
transformation of the federal Medicare reimbursement regime, and, as a risktaking entrepreneur, he capitalized upon an absence of outpatient rehabilitation
options.332 Still, RS is not highly risk tolerant: he thinks and studies before
acting333 and was as cautious in hiring as he was in acquiring new businesses.334

See United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2003 WL 22794503 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2003).
329
RODENGEN, supra note 313, at 56.
330
Id. at 65, 76. In the 2002 foreword to the book The Story of Health South, Senator Orrin
Hatch lauded RS as “way ahead of us on [the subject of rehabilitation for disabled people]” and
pronounced him “a man who truly cares about people . . . [who] has spent a lifetime trying to bring
better healthcare to this country.” Id. at vii. When Senator Hatch was reminded of his earlier
statement, he offered only this: “Yeah, there were some people at HealthSouth who did some rotten
things. I just don’t think he was one of them.” CAST, supra note 309, at 224.
331
CAST, supra note 309, at 224.
332
RODENGEN, supra note 313, at 19.
333
See id. at 41 (“I’ve seen some of the major mistakes CEOs have made in their business
strategies, the way they ran their operations, and the way they financed their companies. Some of
them did some dumb things . . . We didn’t make the mistakes others made.”) (quoting RS).
334
See id. (“If I can’t find the person I’m looking for, I won’t hire anybody. I just won’t do it.
I’ll wait as long as I have to.”) (quoting RS); id. at 40 (“I like what they do. They’ve learned not to
grow too fast. They do a little bit at a time. They’re not free spenders and they’ve probably had a
lot of proposals [for more expansions] that they’ve turned down. I like to see people working with
strict parameters like that.”) (quoting an industry analyst).
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Although he might be considered high in optimism, he must also then be
adjudged low in stress and high in internal locus of control, for, in his words, “I
always knew it would work . . . Some people thought I was crazy, but some in
the business knew I wasn’t.”335 In summary, RS is a deliberate, if optimistic,
decision-maker with an internal locus of control who is neither particularly
anxious nor stressed during decision-making. Moreover, his does not have a
particularly high-risk propensity. He thus scores as high on only three of seven
sub-constructs of adventurism and is thus scored as a non-adventurist.
e. Summary of IVs: Richard Scrushy
Richard Scrushy is a militarist and anomist who is hostile but not
adventuristic.
ii. DVs: CLC and HealthSouth
The first handwriting on the proverbial wall suggesting RS and HS were
manipulating financial data was scrawled in 1998, one year after RS collected
$111 million in salary, when HS first restated earnings.336 Articles critical of HS
and RS appeared, and, in 2001, RS found his firm paying a large sum to settle a
civil suit brought by the Justice Department alleging violation of Medicare
regulations governing patient billing for physical therapy services.337
Undaunted, RS accepted a $6.5 million bonus in 2002 and exercised stock
options worth $56 million even as earnings per share dropped 28%.338
However, the undoing of RS came in 2003, when the SEC began
investigating whether HS had illegally delayed disclosing to the public the
negative financial effects of new Medicaid and Medicare billing regulations on
its financial statements.339 A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raid on
corporate headquarters led to formal charges on March 19, alleging HS had
artificially inflated $2.7 billion in profits over a five-year period through
fraudulent accounting.340 Ten top HS officers, caught internally referencing
fraudulent accounting and financial manipulations as “pixie dust” and filling
“the hole,” pled guilty to fraud, and HS stock was delisted and devalued.341
335
336
337

Id. at 51.
CAST, supra note 309, at 41, 45.
See id. at 85 (reporting RS authorized HealthSouth to pay $325 million in fines to settle the

suit).
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Id. at 92.
The new regulations triggered an earnings shortfall of more than $175 million. Id. at 110.
Id. at 24.
Id. at vi, 71, 171. Only one HS executive received prison time—a total of five months. Id. at
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Nevertheless, RS became the first corporate executive to be tried under SOX.342
RS, denying any legal knowledge of changes to Medicare regulations and
disputing that he or other executives had committed any illegal acts, pled not
guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud, money
laundering, aiding and abetting, false SOX certification, and false statements to
the SEC.343
In other words, RS rested his fate on the “blame the other guy” defense: he
had not ordered anything illegal and did not have actual knowledge that others
had done anything illegal, and, thus, although he was CEO, he did not bear legal
responsibility for the actions of others. RS leveled blame for the fall of HS at
the feet of auditors, his own CFO, and the corporate compliance committee, and,
in a surprise verdict, was acquitted in June 2005, when jurors determined there
was a “lack of substantial evidence and witness credibility,” as well as
insufficient criminal intent, to convict.344 RS, fired from HS, remains a party in
civil litigation brought by shareholders and regulatory agencies.345 HS remains
in operation under a new executive team.
6. Sunbeam
a. CEO Albert Dunlap
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
Albert Dunlap (AD), former CEO of Sunbeam, was a quiet, lonely child
who grew up poor in Hoboken, New Jersey.346 He had few friends and spent his
time playing alone in his room.347 For AD, his self-described unhappy
childhood could only be overcome by “brute struggle of which he was uniquely
capable,” and this lesson left AD—“Chainsaw Al”—an angry man, “defiant and
raging at all that came his way.”348 Anger became entrenched as AD’s dominant
emotion and aggression his default trait at an early age. As a business

171.
342

Id. at vi.
Carrick Mollenkamp, Scrushy Indicted on Fraud Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2003, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB106795409556152100.
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Id. at 188–89, 219.
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For the most updated information about the litigation, see http://www.richardmscrushy.com.
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Byron, supra note 81, at 20.
347
Id.
348
Id. at 18.
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acquaintance recalls, “[h]e was the most unpleasant, personally repulsive
businessman I ever met in my life. Every conversation began in a normal tone
of voice and ended with the man yelling, red-faced and furious, at whoever was
standing in front of him. It was unbelievable.”349
At West Point and in his brief Army career, AD maintained his rage and a
record of academic underachievement,350 and he carried both forward into a first
marriage that ended in divorce from Gwyn Dunlap on grounds of extreme
cruelty.351 During the brief relationship, he would “erupt in tantrums and storm
about the apartment inspecting the furniture for fingerprints,” and even during
periods of “normalcy” AD related to his family more as commander than as
husband and father.352 The worst is revealed in the petition for divorce, which
AD did not contest. That document notes AD denied Gwyn food and maternity
clothes, brandished a Bowie knife at her while expressing his interest in
discovering the taste of human flesh, threatened her with guns, and expressed his
hope that she would die so he might collect her insurance death benefit.353
AD’s aggressive authoritarianism and his delight in the abuse of power
found expression in the workplace as well. His shift superintendent “enjoyed
snarling at his subordinates,” a behavior AD found endearing and deemed
worthy of emulation.354 Throughout his career, AD inspired fear and loathing in
his subordinates355 and strong dislike in his colleagues, and few doubted he
would abstain from any action necessary to achieve his ambitions. AD has
underdeveloped personal affiliations, generally and within his immediate family.
He liked to insult his wife’s parents and thought it fun to give the middle finger
to her mother at church services.356 When his parents died, he chose not to
attend their funerals, and in his autobiography neither merits more than a few
lines.357 It would be a stretch to conclude from the available information that
AD had any genuine friends.
AD scores high on all ten sub-constructs of militarism and, thus, is scored
as a militarist.
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See id at 23 (reporting AD graduated near the bottom of his class at West Point).
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b. Anomism
AD is a breaker of rules, norms, and principles par excellence. Even
though his wealth and status gained him membership to prestigious clubs, no
one would play tennis with him because he “cheated so outrageously—and got
so abusive of opponents who questioned him.”358 Upholding even the most
trivial and symbolic of social norms, such as keeping Christmas gifts secret until
Christmas, were too much to expect of AD, as his wife discovered when she
returned early from a trip to find him carefully rewrapping presents he had
unwrapped earlier.359 More strenuous legal obligations stood no chance: no
sooner did AD join the Nitec Paper Corporation than he established secret
offshore accounts in Switzerland and Bermuda to bank profits from illegal
transactions, labeling them as “consulting fees.”360 Similarly, from the moment
he joined Sunbeam, he treated his position of trust as an opportunity to violate
almost the entire canon of corporate law governing finance and securities to raid
the wealth of its investors. In short, AD is the archetypal anomist—disrespectful
of law and legal authorities, formally untrained in law, and devoid of moral
strictures.
c. Hostility
Even in his youth, AD was a “hostile and arrogant” jock with an “ego the
size of the United States,” and, as he entered adulthood, AD remained
“oblivious to how he was viewed by those all around him.”361 Those who knew
him in business, such as a supplier for Nitec, describe the selfish man even more
colorfully in terms that suggest narcissistic personality disorder: “Frankly, he
was a world-class asshole. He’d stiff you for months on bills then get abusive
the second you asked for payment. He was just the worst. There must have
been something wrong with him.”362
To AD, people were tools to suit his purposes. He married his second
wife only when told by his boss that he would go farther in business if he did so,
and even then AD pressured her to marry before December 31 to reap a tax
deduction; having accomplished his objectives, AS divorced her in less than a
year.363 His dislike for fellow men was general and transparent: he was an equal
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Id. at 76.
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See Dunlap v. Nitec Paper Corp. et al., 77 Civ. 3056 (S.D.N.Y 1977).
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opportunity misanthrope, using and abusing people without regard to race,
religion, ethnicity, or culture.364 Throughout his business career, AD managed
to inspire the loathing of virtually all his subordinates, and, when Nitec’s VPs,
desperate to rid themselves of him, threatened mass resignation if he were not
fired, AD saw opportunity.365 Aware of his supervisor’s implication in illegal
banking activities and other corporate fraud, AD leveraged that information to
negotiate an overly generous severance package.366 When Nitec internal
auditors soon discovered “massive falsifications and fraudulent accounting
entries on the company’s books” the board refused to issue the severance check,
and AD’s suit for breach of contract settled years later for $50,000.367
AD is disinterested in and hostile to others. When he became CEO at
Scott Paper and fired half the employees, an interviewer inquired as to whether
it gave him pause to do what she believed was a distasteful task. AD brushed
aside the suggestion. Pointing to the rising price of Scott’s stock, he declared, “I
created $6.5 billion of value. And[,] for that I received less than 2[%].”368
Then, basking in his newly found fame as the CEO of the moment, he added,
“There are only a handful of superstar executives. You’ve got to compare them
with the other superstars. You can’t compare them with the worker on the
floor.”369
Naturally, CEO AD included himself in this elite group who need not
concern themselves with lesser men. AD thus scores high on all nine subconstructs and is scored a hostile decision-maker.
d. Adventurism
AD has a penchant for diving into things before testing the waters and
brought this impulsivity to bear on the turnaround of ailing companies, itself a
risky enterprise. Rather than analyze, evaluate, decide, plan, and execute, AD
simply cut lines of business, fired employees, reduced capacity, and shrunk
costs, earning the epithet, “Chainsaw Al.” He is “quick, glib, and boast[s] the
attention span of a gnat,” and risk seemed not to register with him.370 His
cocksure certainty that all he touches will turn to gold belies an optimism and an
internal locus of control not always supported by reason and economic reality.
364
See id. at 275 (suggesting AD was no ethnocentrist, even if he “shunned the language of
political correctness,” because he simply hated everyone equally).
365
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366
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His personal demeanor suggests stress and anxiety are frequent, if not constant,
companions that goad him to rage when criticized or otherwise challenged.371
AD thus scores high on all five sub-constructs of adventurism and is scored an
adventuristic decision-maker.
e. Summary of IVs: Albert Dunlap
Albert Dunlap is a militaristic anomist who is hostile and adventuristic.
ii. DVs: CLC and Sunbeam
When AD was hired as CEO of Sunbeam in 1996, the share price had
fallen from $20 to $12, and, in hopes of a quick turnaround, the board offered
him the overly generous compensation package of $1 million in salary, 50,000
shares of stock, 750,000 in-the-money options, and perquisites that included a
full-time bodyguard and chauffeur.372 Predictably, “Chainsaw Al” fired half the
employees, closed two-thirds of the warehouses, eliminated most of the
factories, and scrapped 87% of the product line.373 In response, Sunbeam’s
share price rose to $30 by April 1997.374
However, “an increasingly fishy smell had begun to emanate from
Sunbeam’s financial reports,” suggesting the turnaround had come at the price
of a conspiracy to defraud shareholders.375 Although profits were growing
dramatically, little cash worked its way to the financial statements because
Sunbeam had forced distributors to accept deliveries of goods, even when
previously shipped goods had not sold, and then recording unsold shipments as
revenue—an illegal practice known as “channel stuffing.”376 Thus, although
recorded revenue was robust, actual revenue was nil, and accounts receivable
were growing at a rate of 500%.377 Sunbeam “appeared to be experiencing a
dramatic surge in profitability, but it was actually going broke.”378
In1998, Sunbeam’s purchase of a competitor, Coleman, earned AD a
revised contract of $2 million annual salary, $15 million in Sunbeam stock, and
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$44 million in options.379 Within days of the merger, however, AD’s ruse
collapsed. Sunbeam issued a press statement describing “changes in inventory
management” to remedy its failure to meet first-quarter earnings expectations
and announcing an e-statement of past earnings,380 and investors began dumping
shares. Shareholders filed lawsuits, alleging fraudulent accounting of earnings
and artificial inflation of the stock price, which sent the share price into a
downward spiral.381 The SEC initiated civil proceedings against Sunbeam and
AD, alleging he “was the guiding presence at Sunbeam”382 when the firm
committed fraud to exaggerate its earnings from 1996 to 1998 and he created
“[a] false picture of a rapid turnaround in Sunbeam’s financial performance.”383
AD tried unsuccessfully to explain to analysts the stock would rebound, and,
when asked by a PaineWebber analyst if he would return his bonus, grew
furious and threatened to “come after” the questioner.384 Following an
emergency meeting of the board of directors, in which AD alleged a shareholder
conspiracy to drive down the price of Sunbeam to take over the company, the
board fired AD on June 15, 1998, and surrendered control to AD rival and major
Sunbeam investor, Ron Perelman, to avoid civil suit.385 In 2001, its equity gone,
Sunbeam declared bankruptcy.386
The firm emerged in 2002 and now operates privately under the name
American Household.387 AD agreed to pay $15 million to settle shareholder
suits and an additional $500,000 to settle SEC litigation.388 No settlement
required AD to admit any wrongdoing, although he agreed to be barred from
working as an executive at a public company.389
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7. Tyco
a. CEO Dennis Kozlowski
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
In his youth, Dennis Kozlowski (DK) was just another “face in the
crowd[,] an easygoing, average Joe—not much more than a kid with ho-hum
grades and a smile when he could make somebody laugh. . . . Many didn’t
remember him at all.”390 Despite his obscurity[,] he yearned for adulation,
which he gained to some extent by playing guitar in a band, the Hi-Tones, and
by playing football and basketball, the latter well enough to earn a scholarship to
Seton Hall.391
It is unclear how he spent his immediate post-undergraduate years—a
resume gap might suggest service with Air America flying helicopters in
Cambodia, although no official records exist.392 He began his Tyco career as an
assistant controller, moving up the ranks to become CEO in 1992.393 However,
attaining the top position at Tyco did not release DK from the insecurity of
childhood poverty in Newark, New Jersey. Perhaps there is some ground for it:
DK is described as “[c]rude, tasteless, and unencumbered by the graciousness
and sense of style that a more cultured upbringing might have provided.”394
Moreover, he is dull and uncharismatic, so much so that his large cash donations
to charities earned him nothing more than a string of polite “thank you”
letters.395
DK resolved not to let his humble upbringing impede his social climb,
and, where facts were in the way, he vaulted them, albeit clumsily. Tyco press
releases claimed he had earned an MBA when in fact he only took a few
evening courses,396 and, in describing his newly-found riches, DK referenced his
wine collection by the number of bottles, rather than the quality of their vintage.
Yet, even these measures could not make him popular or quench his desperate
“obsession” with becoming like General Electric CEO Jack Welch, whom he
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viewed as a “member of the Establishment” that had denied him admittance.397
His undoing resulted from increasingly conspicuous consumption that could no
longer be hidden from investors and regulators.
Nothing in the relatively sparse literature suggests DK was a nationalist or
held a favorable attitude toward power, and available sources do not make note
of unusual aggression or dogmatism. His leadership style was unremarkable.
He is a competitive striver who, despite social awkwardness, seeks out the
company and approval of others, and it is apparent he has low self-esteem.
Thus, DK scores high on only three sub-constructs of militarism—
competitiveness, ambitiousness, and low self-esteem.
b. Anomism
Although DK earned a BA in accounting and began his professional career
as an auditor, he has no formal legal training.398 He demonstrates no adherence
to a strong moral code either in his public or private life: while serving as Tyco
CEO, DK had affairs with a series of women—some subordinates—and
appeared with them publicly to humiliate his wife.399 Although his extravagant
abuse of authority for personal gain resulted in a long litany of criminal and civil
charges—evidencing a disregard for law—it is difficult, in light of his conduct
subsequent to arrest, to judge whether DK was similarly disdainful of legal
authorities. He may have simply been a very adult and very wealthy version of
the proverbial kid caught with his hand in a cookie jar. In sum, DK scores high
on all five sub-constructs of anomism save one—disrespect for legal
authorities—and is thus scored an anomist.
c. Hostility
In addition to infidelity,400 which suggests narcissism, a lack of empathy,
and Machiavellianism, DK found other forums to express the dark side of his
personality. After a promotion, he sponsored a dinner for Tyco executives to
announce the firing of the man he judged the worst warehouse manager that
year.401 If there is no evidence of misanthropy per se, DK absorbed
ethnocentrism when, as a boy, he and his anti-Semitic father frequented Polish
397
See id. at 27 (noting, upon DK’s arrest, “few business reporters had yet even heard of the
company he ran . . . and fewer still had heard of his name.”); id. at 309 (noting DK’s obsession with
Welch).
398
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399
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400
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American organizations where “griping among the men about how the blacks
were taking over Newark”402 dominated the discourse. Further, DK is numb to
the externalities of his personality; to wit, he often walked about Tyco
headquarters, eating pizza, oblivious to the fact “grease and cheese [were]
splattering onto the carpets as he passed.”403 Thus, DK scores high on six of
nine sub-constructs of hostility and is scored as a hostile decision-maker.
d. Adventurism
Tyco appointed DK for his reputation as a cost-cutter but underestimated
the degree of risk he would accept on behalf of the firm. He achieved early
successes not because of, but in spite of, himself. He did no research and simply
relied on intuition, wishful thinking, and an overinflated perception of his
judgment, leaping to conclude deals with little real forethought. DK saw few
deals he did not like, and his reaction time was so quick that normal oversight
procedures stood little chance. As a top advisor recalls,
There were times when deals were flowing through at a rate of two and even
three a week[,] and the board just wasn’t able to keep up. A lot of times they’d
have to vote on them before any due diligence was even done. Sometimes things
would get so frantic that there wouldn’t even be time for an actual meeting of the
board, and the vote would have to take place via conference calls.404

There is no evidence DK experienced anxiety; to the contrary, his
optimism and impulsivity were so great there was little time to be anxious. DK
thus is an adventurist who scores high on all sub-constructs of adventurism, save
anxiety.
e. Summary of IVs: Dennis Kozlowski
DK is a non-militaristic decision-maker who is anomistic, hostile, and
adventuristic.
ii. DVs: CLC and Tyco
Tyco is the leading manufacturer of electronic industrial components,
medical devices, and security systems.405 No later than 1995, DK began to raid
402
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Tyco to achieve an extravagant lifestyle that included the purchase of properties
in Florida, Massachusetts, and New York; the collection of art masterpieces,
jewels, and yachts; the throwing of lavish parties; and the donation of large sums
to charities.406 Much of the wealth extracted from Tyco came pre-approved by
the firm, albeit with the firm as co-conspirator: through the Key Employee Loan
Program (KELP), DK received a zero-interest real estate loan of $19 million,
which Tyco forgave the next year as a “special bonus” while paying him an
additional $13 million to pay real estate taxes—and neither the loan nor the cash
were disclosed, as required by law, as executive compensation.407 All told, DK
received at least $270 million such payments gratis through KELP, and total
equity looted by DK reached approximately $600 million by 2002.408
Ironically, what proved DK’s undoing was not his defrauding of Tyco
investors but his decision to use company headquarters to drop ship art
purchased with $13 million in Tyco funds for his Fifth Avenue apartment.
Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau opened a tax fraud
investigation, and, in 2002, DK was arrested and charged with evading $1
million in New York sales tax, securities fraud, and larceny.409 In turn, Tyco
filed a $600 million fraud suit against DK.410
At his criminal trial, DK conceded his compensation package was “almost
embarrassingly big” but denied having committed crimes.411 Nevertheless, DK
was convicted on all charges in 2005, including twenty-two counts of grand
larceny for accepting $150 million in unauthorized bonuses.412 He was released
from prison in January 2014.413 In the civil action, he was found liable and
ordered to reimburse $400 million to shareholders.414 Tyco remains in operation
under new management.
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www.foxnews.com/story/2005/06/17/kozlowski-swartz-found-guilty-in-tyco-retrial/.
412
Ex-Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski Found Guilty, NBCNEWS.COM (June 17, 2005 6:24 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8258729/ns/business-corporate_scandals/t/ex-tyco-ceo-denniskozlowski-found-guilty/#.VTYb5v1fo5s.
413
Shayna Jacobs & Corrine Lestch, Ex-Tyco CEO, Convicted of Stealing $150M from
Company, Set for Release on Parole in January, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013, 1:36 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/tyco-ceo-convicted-stealing-150m-free-article1.1536865.
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8. Halliburton
a. CEO Dick Cheney
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
Since boyhood, Dick Cheney (DS) has pursued “activities that allowed
him either to be alone or to excel.”415 After earning scholarships in football and
baseball to attend Yale University,416 DC eventually abandoned his doctoral
studies in political science for the hypercompetitive world of politics, first as a
staffer to Donald Rumsfeld and then as a member of Congress, Secretary of
Defense, and, ultimately, vice president.417 With the exception of a desultory
period when he flunked out of Yale and labored as a “lineman for the county,”418
DC has led a public life characterized by a driving ambition to acquire power
and authority and great skill in wielding both.419 He is a strategic thinker who
“dr[ives] policy the way commanders are taught to drive operations in the field,
calculating the mission, enemy, troops, terrain[,] and time available.”420 As a
congressman, DC “never saw a defense program [he] didn’t like,”421 including
arming the Contras and deploying the Strategic Defense Initiative.422 Although
he believed himself too uncharismatic to win the presidency, as vice president
DC structured his office to maximize power by requiring that he personally vet
and “tee up” every decision for President George W. Bush.423 Further, by

415
STEPHEN HAYES, CHENEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND
CONTROVERSIAL VICE PRESIDENT 19 (2007).
416
DAN BRIODY, THE HALLIBURTON AGENDA: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND MONEY 192–93
(2005).
417
CHITTICK, supra note 19, at 167.
418
HAYES, supra note 415, at 28–38.
419
BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 34 (2008) (DC is “pretty
damn good at accumulating power, extraordinarily effective and adept at exercising power.”)
(quoting James A. Baker).
420
Id. at 67.
421
PRATAP CHATTERJEE, HALLIBURTON’S ARMY: HOW A WELL-CONNECTED TEXAS OIL
COMPANY REVOLUTIONIZED THE WAY AMERICA MAKES WAR 37 (2009). Similarly, as vice
president, DC led the Administration’s successful effort to overcome objections from liberal
Republican senators and block the International Criminal Court and Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties.
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 63–64.
422
LOU DUBOSE & JAKE BERNSTEIN, VICE: DICK CHENEY AND THE HIGHJACKING OF THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 54 (2006).
423
HAYES, supra note 415, at 302–15. Foremost was DC’s decision to assume command in the
absence of President Bush in the hours after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and order U.S.
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creating special task forces and imposing a culture of secrecy, DC battled
successfully to restore to the executive power he believed had been usurped by
Congress and the judiciary.424
Interestingly, although he has lived in the public arena, and despite his
tremendous success in exploiting a Washington insider’s access to the “corridors
of power,” DC is an “unrelentingly secretive” introvert who is uncomfortable in
the spotlight, possesses much “anti-charisma,” and prefers to be either alone
with his thoughts and books or the “silent strength behind a benefactor.”425
Although he is witty and skilled in developing and maintaining relationships
when they facilitate political objectives,426 DC is simply “not a very social
person.”427 This may be due to DC’s dogmatism: while he declaims the popular
tendency to create rigid dichotomies in regard to policy choices,428 and although
there is a distinction between adherence to principles and rigid ideology, DC
“seldom indulge[s] in ambivalence” and would rather lose than sacrifice
principle to political expedience.429 DC has either friends or enemies—there is
no middle ground. When the State Department took contrary positions, he
described it as an “al Qaeda cell[,]”and foreign governments were either with or
against the United States in the War on Terror.430 When events disconfirm his
theories, DC remains “unyielding and unbending” and anchored to his “set of
beliefs.”431 Moreover, according to a colleague, DC “doesn’t believe in
negotiations.
He’s completely rigid, states his position, and concedes
nothing.”432
Although DC never expresses anger publicly and is widely known for his
calming, collected presence,433 he may suffer from low self-esteem. Despite his
universally recognized intellectual capacity, after he flunked out of Yale for the
second time he quickly accrued two arrests for driving under the influence,

military forces to shoot down hijacked civilian aircraft that might be employed as guided missiles.
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 119, 129–30.
424
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 82–83 (describing DC’s view of executive power as
Hamiltonian in that it is “absolute within its constitutional sphere” and “supreme outside [it].”).
425
BRIODY, supra note 416, at 218, 194, 197.
426
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 48–49 (describing DC as “calculating” in the
development of relationships).
427
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 383 (quoting former President George W. Bush).
428
BRIODY, supra note 416, at 205.
429
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 68.
430
Id. at 171, 225.
431
Id. at 336, 384.
432
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 58.
433
See, e.g., BRIODY, supra note 416, at 194 (reporting colleagues describe DC as “low key,”
“bland,” and “calming”).
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worked a blue-collar job, and failed to complete graduate school.434 Further,
although his long record of service from the Cold War through the War on
Terror testifies he is a nationalist who believes in “American Exceptionalism,”
he secured five deferments to avoid military service in Vietnam on the ground
he “had other priorities in the 1960s.”435
While he is not an aggressive person, DC is an ideologue as well as a
competitive, nationalistic authoritarian and introvert who holds a favorable
attitude toward the use of power to achieve security and exert influence in the
world on his own behalf and on behalf of the United States. Despite his
influence over people and events, he is an isolated individual with a measure of
low self-esteem. Accordingly, DC scores high on nine of ten sub-constructs of
militarism and is thus scored a militarist.
b. Anomism
Although DC was involved in church activities as a youth, as an adult he
is largely secular and, in public life, has “resolutely avoided discussions of
faith.”436 As a young adult, DC was disciplined at Yale University for alcoholrelated offenses and for disrupting campus activities, and he was arrested twice
for driving under the influence.437 He secured deferments to avoid Vietnam
service but only by gaming the draft rules and enrolling in a community college
to preserve his ineligibility.438 Although DC has no formal legal training and,
like many Westerners, is deeply skeptical of regulation and of Congress, he is
profoundly aware that law is a ubiquitous and powerful instrument.439 While
CEO of Halliburton, DC sharply differentiated legal compliance from ethical
behavior and directed his subordinates and legal team to adhere scrupulously to
the former while ignoring the latter.440 Upon discovering in 2000 that the
Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the election of a
president and a vice president domiciled in the same state, DC took a day trip
from his primary residence in Texas to register to vote in Wyoming, where he
maintained a vacation home; to do legal battle in Florida during the 2000 vote

434

Id. at 193.
HAYES, supra note 415, at 44 (quoting DC).
436
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 52.
437
See CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 31 (describing DC’s administrative troubles at Yale);
BRIODY, supra note 416, at 193 (discussing DC’s DUI arrests).
438
HAYES, supra note 415, at 43–45.
439
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 38 (describing DC’s hostility to regulation); id. at 82–83
(noting DC’s distrust of Congress).
440
See BRIODY, supra note 416, at 210 (citing an interview with the CEO of a Halliburton
subsidiary).
435
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recounts, he and the president-elect traveled on Halliburton corporate jets.441
Moreover, when DC concludes that law poses obstacles, he evinces the
capacity to reinterpret, modify, and even violate the rules at issue. When a
reporter threatened to leak classified information regarding U.S. submarine
espionage against the Soviet Union, DC, then Chief of Staff to President Gerald
Ford, suggested authorizing a burglary to retrieve information from the
reporter’s home.442 While vice president, DC understood instinctively that the
exercise of power would depend upon the capacity to frame legal issues. Within
minutes after the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked on
September 11, 2001, DC requested his legal counsel to draft “extraordinary
powers” to be wielded by the White House in the coming War on Terror.443 DC
approved and authorized a new legal framework drafted by subordinates that
founded and justified a series of controversial steps, including the Authorization
for the Use of Force, “enhanced interrogation” of detainees, the USA PATRIOT
Act, and the claim of broad executive powers to violate treaties and domestic
law.444 DC directed the National Security Agency to “forget about the law”
when responding to a query as to what else, besides spying on U.S. citizens
under the “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” could be done, and he directed the
executive branch to keep much of this new legal regime secret from the
legislative and judicial branches.445 In sum, DC is an amoral decision-maker
with no legal training whose conduct evinces disregard for law and legal
authorities despite his deep intellectual capacity to shape the creation,
interpretation, and application of law.446 He is high on all sub-constructs of
anomism and is scored an anomist.
c. Hostility
To DC, the world is “an inherently dangerous place . . . populated by fouryear-olds with automatic weapons.”447 He is distrustful of others and believes
little without independent verification.448 His exploitation of the rules regarding
the draft to avoid military service, and his doubts about the sincerity and
trustworthiness of not only Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost
441

GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 17.
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 34–35.
443
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 129–30.
444
See id. at 132–38, 140–43 (detailing DC’s development of new legal regimes for the War on
Terror).
445
Id. at 142.
446
By all accounts, DC is “intimidatingly smart.” DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 423, at 95.
447
Id. at 52.
448
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 9.
442
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agenda but also of liberal Republicans in Congress, suggests a strong thread of
cynicism.449 Nothing in the literature suggests DC is ethnocentric;450 on the
contrary, he is hostile without regard to group or affiliation and is openly
contemptuous of public opinion.451 For DC, the world consists solely of friends
and enemies: sticks are more useful than carrots, hard power is better than soft
power, and war is central to human existence.452 Moreover, particularly as his
cardiac health has degenerated, DC’s longstanding distrust and introversion may
have trended toward misanthropy.453 DC is a vindictive, unempathetic person
who keeps a “blacklist,”454 uses power to settle petty scores,455 and fires
employees who present him with conclusions incompatible with his
worldview.456 DC is neither selfish—he gratefully embraces the role of loyal
sidekick to his political benefactors and extends that loyalty to a cadre of
subordinate cronies457—nor is he a narcissist or a misanthrope—he is famously
“low-key,” self-deprecating, and quietly competent,458 and gets along well with
others when it suits him. However, DC is the archetypal Machiavellian for
whom politics is the continuation of war by other means. He is a nakedly
amoral hypocrite who resorts to deceit,459 media manipulation and smear

449
See HAYES, supra note 415, at 201–03 (Gorbachev); GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 63–65
(Senate Republicans).
450
Although DC opposed sanctions against apartheid-era South Africa, he did so on economic,
rather than racial, grounds. Id. at 270. Moreover, although he opposes affirmative action, he
selected General Colin Powell over one hundred other officers to be his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff because he believed Powell to be the most talented option. DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra
note 422, at 92 (discussing DC’s hiring of Powell).
451
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 390 (suggesting, for DC, public scorn is a “virtue”).
452
Id. at 161, 250.
453
See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 149 (suggesting DC’s numerous cardiac
events may have rendered him more hostile and less social).
454
Id. at x.
455
See CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 37 (reporting, as Secretary of Defense, DC cut defense
programs located in the districts of prominent Democrats to harm their electoral futures).
456
See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 211 (reporting DC fired CIA intelligence
briefers seriatim until he found those who would confirm his views on the situation in Iraq prior to
U.S.-led intervention in 2003).
457
See CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 31–34 (detailing Donald Rumsfeld’s and Gerald Ford’s
patronage of DC and DC’s subordination of his own interests to theirs); BRIODY, supra note 416, at
212 (describing DC’s extensive development of, reliance upon, and rewards to a network of friends
and loyalists).
458
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 2.
459
See id. at 219–20 (reporting, when leaving a 2002 briefing from DC on intelligence
suggesting Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), House Majority Leader Dick
Armey felt a “very deep sadness about [his] relationship with [DC]” because he “deserved better . . .
than to be bullshitted by him.”). When chairing the vice presidential search committee, DC solicited
and received extensive personal background information from potential running mates, only to
accept the nomination himself and later use information gleaned in the process against spurned
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campaigns,460 stealth and misdirection, and “the dark side”461 to prevail over
opposition, yet rails against others who use the same strategy.
In sum, DC scores high on five of nine sub-constructs of hostility and is
thus scored as hostile.
d. Adventurism
DC is a “worrier” who plans extensively to guard against the worst
possible outcome of every decision.462 He is emotionally reserved and disfavors
surprises.463 His cardiac illness suggests he internalizes significant stress when
making exigent decisions such as the order, in the absence of President George
W. Bush, to authorize U.S. military aircraft to destroy hijacked civilian aircraft
to prevent their use as guided missiles on September 11, 2001.464 Still, despite
his pragmatism, DC is possessed of enough optimism to believe he can change
the world by taking risks and exerting his relentless will, to include, most
significantly, the “constructive destabilization” of Middle East regimes such as
Iraq.465 Thus, DC scores high on six of seven sub-constructs of adventurism and
is scored an adventurist.
e. Summary of IVs: Dick Cheney
Dick Cheney is a militaristic anomist who is hostile and adventuristic.
ii. DVs: CLC and Halliburton

potential nominees—fueling speculation this had been DC’s plan and reinforcing a perception of DC
as “gratuitous, petty, and vindictive.” Id. at 4–6, 28–29.
460
When Joseph Wilson, husband of CIA clandestine officer Valerie Plame, published an op-ed
disputing DC’s claim Iraq had been attempting to acquire uranium from Niger, DC allegedly advised
his Chief of Staff, Scooter Libby, to leak the fact of Plame’s covert status to the media to pressure
Wilson and then successfully resisted congressional demands for the transcript of his FBI interview
regarding the matter, wherein he was questioned as to whether, as widely believed, he was the
source of the illegal leak. See id. at 364–65 (chronicling the Plame/Libby scandal).
461
In a staff meeting after September 11, 2001, DC stated the U.S. would “have to work . . . the
dark side” and “[a] lot of what need[ed] to be done [t]here [would] have to be done quietly, without
any discussion, using sources and methods that [we]re available . . . [and] any means at [their]
disposal . . . to achieve[their] objectives.” Id. at 160.
462
Id. at 19 (noting, in DC’s experience, “you usually end up with the least worst option.”)
(quoting DC).
463
Id at 17, 86, 95. DC never gets angry and is “not the hugging kind” according to GWB. Id.
at 328.
464
See id. at 119–20 (chronicling and analyzing DC’s actions and orders on September 11,
2001).
465
Id. at 242, 252.
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Although he had no private-sector experience, DC was hired as CEO of
Halliburton (H), an oil services company, in August 1995 to leverage the
extensive influence he developed in Congress and as Secretary of Defense from
1989 to 1993.466 During his tenure at H, DC spent “countless days on the road,
using his contacts to court key business players around the world, especially in
the Middle East[,]”467 expanding government contracting, and doubling
revenues in five years.468 DC’s retirement in 2000 with a $20 million severance
package was framed as that of a “triumphant CEO, a self-reliant insider-turnedoutsider who competently and ethically grew his company while increasing
shareholder value.”469 However, closer examination supports an inference that
luck and spin kept a messy legacy quiet long enough for DC to return to politics.
In addition to fraud,470 commentators allege political cronyism and collusion
with officials beholden to DC in the steerage of government contracts to H,471
although proof of it is “a little like trying to build a murder case without the
murder weapon.”472 By 2003, H was the primary U.S. Army contractor—up
from 19th—and the no-bid process whereby H secured contracts—LOGCAP—
had been implemented by DC as Secretary of Defense in 1993.473 LOGCAP, a
monopoly that pays a guaranteed profit for construction, food service, sanitation,
laundry, postal, energy, prison, and other services to the U.S. government, was
created to enhance military logistical capability and efficiency by shifting these
functions to one civilian contractor.474 From inception, LOGCAP has been
controversial: DC’s Department of Defense awarded it to H, the very company it
asked to draft the proposal, and, as a “cost-plus” contract, it is a de facto blank
466
See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 106–08 (describing H as devastated by
declining 1980s oil prices and reporting DC was hired in the hope his “Rolodex” would reinvigorate
H). Still, despite DC’s contacts, his lack of private sector experience was so remarkable that the
price of H fell on news of his appointment. BRIODY, supra note 416, at 191–92.
467
CHITTICK, supra note 19, at 167.
468
BRIODY, supra note 416, at 204.
469
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 104–05.
470
During DC’s tenure, H engaged in systematic inflation of project costs, use of substandard
materials, overstaffing, excess production, and other acts of waste, fraud, and abuse for which it
entered into settlements with the Justice Department subsequent to DC’s departure. See generally
CHATTERJEE, supra note 421. By 2004, H was under investigation by the Department of Defense,
the SEC, Justice, and the GAO for acts and omissions during DC’s tenure. BRIODY, supra note 416,
at 234.
471
See, e.g., DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 152–64.
472
BRIODY, supra note 416, at 224.
473
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 153. While Secretary of Defense, DC asked H to
develop a classified report on how a single private firm could develop logistical capabilities in the
event of military overstretch. Id.
474
CHATERJEE, supra note 421, at xvi (chronicling the shift to civilian logistical support and the
creation of LOGCAP); BRIODY, supra note 416, at 184–88, 198–206 (detailing the creation, award,
and controversies of LOGCAP).
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check making H the “government quartermaster.”475 Whereas H lost money
before LOGCAP, from 1995–2000, H earned $2 billion for LOGCAP in Bosnia
and Kosovo.476
More serious are allegations DC exploited his office to steer a LOGCAP
contract to restore Iraqi oil production, awarded to H prior to the 2003
intervention by the United States.477 That the close relationship between H and
the Department of Defense benefited DC, and that neither DC nor H are fully
forthcoming about the extent and timing of these benefits,478 fuels speculation
the 2003 invasion was motivated by financial self-dealing.479 The dubious
constitutionality of DC’s secretive Energy Policy Development Group (EPDG)
formed to achieve environmental deregulation and removal of sanctions against
oil producing nations,480 the revelation EPDG began studying maps of Iraqi oil
fields in 2001, and H’s retaliation against whistleblowers481 reinforced a
perception of a scofflaw firm marshaling influence to spark an unprovoked “war
for oil.” During DC’s tenure, H suffered other scandals, including violating
sanctions,482 bribery,483 violation of labor laws,484 and accounting fraud.485 In

475

DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 160.
BRIODY, supra note 416, at 198.
477
See id. at 221 (alleging violation of federal law in the award of the Restore Iraqi Oil
contract); DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 158–60 (analyzing adverse actions taken
against officials who protested legal violations in the bid and award process). Whether DC
participated in the award of contracts to H, ordered or permitted his staff to do so, or otherwise knew
or should have known is contested. See id. at 153 (discussing unsuccessful discovery in litigation).
DC claims he “never went near the Defense Department” while vice president and never lobbied on
behalf of H. Id. at 152–53. The Defense Department defends the award on “national security”
grounds. Critics suggest bid and award meetings conducted after the secret award were a “sham,”
and DC’s claim of ignorance is incredible. See id. at 158–60.
478
Although DC claimed to have severed all financial ties to H after resigning in 2000, H made
six-figure payments to DC from 2000 to 2005, and DC cashed in stock options to earn over $18.5
million—interests that, according to the Congressional Research Service, constituted a “continued
financial interest” and a “potential conflict.” CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 49. As late as 2006,
DC retained stock options in H worth $4 million. DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 105.
479
See, e.g., CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 28 (reporting this allegation).
480
See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 7–11 (discussing the creation of and
controversies surrounding the operation of the EDG).
481
See FBI Interviews Halliburton Whistleblower, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 2004, http://www.
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-11-24-halliburton-whistleblower_x.htm; Walker v.
Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (2002).
482
Although DC opposed unilateral U.S. trade sanctions on the ground they hindered U.S.
competition with foreign firms, he claimed to have a “firm policy” against violations. DUBOSE &
BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 17; 111–12; see also id. at 115 (reporting H helped found a lobbying
group, “USA Engage,” to fight sanctions); id. at 116 (noting DC lobbied for a waiver from
application of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996). However, while DC was CEO, H created
fictitious foreign subsidiaries out of glorified post office boxes and used them to trade illegally with
Libya, Iran, Burma, and Iraq. CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 45–46. In 1997, H settled with the
Commerce Department over charges it violated the U.S. Export Administration Act fifteen times in
476
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respect to these misdeeds, DC claims ignorance.486
Moreover, it might fairly be said that a culture of corruption established
during DC’s tenure survived his departure: since 2000, dozens of H employees
have been charged for crimes involving official duties,487 abuse of foreign
migrant laborers has embarrassed the Department of Defense,488 and federal
agencies and Congress have launched investigations.489 Under the pressure of
these scandals, the share price of H—$49 when DC resigned in 2000—plunged
to $15 by 2002,490 and H has labored to “extricat[e] itself from its former CEO’s

transactions with Iran. When it was revealed in 2000 H had done over $70 million in business with
Iraq between 1997 and 2000, DC pled ignorance. DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 117.
483
Beginning in 1995, a subsidiary of H paid $180 million in bribes for favorable treatment in
contracts connected to construction of a natural gas facility in Nigeria in violation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. See Barbara C. George & Kathey Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton
Co./TKSL’s Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption
Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503
(2006) (detailing investigations). An investigation by the Nigerian government led to parallel
investigations by the Justice Department and the SEC in 2004. Id. H acknowledged in subsequent
SEC filings that it had produced documents and made employees available to the SEC for
deposition. Id. at 245. DC denied any knowledge of bribery during his tenure at H. DUBOSE &
BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 114. By 2006, the investigations had stalled, and, although by its
own admission H had violated the FCPA, no evidence implicated DC beyond the “should have
known” standard. Id. at 112.
484
A Labor Department investigation revealed, during DC’s tenure, H charged some costs of
senior executive pension and bonus plans to its workers’ pension fund and failed to pay pensions
owed to employees. CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 50.
485
While DC was CEO, H—in concert with its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen—changed its
accounting practices in violation of GAAP to postpone revealing losses on over-budget construction
projects and artificially inflate after-tax profits, and failed to inform stockholders. BRIODY, supra
note 416, at 213. The SEC opened an investigation in July 2002, and H restated earnings and settled
twenty-nine shareholder lawsuits over financial violations in June 2003. Id. Among the practices
questioned were the creation of fifty-eight SPEs during DC’s tenure. Id. at 227. In 2004, the SEC
fined H $7.5 million and imposed fines on H executives; no action was taken against DC. DUBOSE
& BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 118.
486
See BRIODY, supra note 416, at 288 (questioning whether DC can credibly claim to have not
had knowledge of any of the misconduct).
487
CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at xv.
488
In 2006, General George Casey issued an order, “Prevention of Trafficking in Persons in
MFI-I,” ordering contractors and other persons and entities within DOD jurisdiction to cease
deceptive hiring practices, charging excessive fees to foreign workers, and permitting substandard
living conditions and wages. Halliburton/KBR Scandals, ALLGOV, http://www.allgov.com/
departments/department-of-defense/defense-criminal-investigative-service?agencyid=7361
(last
visited Apr. 21, 2015).
489
In 2004, Congress issued subpoenas to investigate the relationship between the UN Oil for
Food Program, H, waste and fraud in LOGCAP, and the Bush-Cheney decision to intervene in Iraq
in 2003. David Teather, Congress Inquiry Links Cheney Aide to Halliburton Deal, GUARDIAN (June
14, 2004), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/15/usa.dickcheney.
490
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, H stock soared to $66 per share but since fell to $44
per share—more than $5 less than when DC departed in 2000. See In 1 Year, Halliburton’s Stock
Doubles as Troop Deaths Double, HALLIBURTON WATCH (Sept. 20, 2005), at http://www.
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mismanagement.”491 In 2007, H relocated to Dubai—a no-tax jurisdiction with
looser regulatory standards—although it remains incorporated in the United
States and engages in extensive LOGCAP contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
9. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
a. CEO Bernard Madoff
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
Bernard L. Madoff (BM) was born in New York City to middle-class
children of Eastern European Jews in 1938492 and is universally recalled by
childhood contemporaries as a physically unremarkable, introverted
individual493 disinterested in current events.494 Although he participated in
extracurricular activities, including swimming, basketball, playground
monitoring, and lifeguarding, BM was and remains a loner.495 BM is quiet,
distant, and aloof.496 He is an intensely secretive person who keeps his own
counsel and did not display the trappings of his wealth to make or keep
friends;497 on the contrary, he grew “cranky” when obligated to socialize498 and
did so solely to achieve business objectives.499 His introversion and isolationism
may be a function of low self-esteem: he was considered “dull” by schoolmates
and rejected by the opposite sex due to his lack of intellect500 and relative
poverty.501
The foregoing may account for a high degree of ambition: BM discovered
his road to happiness was paved with cash. As a youth, he ran a lucrative
halliburtonwatch.org/news/stock_troop2.html (postulating H’s share price depends on U.S. military
success in foreign conflicts).
491
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 105–06.
492
ANDREW KIRTZMAN, BETRAYAL: THE LIFE AND LIES OF BERNIE MADOFF 16 (2010).
493
Id. at 14–15.
494
JERRY OPPENHEIMER, MADOFF WITH THE MONEY 48 (Wiley 2009).
495
See id. at 31–32.
496
Id. at 89–90.
497
Id. at 118.
498
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 60.
499
See ERIN ARVEDLUND, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE 19 (2010) (describing BM’s social
networking as an undertaking designed to safeguard his business).
500
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 20.
501
See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 140 (indicating BM experienced embarrassment as a
child because his family’s economic circumstances would not permit him to wear “trendy” clothes).
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sprinkler business and was “the image of a driven young man” who “radiated an
entrepreneur’s spirit.”502 Through long, hard hours doing manual labor and
trading stocks in struggling firms, he discovered a gift for making money, and,
in his cultural milieu, this conferred a sense of status and a belief he could “be
one of them, the big shot, the Jewish prince who could dole out favors and
advice, . . . a great power in the Jewish world of his fathers.”503
BM enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1960 primarily to avoid the
draft, rather than out of a sense of patriotic duty or nationalistic beliefs.504 He
then attended the University of Alabama and Hofstra University on swimming
and Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships.505 College
classmates described an “assured, authoritarian” demeanor and noted BM had
few friends.506
Nothing in the literature suggests he has any ideological
commitments or other aspects of dogmatism. In sum, BM scores high on seven
of ten sub-constructs of militarism and is thus scored as a militarist.
b. Anomism
Prior to his arrest in 2009, BM had no criminal background whatsoever,507
although he was a suspected cheat at the golf course,508 a confirmed cheat in his
marriage,509 and a frequent sexual harasser of his female employees.510 An
ingrained disregard for law and legal authorities may have been bequeathed by
his parents, who ran illegal stock trading operations out of the family home and
may have elicited BM’s participation in this venture.511 BM enjoyed pretending

502

KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 15.
Id. at 26–27, 39, 74.
504
Id. at 36. BM later exaggerated a medical condition to acquire a medical discharge and avoid
additional service as was his obligation, reinforcing the impression he is not especially patriotic. See
id. at 167.
505
See id. at 30, 36.
506
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 58.
507
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 9.
508
See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 92 (reporting BM reported golf scores that never
varied below eighty or above eighty-nine—returns from the links that mirrored his fictitious market
returns and raised skepticism).
509
BM was a serial adulterer during his marriage to Ruth, often meeting women—including
prostitutes—for trysts at his office and paid “hush money” to prevent disclosure. Id. at 62, 185;
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 111–12.
510
BM made “sophomoric sexual comments” and was so inappropriate with female employees
that he paid cash severances to several to avoid lawsuits. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 111–12.
511
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 9. The SEC closed down the operation in 1963. Id. at 35.
Commentators refer to an “ethically and morally bankrupt household” where BM’s “values,
principles, behavior, sense of right and wrong, ideals, and standards were established.”
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 29.
503
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to be a “wise Jewish elder,” but he is a self-confirmed “lox and bagels” Jew who
did not attend synagogue, celebrate religious rituals, or otherwise participate in
his faith.512 BM does have some legal training—he attended law school for one
year, primarily to earn a draft deferment, only to drop out and form his
business.513 However, he has no specific training in corporate law, and the
extent of his knowledge of the field appears to have been confined to a group of
pliant lawyers on retainer with whom he shared little information about his
business.514 BM thus scores high on four of five sub-constructs of anomism and
is scored as an anomist.
c. Hostility
As a youth, BM was a “happy-go-lucky guy,”515 and friends report that
even in adulthood BM had a “great sense of humor,” was “very considerate” and
personable,516 and shared freely of his wealth.517 Others suggest BM is more
emotionally complex and variable and, “in his inner sanctum, he c[an] be
gregarious, coarse, generous, gentle, rude, and sometimes vicious.” 518 With his
employees, he vacillated between paying off their mortgages and honeymoons,
throwing elaborate office parties, and otherwise treating them as valued
members of a team with making crude sexual jokes, hurling insults, and
degrading them.519 With potential clients, he was “so rude, he was a bastard,”
perhaps out of a natural proclivity, or perhaps to maintain the air of phony
exclusivity essential to his business.520 With his social equals, BM fostered the
impression he was a “[g]od [and] . . . [he] was special, so unique,”521 and he
boasted often he was the “most powerful man on Wall Street.” 522 Whether BM
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KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 96–97.
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 64–66.
514
See KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 66 (describing the relationship between BM and his Wall
Street attorneys).
515
Id. at 24.
516
DEBORAH STROBER & GERALD STROBER, CATASTROPHE: THE STORY OF BERNARD L.
MADOFF, THE MAN WHO SWINDLED THE WORLD 72 (2009) (describing BM as “loved and
respected.”).
517
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 210. Others note BM was unenthused about the “charity
circuit.” KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 58.
518
Id. at 110.
519
See id. at 104–09 (describing the bipolarity of BM’s treatment of his employees).
520
ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 159 (speculating on why BM behaved as he did with
potential clients).
521
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 96 (quoting Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel, an acquaintance and
client of BM).
522
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 18.
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is suffering from narcissistic personality disorder, as some surmise, is unknown,
but most believe a latent misanthropy and deep absence of empathy surfaced in
his personality, producing some “inner need to screw the system in a grand way
that no one had ever done before.”523
Given the nature of his criminal enterprise, it is unsurprising BM made a
practice of hiring only those he deemed insufficiently smart to be able to
discover the workings of his Ponzi scheme.524 In addition to his lack of trust,
BM exhibits elevated cynicism, narcissism, and Machiavellianism. Even while
running the largest Ponzi scheme in history, BM boasted on his website that his
clients “[knew] that Bernard Madoff ha[d] a personal interest in maintaining an
unblemished record of value, fair dealing, and high ethical standards that ha[d]
always been the firm’s hallmark.”525 After he dropped out of law school, the
U.S. Army ordered him to report for active duty to fulfill his ROTC scholarship
obligation, and BM, realizing he would be sent to Vietnam, “suddenly suffered a
medical malady” in the form of an ulcer, which led to a medical discharge.526
Deception is a life-long trait: in grade school BM gave a report on a nonexistent
book to avoid punishment for failing to execute the assignment, and, as an adult,
he spun a “rags-to-riches” story out of whole cloth, claiming to have grown up
poor on the Lower East Side, rather than middle-class in Laurelton.527 He is an
“incredibly shrewd man in understanding human psychology” and manipulates
others to serve his narcissistic ego.528 There is, however, no evidence BM is
ethnocentric. BM thus scores high on nine sub-constructs of hostility and is
scored as hostile.
d. Adventurism
BM is not impulsive, but he suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorder
and is manic about appearances, cleanliness, and order.529 He is an optimist
with an internal locus of control who has long believed it possible to structure
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Id. at 81–82 (quoting a long-term friend of BM); KIRTZMAN, supra note 494, at 74 (“[BM],
who grew up feeling inferior, may well have looked on [his victims] . . . as societies of judgmental
Jews he wanted to impress—or get his revenge on.”).
524
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 117 (“You could have a great job at [BM] if you were a
semimoron, because . . . you didn’t ask too many questions.”).
525
Id. at 3.
526
Id. at 64–66.
527
Id. at 22–23.
528
STROBER & STROBER, supra note 516, at 80–83 (discussing diagnoses by psychiatrists who
believe BM suffers from narcissistic personality disorder, fractured ego, and other maladies).
529
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 117. Doors left ajar, window blinds not properly aligned, and
colors other than black and gray were all triggers for BM’s obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 125.
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the world to create happiness by acquiring its primary determinant: money.530
As a schoolboy he manifested a “devil-may-care” attitude and “didn’t take
anything overly seriously,”531 and later in life he demonstrated “no anxiety,
guilt, or remorse” in connection with his swindles,532 even when SEC
investigators probed his operations in 2004.533 However, BM has an abnormally
large appetite for risk, as illustrated by his decades-long criminal enterprise and
by an anecdote from his college years that describes him joyriding down icy side
streets, just missing parked cars, solely for a thrill not shared by his
passengers.534 Attendant to this is elevated stress: despite his optimism, BM
“always had a sense of worry about him,”535 and he has persistent facial tics.
BM thus scores high on five of seven sub-constructs of adventurism and is
scored an adventuristic decision-maker.
e. Summary of IVs: Bernard Madoff
Bernard Madoff is a militaristic anomist who is hostile and adventuristic.
ii. DVs: CLC and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
Until his arrest in 2009, BM and his financial services firm Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS) were relative unknowns beyond Wall
Street. When BM dropped out of law school in 1960, he created BLMIS, which
was then a one-man boutique firm specializing in trading penny stocks.536 With
seed money and Jewish community contacts provided by his father-in-law, BM
grew BLMIS rapidly by promising investors supra-normal market returns of
18%, and “[t]his was to be the template for all of [BM’s] future [business]:
friends and family were guaranteed a certain return on their money annually,
and, pleased and grateful, they were converted into an instant sales force . . .
They came with indubitable references and glowing reports about the young
[BM].537
Claiming to use a sophisticated “spit-strike conversion strategy”—a hybrid
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KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 28 (stating, for BM, “money [is] his key to happiness.”).
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 41.
532
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 8.
533
See id. at 148 (describing BM as without “nervousness or . . . remorse” when duping SEC
investigators in 2004).
534
See id. at 33 (noting BM’s unusual “appetite for risk and his apparent belief he was
impervious to its consequences.”).
535
Id. at 61.
536
Id. at 37.
537
ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 45.
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stock and options hedging approach that produced consistent returns based on
equal parts science and timing538—BM lured wealthy investors from Jewish
social networks with promises of guaranteed money.539 Yet, BM delivered
remarkable returns over the next four-plus decades—even during bear
markets—only because he was not really trading. BLMIS was partitioned to
create a legitimate brokerage business that at its peak traded 10% of the total
shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)540 and, more importantly,
created a cover for a separate, secretive, and illegal “investment advisory”
business that pretended to invest through a London trading office but in fact did
not.541 BM received cash deposits from investors542 in brokerage accounts and
deposited the cash in his personal JPMorgan Chase bank account.543 BLMIS
employees created a fictitious paper trail to support the appearance the
investment advisory fund was functioning lawfully and to deceive SEC
auditors.544 In reality, BLMIS was the biggest private sector Ponzi scheme ever,
paying earlier investors with the contributions of more recent rubes but
skimming enough from the take to reap immense personal wealth. BM easily
fooled regulatory authorities during numerous audits and investigations,545 and
new investors, if they suspected insider trading, were unwilling to ask why the
538
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 66 (describing BM’s claims about his investment strategy). A
hedge fund is a complicated arrangement that functions by making bets on securities an investor
believes will increase in price while at the same time making other bets—”options” to purchase or
sell shares—on securities the investor believes will decrease in price. These “longs” and “shorts”
offset and return a reasonable but stable yield to the investor over time, and a portfolio of such bets
earns a profit.
539
See id. at 73–74 (describing BM’s investors as a “highly networked” group of wealthy Jews
who trusted BM as a fellow “member of the tribe” and an “extended family member[]” with “shared
responsibility to look out for [them].”).
540
ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 70.
541
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 176. The “investment advisory” business was illegal because
it was not registered as a separate entity from the brokerage as required by SEC regulations, and,
thus, BM kept its existence secret from all but a very few. Id. at 146.
542
In addition to individuals lured into his scheme through family and social networks, other
investors included “feeder funds”—“financial octop[i]” that, in effect, were co-conspirators with
BLMIS and worked as sales agents to draw and pool investment capital. Id. at 44; 88–94.
543
ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 176 (detailing BLMIS’ Ponzi scheme).
544
See id. at 171, 181 (describing how BLMIS covered its tracks to deceive auditors).
545
Private audits of the investment advisory business were strictly prohibited on “trade secrets”
grounds, and SEC investigators were undermanned, underfunded, and undertrained in the
architecture and operations of hedge funds to be able to discern illegality. KIRTZMAN, supra note
492, at 198, 229. Moreover, BM, as one of the founders of the NASDAQ exchange, had generated
competition with the NYSE and was thus perceived by the SEC as having interests in alignment with
its own. See ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 33, 77 (explaining reasons for SEC failures to detect
BM’s illegal operations); KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 65 (suggesting BM’s status as a NASDAQ
founder blinded investigators). An SEC investigation concluded in 2007 with no enforcement after
BM committed perjury by denying allegations of fraudulent trades; BM reported later that he was
“amazed” at the youth and inexperience of SEC regulators. Id. at 186.
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goose laid golden eggs.546 The scheme had “an unbelievable performance
record . . . [with] no resemblance to any other investment manager’s track record
throughout recorded human history,”547 yet, so long as more money entered
BLMIS than was being withdrawn, the ruse endured.548
However, in 2008, a perfect storm of housing, manufacturing, credit,
stock, and employment market collapses triggered a liquidity crisis that drove
many investment advisory fund investors to withdraw and spooked prospective
new investors.549 When, in December 2008, BM failed to stem the flood of
demands for withdrawal of as much as $65 billion due, he wrote checks to
family members, friends, and employees for the last $300 million in his account,
confessed his crime to his sons, and was arrested by the FBI for what was soon
determined to be the biggest fraud in financial history.550 As a result of the
collapse and bankruptcy of BLMIS, over five thousand investors lost money,
including luminaries in many fields; some individuals, charities, and financial
firms were completely wiped out.551 In March 2009, BM pled guilty to eleven
felonies and refused a plea bargain that would have required him to implicate
others.552 He was sentenced in June 2009 to 150 years’ imprisonment.553 All
investors, including feeder fund managers, claim to have known nothing of the
scheme.554 BM has steadfastly refused to account for missing funds and is
expected to die in prison.555

546
Some blame investors, contending they were willfully ignorant, greedy arrogant, or lazy.
See, e.g., ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 96, 104–05 (examining investors’ motives and reasons for
failing to suspect illegality in their unusually good investment returns); KIRTZMAN, supra note 492,
at 51–52, 157 (“[A] lot of people . . . cast aside all suspicions and all doubt and all fear, and . . . let
greed overrule all else.”). For an examination of BM’s Ponzi scheme and an account of the SEC’s
failure to detect it despite a decade of warning, see HARRY MARKOPOLIS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN:
A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER (2010).
547
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 84 (quoting an interview with Harry Markopolos).
548
ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 165 (opining that the BLMIS scheme might have continued
indefinitely but for the crash).
549
See KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 214–21 (chronicling causes of and important events in the
Wall Street “meltdown” that ultimately imploded BLMIS).
550
Id. at 224–36 (chronicling the final days of BLMIS).
551
Id. at 7–8, 244.
552
Id. at 260. It is widely believed that BM is shielding family members and other associates by
refusing cooperation. ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 268–77.
553
Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
554
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 260.
555
ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 277.
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10. Countrywide Mortgage/Financial
a. CEO Angelo Mozilo
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs
a. Militarism
Angelo Mozilo (AM), the son of Italian immigrants, is an “aggressive,
short, ballsy, street-smart New Yorker” acutely aware he is “not a product of
privileged Ivy League education and polish,” and “Harvard types would look
down on him when he was a young man in New York trying to make his
way.”556 At the age of twelve, he began a career as a “feisty, charismatic, gifted
salesman” behind the counter of his father’s butcher shop,557 earned a degree in
business at New York University while working full-time as a mortgage lender,
and extended a reputation as a “tough guy”558 in 1968 when he founded
Countrywide Mortgage—later Countrywide Financial (C). The “bad boy of the
mortgage industry” is a fierce competitor with a “winner-take-all” philosophy
toward life and business and has always been determined to realize his ambition
to be a “major player—one way or another.”559 He is a meritocrat560 who gloats
over victories” and describes business as a “battle.”561
AM is a control-obsessed perfectionist who secured his corporate
headquarters “like a top-secret [military] base” with “guards at every
checkpoint”562 and insisted his employees be “wholesome, honest, hardworking,
. . . the best of America,” yet, overt expressions of nationalism conflicted with
C’s culture, and requests from patriotic employees for time off in recognition of
Memorial Day and Independence Day were rejected.563 AM was on a “mission
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ADAM MICHAELSON, THE FORECLOSURE OF AMERICA: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RISE AND
FALL OF COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, AND THE DEFAULT OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM 269 (2009).
557
Id. at 140.
558
Bernard Condon, Last Man Standing, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2000, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/1127/6614108a.html.
559
Id. AM “couldn’t accept being second or third” and sought “dominance” over his
competitors. MICHAEL W. HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY LENDERS AND
WALL STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA—AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS 212 (2010).
560
MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 182.
561
Condon, supra note 558.
562
MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 70–71. The “mechanisms of Countrywide processes,
procedures, checking and rechecking, and attention to perfect, verifiable detail had to be on a par
with or exceeding that of NASA.” Id. at 111.
563
Id. at 97, 121, 234.
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to help Americans achieve the dream of home ownership,” and left no one else
any “strength, position, [or] power to change [C’s] entire company mission,
culture, and reason for being.”564 When employees arrived late for meetings,
they would find the door locked; they experienced pressure to sign a loyalty oath
and wear a green armband signifying their devotion to C.565 To the external
world, C was an extension of AM and his personality—a “wonderful, helpful
neighbor,” but the employees’ role was to put their noses to grindstones and
execute AM’s mission.566 Despite his competitiveness, aggression, ambition,
favorable attitude toward power, and dogmatism, AM is a “warm, slick,
reassuring” character567 with high self-esteem who holds seats on boards of
directors, boards of trustees, charitable and fraternal organizations, and industry
advisory groups.568 Still, AM scores high on six of ten sub-constructs and is
scored as a militaristic decision-maker.
b. Anomism
Nothing in the literature suggests AM should be scored high on the
amoralism sub-construct, and AM has no formal legal training. No evidence
indicates AM has demonstrated systematic disregard for law or legal authorities.
C may have contracted with unscrupulous real estate appraisers and developed
business models that skirted laws and regulations,569 including offering
“sweetheart deals” to influential friends of AM, but, prior to its collapse, C had a
corporate compliance culture that required employees to “ben[d] over backward
to make sure that every [act] was accurate, truthful, legal, and thoroughly vetted
through the byzantine rules and regulations among the [fifty] states.”570
Moreover, “[C] had at its center a culture of ethics . . . . Every meeting, every
report, every lunchroom poster really pounded it into our brains that we should
always be doing the honest, right thing for our customers, for our shareholders,
for our values.”571
Presumably, the corporate culture reflects AM’s personal views on law
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Id. at 23, 54.
Id. at 59, 262.
566
To drive his employees, AM “mixed equal parts pride and fear. Some recall him checking
slips from the company garage to see who was cutting out early. Employees took the stairs[,] rather
than waste time waiting for an elevator.” Condon, supra note 558.
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MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 140.
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Condon, supra note 558.
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See MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 324 (suggesting C committed minor ethical violations
under AM’s tenure but finding nothing attributable to AM).
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Id. at 193.
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Id. at 192.
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and compliance; accordingly, AM is scored low on all five sub-constructs of
anomism and, thus, is scored as a non-anomistic decision-maker.
c. Hostility
AM is a self-confessed vulgar “son of a bitch” who is volatile emotionally
and holds grudges.572 He blames rivals for price wars he starts himself,573
regards opponents as “enemies,” and cultivates a corporate culture where
attacking the “stupidity or sloppiness” of employees is a sport.574 The “Rommel
of the mortgage business” is an intensely distrustful, cynical employer who
made C “Orwellian in its monitoring of employees and steadfast determination
to push every worker to the grindstone all day, every day.”575 Moreover, he is a
narcissist who attributes perceived deficiencies in others to “stupidity,” “ego,” or
unworthiness576 and has made a perpetual tan, French cuffs, and gold Rolls
Royces his signature style. His lack of empathy has proven embarrassing. In
2008, a homeowner in need of loan modification wrote requesting assistance,
and, when AM discovered the letter was based on a template provided by a
homeowners’ advocacy website, AM sent the following note that was later
distributed worldwide: “This is unbelievable. Most of these letters now have the
same wording. Obviously they are being counseled by some other person or by
the [I]nternet. Disgusting.”577
As the mortgage crisis deepened, rather than “being empathetic to the
national disaster hitting millions of homes all across the country,” AM led C in
an “spastic fit of rage” and developed a “Protect Our House” campaign to
“defen[d] the virtues of [C], lash[] out at any detractors, and mak[e] it
personal.”578
The foregoing contrasts with AM’s apparent absence of elevated levels of
misanthropy, ethnocentrism, and selfishness. C’s corporate mission is to
advance the American dream for everyone, “especially . . . the underprivileged
in our country, through access and opportunity in the mortgage and housing
systems[,]” and AM took great pride in lowering barriers to home ownership for
minority and lower-income borrowers.579 Moreover, he is “extremely loyal to
572

Condon, supra note 558.
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HUDSON, supra note 559 (reporting AM reported information about rival firms to New York
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Condon, supra note 558.
577
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Id. at 259–60.
579
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his people.”580 Still, AM scores high on six of nine sub-constructs of hostility
and, thus, is scored as a hostile decision-maker.
d. Adventurism
When his father rejected his idea to modify the family butcher shop to
compete with emerging supermarkets in the 1950s, only to see the business fail
and his father die of cardiac stress, AM vowed to “never shrink from risk”
again.581 Accordingly, he gambled throughout the life of C, altering its business
model to compete on price and market directly to borrowers, expanding as
interest rates fell and competitors became risk-averse, and creating ever-more
risky loan products. An examination of AM’s decision-making suggests,
although he believes he has the power to succeed through application of
judgment and hard work, he acknowledges an inability to dictate events: before
the collapse of C, AM claimed the credit-rating agencies’ requirement that C
hold more capital than banks limited its growth and profitability.582 Moreover,
no evidence suggests AM is impulsive; his moves in the markets were planned,
and, under his leadership, C developed a conservative, slow-moving culture that
vetted decisions carefully.583
Furthermore, while AM is “intensely
optimistic”584 and does not appear to experience elevated anxiety or stress, his
“let the chips fall where they may” attitude—predicated upon a belief, despite
hardships, events will ultimately redound to his benefit—evidences some
fatalism.585 In sum, AM scores high on three sub-constructs of adventurism and
is scored as a non-adventurist.
e. Summary of IVs: Angelo Mozilo
Angelo Mozilo is a militaristic non-anomist who is hostile but not
adventuristic.
ii. DVs: CLC and Countrywide Mortgage/Financial
AM created C in the late 1960s and, by 2004, with C then the largest home
580
PAUL MUIOLO & MATTHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE
MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 119 (2008).
581
Condon, supra note 558.
582
See id. (quoting AM as stating the credit-rating agencies placed a “governor on my engine”).
583
MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 102, 111.
584
Id. at 271. Even when the real estate market was crashing in 2006, AM insisted he saw
“early signs of stabilization” and 2008 would be a “hell of a year.” HUDSON, supra note 559, at 270.
585
MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 258.
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loan lender in the United States, was widely regarded as the “father of . . . the
modern mortgage business.”586 However, in an effort to expand market share
and make homeownership available to borrowers whose credit scores suggested
they were greater risks, C began marketing “exotic” subprime loan products,
including a “Pay Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage” (POARM).
The
POARM—lawful then—allowed a borrower to purchase a house and select from
a set of monthly payment options that included a negative amortization payment
of an amount less than interest and principal otherwise due; the assumption was
the value would continue to appreciate, and, as the borrower’s income grew, the
borrower would either refinance before the loan re-set to a higher interest rate or
begin to make payments that decreased loan principal.587 At least one senior
executive questioned whether the assumption of constant future home value
appreciation was valid and noted that if not “half the country could be upside
down on these loans,” but more senior C officials believed the “risk [wa]s offset
by the opportunity for market share and revenue gain” and if C did not make the
loans its competitors would.588 When C initiated the POARM program, the
dissenting executive pronounced, prophetically, he had “just witnessed the
beginning of the end of [C] and maybe the entire U.S. economy.”589
By 2006, interest rates ticked upward, loan applications slowed, and
layoffs began across the mortgage industry. In the 2006 annual report, AM
claimed C was a “strong, viable financial company” and he “continue[d] to be
bullish in the long-term prospects” of the firm despite challenges in the
“shrinking mortgage market.”590 In August 2007, with housing values in freefall, borrowers unable to refinance as a result of unfavorable loan-to-value
ratios, and foreclosure rates climbing, C, unwilling to admit a structural
transformation was in effect and determined to compete with Ameriquest
Mortgage,591 began drawing on its $11 billion credit line.592 Bank of America—
long interested in acquiring C—took a $2 billion equity stake with an option to
buy if C were ever for sale.593 AM explored the creation of a “loan recall”
program to achieve a soft landing, but Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae regulations
blocked the approach; by the end of that year, with C’s credit line exhausted,
Bank of America exercised its option and purchased C for $4 billion in January
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Id. at xiii. In 2005, C funded one of every five mortgages in the U.S. Id. at 125.
See id. at 10, 15–17, 155 (describing C’s POARM product).
588
Id. at 21, 204–05 (outlining the reasons C extended POARM loans despite the risks).
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Id. at 23.
590
See COUNTRYWIDE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT.
591
See HUDSON, supra note 559, at 280 (reporting experts’ belief C would have survived if AM
“hadn’t become fixated on competing with Ameriquest.”).
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MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 257–59.
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Id. at 259.
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2008.594
Some suggest AM was unfairly vilified because he was the face of the
subprime mortgage crisis and all he and C were guilty of was assuming too
much risk and failing to adapt—an indictment that can be leveled at borrowers
as well.595 However, as C was collapsing in 2007, AM sold $129 million of his
shares in C while publicly touting the stock and using shareholder funds to
repurchase stock to support the share price.596 During the scrutiny that followed,
it was discovered C had extended “sweetheart” financing, including discounted
rates and fees, to influential politicians, including members of the House and
Senate Banking and Budget Committees and a former CEO of Fannie Mae—all
individuals who exercised regulatory authority over C.597 AM was subpoenaed
by and berated before congressional committees,598 and shareholders, state
pension funds, and owners of mortgage-backed securities filed suits alleging
serial violations of SEC, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac regulations.599 With
housing values down by 30% in many areas of the country, state and municipal
revenues diminished, leading to budget deficits that in turn sparked political
unrest across the Midwest.600 On June 4, 2009, the SEC charged AM with
insider trading and securities fraud,601 and on October 15, 2010, the parties
reached a settlement in which AM agreed to pay $67.5 million and accept a
lifetime ban from serving with any public company,602 thereby avoiding a civil
trial that might have developed evidence, along with an ongoing FBI
investigation, to support criminal charges.603 However, this fine is a small
594

Id. at 267–272.
Id. at 186, 307–08 (arguing AM and C were not solely responsible for C’s collapse because
borrowers overleveraged themselves to purchase houses they could not afford).
596
Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/yourmoney/26country.html?pagewanted=all.
597
Sam Gustin, Countrywide VIP Loans Went to Key Lawmakers: Congressional Report, TIME
(July 6, 2012), http://www.business/time/com/2012/07/06/countrywide-vip-loans-went-to-key-law
makers-congressional-report/.
598
See MUIOLO & PADILLA, supra note 580, at 270–73 (describing the hearing before the House
Oversight Committee in January 2008).
599
See, e.g., Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2008)
(alleging C “omitted and misstated the credit worthiness of the underlying mortgage borrowers”
thereby greatly underrepresenting the risk of the investment to plaintiffs); Brill v. Countrywide
Home Loans Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
600
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2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/14/impact-on-states-of-2008-finan
cial-crisis/2812691/.
601
See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Mozilo, No. CV09-3994HFWNABX, 2009 WL 3807124, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009).
602
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fraction of the more than $600 million of AM’s net worth, and C reimbursed
AM $20 million pursuant to an indemnification clause in AM’s employment
contract.604 AM rejects responsibility and instead “blame[s] everyone from alQaeda to the ratings agencies” for the bursting of the real estate bubble and the
collapse of C.605
B. Analysis
1. Methodological Considerations and Limitations
The ultimate objective in the field of CLC is the specification and testing
of a theory with explanatory and predictive power. Theoretical testing requires
data analysis, but, as the complexity of the phenomenon increases, the
availability of data decreases. Some phenomena, such as corporate scandal,
yield insufficient cases to support the testing of general propositions with
traditional quantitative analysis. Indeed, the data universe is limited, at first
blush, to an “n” of fewer than thirty cases of corporate scandal.
Moreover, phenomena that are causally linked to human agency and social
processes are so complex and rooted in specific contexts that quantitative
methods often obscure nuances, rendering barren descriptions and weak
explanations. Although there is pressure to transform contextually-sensitive
social phenomena, including the study of CLC, into empirical questions
“answerable” with statistics, and although statistical analysis does afford a
rigorous assessment of patterns of covariation across a wide range of cases,
statistical analysis treats cases as aggregates of a limited number of variables
and generalizes from identifiable patterns of variance. By drawing a small
number of independent variables from their natural contexts and relegating all
others to theoretical irrelevance, statistical analysis marginalizes human agency.
A fundamental canon in science is that the research question, rather than
methodological preferences, should drive experimental design. When few cases
exist and the hypothesized chain of causation involves human agency, the
“comparative method” best fosters development and testing of theory.
2. The Comparative Method
The comparative method is case-oriented and relies upon comprehensive
historical research to identify causal factors while simultaneously comparing

the civil settlement between SEC and AM.
604
Gretchen Morgenson, Lending Magnate Settles Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/business/16countrywide.html.
605
MUIOLO & PADILLA, supra note 580, at 256.
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each case as a holistic entity to every other case. Researchers compare and
contrast combinations of casual factors in one case with different combinations
in another and, through systematic “eyeballing,” identify patterns of similarity
and difference in the distribution of outcomes associated with various
combinations. Comparativists then identify which of the possible causal factors
is constant across all cases of a particular outcome and thereby denote degrees
of isomorphism. While the comparative method does not prove causation, it
creates a point of departure for experimental research. As formalized here, the
comparative method treats each personality construct as a causal
factor/independent variable and each outcome as a dependent variable.
3. Formalization: Qualititative Comparative Analysis
Events do not simply happen but instead occur only under precisely
delimited conditions. Formal methods led researchers to find combustion
requires oxygen, microbes cause infectious disease, and an absence of Vitamin
C causes scurvy. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) rests upon the axiom
that, short of laboratory experimentation, which is nearly impossible in the
social sciences, inductive logic is required to determine necessary and sufficient
causal factors of outcomes.
a. Causal Factors and Outcomes
QCA, a methodology developed to investigate questions grounded in
human agency, permits the investigator of a particular DV, or “outcome,” to
identify, through interpretation of all existing historical cases of the outcome, a
broad number, “n”, of probable IVs, or “causal factors.”606 These causal factors
are measured dichotomously across the universe of cases. Each case is
examined for the presence or absence of the causal factor; its presence is
indicated by a capital letter, for example, “A,” and its absence by a lower-case
letter, “a.” The theoretical number of combinations of causal factors is thus 2n
where “n” is the number of independent variables.
b. Necessary and Sufficient Conditionality

606
The term “causal factor” is a misnomer. Although it is possible to establish associative
relationships between variables through QCA, it is impossible to prove causation. An associative
relationship is a statement that the presence of an IV tends to occur in connection with the presence
of a DV; it does not mean the DV is caused by the IV, although a causal inference may be drawn.
Proof of causation requires controlled experimentation to prove the IV, rather than some intervening
variable, causes the DV to occur and that the association is not simply one of covariance.
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Each of the 2n cases is placed in a “truth table” matrix that associates
particular outcomes with particular combinations of causal factors that
manifested in actual historical cases. Where cells in the truth table are unfilled
due to an absence of the particular combination in the historical record,
experimental research augments history and exhausts all possible combinations
of causal factors. While QCA cannot yield completely generalizable laws on the
basis of very few cases, it nonetheless specifies relationships of necessity and
sufficiency between causal factors and outcomes that hold across the universe of
extant cases. A “necessary” causal factor is one that always precedes a given
outcome/effect and in the absence of which the outcome/event cannot occur. A
“sufficient” causal factor is a factor in the presence of which a given
outcome/effect must occur.
c. Prime Implicants
QCA employs Boolean algebra to reduce several combinations of causal
factors productive of the same outcome(s) to “prime implicants.” In formal
logic, an “implication” is formed when two statements are combined by placing
the word “if” before the first and the word “then” between them. For example,
“If I drink this glass of water, then my thirst will be quenched.” In an
implication, the statement between the words “if” and “then” is known as the
“antecedent;” the statement which follows the word “then” is the “consequent.”
An implication asserts that its antecedent implies its consequent; thus, if the
statement “I drink this glass of water” is true, it is also true that “my thirst will
be quenched.” Implication does not suggest it is impossible to satisfy thirst in
any other manner, nor does implication imply there may not be other outcomes
attendant to drinking the glass of water. It may be argued beer may satisfy my
thirst, or the water may be poisoned, and, thus, although it quenches thirst, it
may also produce death. However, the essential meaning of implication is the
relationship asserted between antecedent and consequent: if the antecedent is
true, the consequent is also true.
A “prime implicant” is a special implicant in which the antecedent is the
minimum combination of causal factors, which together are either 1) sufficient
to cause a particular outcome, or 2) necessary to cause a particular outcome
across the universe of cases, and the consequent is that outcome. For any given
outcome, y, for which there is a prime implicant, x, if x is a true statement of
existing causal factors then either 1) y must occur as a result of the existence of
x, or 2) x is a prerequisite for the production of y. A prime implicant can be
identified by surveying the universe of cases in which a given outcome is
expressed and eliminating each of the “n” causal constructs for which there is
more than one possible value from the causal construct combinations associated
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with that outcome. Taken together, those constructs that remain in every case in
which the outcome occurs constitute the prime implicant.
d. Probabilities: Hypothetical Analysis
When the historical record fails to exhaust all possible combinations of
causal factors, it is impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality.
QCA then analyzes preliminary hypotheses regarding relationships between
causal factors and outcomes to derive probabilistic statements to inform
experimental research.
Consider the phenomenon of “successful social
revolution,” which has occurred three times. In all three cases the causal factor
of “collapsing monarchy” was present, but in only two—the Russian Revolution
in 1917 and the Chinese Revolution in 1949—was “charismatic leadership”
present. In the third—the French Revolution in 1789—it was absent.
Accordingly, while “collapsing monarchy” is a necessary condition for social
revolution, “charismatic leadership” is not.
However, the preliminary
hypothesis, “The stronger and more charismatic the leader of the revolutionary
element, the more successful the resulting social revolution,” is affirmed by two
of three, or 66.7%, of cases, as is the probabilistic statement, “A successful
social revolution will be led by a strong and charismatic leader.”
4. QCA Applied to the Association of Personality Constructs and
CLC Outcomes
a. Personality Constructs as Causal Factors
Four personality constructs, each of which is a causal factor and an IV, are
labeled as follows:
• militarism: A (presence of construct/factor) or a (absence of construct/
factor);
• anomism: B (presence of construct/factor) or b (absence of
construct/factor);
• hostility: C (presence of construct/factor) or c (absence of
construct/factor);
• adventurism: D (presence of construct/factor) or d (absence of
construct/factor).
Personality construct scores for each CEO are aggregated to create
personality profiles for all historical cases of corporate scandal. Four
dichotomized IVs yield 24, or sixteen, possible personality profiles. As Table I
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illustrates, the presence of each outcome/DV in a case is scored “1,” while its
absence is scored “0”:
Table I: Personality Construct Scores
Market Manipulation

Bribery

Political Influence

Labor Law

Enviro

Resist Enforce

Bad Reputation

Restate Earnings

Subpoena

Legal Penalties

Legal Death

Deny & Blame

Enron/

Inflated Compensation

Profile

Securities Violation

CEO/

Financial Violation

Firm/

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

JS/
ABCD
WC/
BE/
aBCD
ImClone/
SW/
ABCD
AIG/
HG/
AbCd
HS/
Scrushy/
ABCd
Sunbeam/
Dunlap/
ABCD
Tyco/
DK/
aBCD
H/
Cheney/
ABCD
BM/
BMLS/
ABCD
AM/
Counry
Wide/
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AbCd

Table II illustrates sixty preliminary hypotheses, twenty of which are
affirmed by 70% or more of cases and eight by 30% or fewer:
Table II: Preliminary Hypotheses
1

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

financial regulations.
2

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate securities

6/10

regulations.
3

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate executive

6/10

compensation.
4

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate

3/10

the market.
5

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in

5/10

bribery.
6

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to buy political

5/10

influence.
7

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

employee rights.
8

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

3/10

environmental standards.
9

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to resist

5/10

enforcement.
10

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn

7/10

reputations as bad corporate citizens..
11

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate earnings.

6/10

12

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by Congress.

6/10

13

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur

7/10

legal penalties.
14

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer legal

4/10

death.
15

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and

5/10

blame others..
16

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

financial regulations.
17

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

securities regulations.
18

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate
executive compensation.

8/10
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The more anomistict he CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate the

5/10

market.
20

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in

3/10

bribery.
21

The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to buy political

3/10

influence.
22

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

employee rights.
23

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

3/10

environmental standards.
24

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to resist

5/10

enforcement.
25

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn reputations as

5/10

bad corporate citizens..
26

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate earnings.

6/10

27

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by Congress.

6/10

28

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur

7/10

legal penalties.
29

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer legal death.

6/10

30

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and

7/10

blame others.
31

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate financial

7/10

regulations.
32

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate securities

8/10

regulations.
33

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate executive

6/10

compensation.
34

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate the

3/10

market.
35

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in

3/10

bribery.
36

The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to buy political influence.

5/10

37

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate employee

6/10

rights.
38

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

1/10

environmental standards.
39

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to resist enforcement.

5/10

40

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn reputations as

5/10

bad corporate citizens.
41

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate earnings.

6/10

42

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by Congress.

6/10
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penalties.
44

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer legal death.

4/10

45

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and

7/10

blame others.
46

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

6/10

financial regulations.
47

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

9/10

securities regulations.
48

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate

7/10

executive compensation.
49

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate the

6/10

market.
50

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in

4/10

bribery.
51

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to buy political

4/10

influence.
52

The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate

3/10

employee rights.
53

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

5/10

environmental standards.
54

The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to resist

4/10

enforcement.
55

The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to earn reputations

5/10

as bad corporate citizens..
56

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate

5/10

earnings.
57

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by

7/10

Congress.
58

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur

8/10

legal penalties.
59

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer

7/10

legal death.
60

The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and

4/10

blame others.

b. Prime Implicants of CLC Outcomes
No outcome is associated with a single personality profile across all ten
cases, thus it is not possible to identify a prime implicant for any outcome.
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Although several outcomes are associated with the presence or absence of
personality constructs across several cases, including in every case in which a
particular outcome is expressed—for example, “violate financial regulations”
occurred in seven of ten cases, and in all seven occurrences the CEO scored “C”
for the presence of the hostility construct. For none is the presence of a given
personality construct associated with each case wherein the outcome occurs
while the absence of that personality construct is associated with each case
wherein the outcome does not occur—for example, in the three cases where no
violation of financial regulations occurred the CEO scored “C” for present and
not “c” for absent on the hostility construct. Hypothetically, a single personality
profile could serve as a prime implicant in all ten historical cases across all
sixteen possible personality profiles. However, in the ten cases, only four
personality profiles—ABCD, aBCD, AbCd, ABCd—have been associated with
corporate scandal. Where history has not exhausted all possible combinations of
causal factors and prevents specification of necessary and sufficient causality,
QCA directs the investigator to perform hypothetical analysis to derive
probabilistic statements.
c. Hypothetical Analysis
No Preliminary Hypothesis (PH) is affirmed by all or none of the ten
historical cases of corporate scandal. Nonetheless, if there were no relationship
between any personality construct and any outcome, chance predicts each PH
would be affirmed by five cases and rejected by five cases. To affirm a
particular PH, an arbitrary determination is made that it must be supported by at
least 70% of cases in which the outcome is expressed; to reject a particular PH,
and to affirm the null hypothesis expressing the inverse relationship of causal
factor and outcome, it must be affirmed by 30% or fewer of the cases in which
the outcome is expressed. This requirement establishes a sufficiently significant
improvement over chance that a measure of confidence can be placed in those
PHs affirmed or rejected. Reformulated hypotheses, stated as working
postulates (WPs) are offered in Table III:
Table III: Working Postulates
WP1

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

financial regulations.
WP2

The more militaristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to

7/10

manipulate the market.
WP3

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

employee rights.
WP4

The more militaristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate

7/10
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environmental standards.
WP5

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn

7/10

reputations as bad corporate citizens.
WP6

The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur

7/10

legal penalties.
WP7

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

financial regulations.
WP8

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

securities regulations.
WP9

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate

8/10

executive compensation.
WP10

The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to engage in

7/10

bribery.
WP11

The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to buy

7/10

political influence.
WP12

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

employee rights.
WP13

The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate

7/10

environmental standards.
WP14

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur

7/10

legal penalties.
WP15

The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing

7/10

and blame others.
WP16

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

7/10

financial regulations.
WP17

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate

8/10

securities regulations.
WP18

The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to manipulate

7/10

the market.
WP19

The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to engage in

7/10

bribery.
WP20

The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate

9/10

environmental standards.
WP21

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur

7/10

legal penalties.
WP22

The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing

7/10

and blame others.
WP23

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to

9/10

violate securities regulations.
WP24

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate
executive compensation.

7/10
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The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to

7/10

violate employee rights.
WP26

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by

7/10

Congress.
WP27

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will

8/10

incur legal penalties.
WP28

The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer

7/10

legal death.

d. Analysis of Associative Relationships
i. Militarism and CLC
WP 1 confirms the intuition that a CEO who is fixed upon achieving
wealth, power, and status to the detriment of other ends, including the discharge
of responsibilities to stakeholders, will violate financial regulations if rules stand
in the way. Similarly, as WP 3 suggests, it stands to reason that such a person so
motivated will run roughshod over the legally-protected rights and interests of
employees. Moreover, as violations mount, detection is inevitable in the long
run, and WP 5 predicts that along the path the odds the illegal conduct of firms,
or at least some aspects of it, will “leak” into the community and earn them and
their CEOs reputations as scofflaws increases in direct proportion to the
frequency of their lawbreaking which, in turn, is a function of CEO militarism.
Finally, it stands to reason, as WP 6 suggests, firms with militaristic CEOs will
be more likely to commit legal violations that result in legal penalties.
In contrast, it is counterintuitive, as WPs 2 and 4 suggest, that militaristic
CEOs are better environmental defenders than their non-militaristic peers and
less likely to manipulate the market. Both findings are likely an artifact of the
small number of cases, and the former is likely the result of the fact that few, if
any, include the enterprises—mining, manufacturing, etc.—against which most
of the existing environmental legal regime is directed.
ii. Anomism and CLC
Anomistic CEOs—ignorant and even disdainful of law and legal
authorities and bereft of an internal moral code—will instinctively regard legal
and moral restrictions on their conduct in purely instrumental terms. As WPs 7,
8, 9, and 12 suggest, little, if any, independent weight will be accorded to
financial and securities laws, customary expectations regarding executive
compensation, or the rights of employees in their CLC decision-making, and
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behaviors will be guided largely, or even solely, by other considerations. WP 14
indicates anomistic CEOs assume greater legal risk and, therefore, incur greater
legal exposure, to include the increased likelihood of prosecution, and, with
prosecution, conviction. Finally, it is consistent with the general description of
anomism that, as WP 15 anticipates, the anomistic CEO, who knows and cares
little about the legal regime he or she is accused of violating and has never felt
impressed by any sense of legal obligation, will deny any knowledge of or
responsibility for his or her wrongdoing and seek to attribute any such
responsibility to other parties. Although there is a human tendency to deny
responsibility for one’s mistakes, this tendency is strongest in the anomistic
CEO, who does not believe in the law, and, if in fact the law exists, is sure he or
she is above it.
WPs10 and 11, however, are counterintuitive. An anomistic CEO is
precisely the sort expected to engage in buying political influence and outright
bribery, notwithstanding any legal prohibition. Still, at least insofar as WP 10 is
concerned, only a small number of cases are available for study and the practice
may largely be limited to international firms doing business overseas. Similarly,
the finding in WP 13—an anomistic CEO is less likely to engage a firm in
violation of environmental law—is difficult to explain and may be driven in part
by the limited number of cases and the lack of representation in the sample by
extractive and manufacturing firms that engage in operations with potential
environmental impacts.
iii. Hostility and CLC
It stands to reason, as WPs 16 and 17 postulate, that self-absorbed,
delusional, amoral CEOs who distrust and dislike humanity would treat “lesser”
people as tools for grabbing wealth and power in contravention of financial and
securities laws. Hostility may warp CEO judgments. It also should follow, as
WP 21 anticipates, that such selfish and hostile personalities subordinate firm
interests to their own in ultimately futile attempts to stave off detection and
punishment. And, as WP 22 indicates, when confronted with evidence of their
wrongdoing, hostile CEOs are psychologically predisposed to preserve
delusions of perfection and nobility, deny wrongdoing, and blame the “little
people” who have failed them.
The finding in WP 18 is likely an artifact of too few cases. Only five
firms—Enron, WorldCom, AIG, Halliburton, and Countrywide—possessed the
kind of market clout that could disturb the efficient operation of markets, and the
majority of these firms did wield this clout. Had more firms with market power
and hostile CEOs been available for study, intuition suggests the direction of
this relationship would be reversed. WP 19 is also counterintuitive; we would
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expect that the more hostile a CEO is the more likely he or she would be to look
upon bribery as nothing more than necessary business expense paid to achieve
gains, particularly as against those unwilling to pay. It may be that hostility is
no absolute bar to the exercise of prudent discretion, or that parties seeking
bribes are more cautious in their dealings with CEOs they recognize as hostile
and tend to refrain from conduct in which they suspect their would-be coconspirators would later implicate them. Because the analysis of the ten cases of
corporate scandal yield only three instances of bribery, it is premature to claim
much strength for the associative relationship implied by WP 19. The same
must be said for WP 20; the ten cases reveal only a single attempt to violate
environmental laws, and the prediction that the more hostile the CEO the less
likely his or her firm will violate environmental standards may be the product of
insufficient data.
iv. Adventurism and CLC
WP 23 states impulsive, optimistic gamblers who repose great faith in
their capacity to control events and absorb stress are, as CEOs, compelled to
undertake business strategies that afford the prospect of significant benefits—
specifically, violating securities regulations—while presenting significant risks
in the form of financial and legal consequences to themselves, their firms, their
shareholders, and their communities. As WPs 24 and 25 predict, seeking
inflated compensation and abusing subordinate employees for selfish motives
are behaviors associated with the adventuristic CEO because the payoff to the
CEO is great and the potential penalties—the loss of face and the loss of human
capital to the firm—seem small in comparison. WP 26, which postulates that
the more adventuristic the CEO the more likely he or she will be subpoenaed by
Congress, illustrates that, although risk and optimism are necessary parts of a
business strategy and although some of the greatest human triumphs have been
attained by the assumption of great amounts of risk—aviation and the discovery
of drugs for cancer are but two—risk can also lead to business failure, and to the
sort of financial and accounting shenanigans designed to shield failure from
investors. WP 27 and WP 28 illustrate a strong association between
adventurism and legal penalties, as well as the legal death of the adventurist’s
firm. Apparently, not only Congress but also shareholders eager to recoup
losses and prosecutors motivated by visions of higher office take a dim view of
CEO adventurism.
e. Outcome Maximizing Associations and Combinations
Although no CLC outcome has a prime implicant, several are associated
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with personality profiles that share at least one personality construct score across
at least 70% of associated profiles. WP 1, “The more militaristic a CEO, the
more likely his/her firm will be to violate financial regulations,” is supported by
seven of ten, or 70%, of cases, while six of seven, or 86%, of personality
profiles associated with the presence of the outcome “violate financial
regulations” contain the personality construct “A,” “militaristic,” and, thus,
reinforce WP 1. Nineteen Outcome Maximizing Associations (OMAs) meet or
exceed the 70% confidence level on both measures: WPs 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12,
14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28.
An “Outcome Maximizing Combination” (OMC) represents that construct
or aggregation of constructs that yields the greatest probability, relative to all
others, that the corresponding outcome will occur. Each construct that generates
an OMA for an outcome is included in the OMC for that outcome. Constructs
that do not meet this threshold are excluded from OMCs, and it is assumed that
these constructs have no greater influence than chance on the associated
outcomes. For example, for the outcome “violate securities regulation,” three
WPs—WP 9, “The more anomistic the CEO the more likely his/her firm will be
to violate securities regulations,” WP 19, “The more hostile the CEO the more
likely his/her firm will be to violate securities regulations,” and WP 27, “The
more adventuristic the CEO the more likely his/her firm will be to violate
securities regulations”—are OMAs. Therefore, “anomism,” “hostility,” and
“adventurism,” indicated by the score BCD, form the OMC for “violate
securities regulations. However, PH 2, “The more militaristic the CEO the more
likely his/her firm will be to violate securities regulations,” was supported by
60% of cases and, thus, did not meet the 70% threshold to be included as a WP
and, thus, is excluded as an OMA. Consequently, neither the presence nor
absence of militarism is part of the OMC for “violate securities regulations,” and
whether the CEO is militaristic or not has no greater influence than chance on
the outcome “violate securities regulations. Table IV illustrates OMCs for all
CLC outcomes:
Table IV: Outcome Maximizing Combinations
Outcome Maximizing Combination
Financial Violation

AC

Securities Violation

BCD

Inflated Compensation

BD

Market Manipulation

None

Bribery

None

Political Influence

None
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Labor Law

ABD

Enviro

None

Resist Enforce

A

Bad Reputation

C

Restate Earnings

ABD

Subpoena

ABCD

Legal Penalties

D

Legal Death

D

Deny & Blame

BC
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Each construct is associated with six OMCs, a finding that suggests all
constructs are equally associated with CLC outcomes. Yet, as further analysis
reveals, hostility, and to a lesser extent adventurism, may be the “master” CLC
personality constructs that harness the greatest explanatory and predictive
power. If so, then the capacity to determine the presence or absence of hostility
and adventurism is a potent tool in CEO selection and retention. That anomism
may yield less predictive power is counterintuitive inasmuch as one might
expect this construct, which most closely taps attitudes, beliefs, and values about
law and legal institutions, to offer greater insight into CEO behaviors regarding
CLC. The fact that beliefs, attitudes, and values held by a CEO regarding law
may be less salient to explaining and predicting the compliance of his firm than
his hostility or adventurism is remarkable.
f. Probabilistic Statements of Association
A “Probabilistic Statement of Association” (PSA) is a synthetic statement
of the associative strength between a personality construct and a CLC outcome
across a minimum of 70% of the ten historical cases in hypothetical analysis, as
well as across a minimum of 70% of cases in which the outcome is actually
expressed. A PSA expresses the strength of the associative relationship in terms
of the probability that a given CLC outcome will occur given information about
the construct or profile of the CEO who makes CLC decisions. PSAs do not
imply the absolute truth of the associative relationship, nor do they identify the
microprocesses that “produce” outcomes.
Nonetheless nineteen PSAs,
illustrated in Table V, help extend the reach of data analysis:
Table V: Probabilistic Statements of Association
1

A militaristic CEO associates with violation of financial regulation in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and
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6 of 7 outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78.
2

A militaristic CEO associates with violation of employee rights in 8 of 10 cases (100%) and 6
of 6 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .90.

3

A militaristic CEO associates with a bad reputation in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 5 of 5 outcome
occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85.

4

A militaristic CEO associates with legal penalties in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 6 of 7 outcome
occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78.

5

An anomistic CEO associates with violation of financial regulations in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and
6 of 7 outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78.

6

An anomistic CEO associates with violation of securities regulations in 8 of 10 cases (80%)
and 7 of 8 outcome occurrences (88%) for an average probability of .84.

7

An anomistic CEO associates with inflated executive compensation in 8 of 10 cases (80%) and
6 of 6 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .90.

8

An anomistic CEO associates with violation of employee rights in 8 of 10 cases (80%) and 6
of 6 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .90.

9

An anomistic CEO associates with legal penalties in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 6 of 7 outcome
occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78.

10

An anomistic CEO associates with denial of wrongdoing in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 6 of 7
outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78.

11

A hostile CEO associates with violations of financial regulations in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 7
of 7 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85.

12

A hostile CEO associates with violations of securities regulations in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 8
of 8 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85.

13

A hostile CEO associates with denial of wrongdoing and attribution of blame in 7 of 10 cases
(70%) and 7 of 7 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85.

14

An adventuristic CEO associates with securities violations in 9 of 10 cases (90%) and 7 of 8
outcome occurrences (88%) for an average probability of .89.

15

An adventuristic CEO associates with inflated executive compensation in 7 of 10 cases (70%)
and 5 of 6 outcome occurrences (83%) for an average probability of .77.

16

An adventuristic CEO associates with violation of employee rights in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and
5 of 6 outcome occurrences (83%) for an average probability of .77.

17

An adventuristic CEO associates with a congressional subpoena in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 5
of 6 outcome occurrences (83%) for an average probability of .77.

18

An adventuristic CEO associates with legal penalties in 8 of 10 cases (80%) and 6 of 7
outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .83.

19

An adventuristic CEO associates with legal death in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 4 of 4 outcome
occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85.

PSAs offer explanatory and predictive probabilities for eleven of fifteen
DVs/outcomes; no PSA can be deduced on the basis of existing data for four
CLC outcomes at or above the 70% threshold. For example, PSAs 4, 9, and 18,
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taken together, suggest the probability that legal penalties were or will be
imposed upon a firm led into scandal by a militaristic, anomistic, and
adventuristic CEO is 80%—the average of 78%, 78%, and 83%. Put differently,
the probability that a militaristic, anomistic, and adventuristic CEO has or will
be more likely to make business decisions that result in legal penalties than will
a non-militaristic, non-anomistic, and non-adventuristic CEO is 80%. The
corollary also holds: the probability that legal penalties have been or will be
imposed upon a firm led by a non-militaristic, non-anomistic, and nonadventuristic CEO is 20%.
C. Combined Theoretical Model
Coefficients of Associative Relationships (CAR) relax the rigor in
establishing association between personality constructs and CLC outcomes and
are measured by calculating the average of (1) the percentage of cases in
hypothetical analysis supporting a particular associative relationship between a
construct and a particular outcome and (2) the percentage of QCA outcome
occurrences in which the associative relationship between the construct and
outcome is expressed. For example, for militarism and “violate financial
regulations,” the associative relationship is supported in 70% of cases and the
militarism sub-construct is present in 6 of 7, or 86%, of occurrences of “violate
financial regulations.” Thus, the CAR for the relationship between militarism
and “violate financial regulations” is .78—the average of .70 and .86. In Figure
1, arrows indicate associative relationships between constructs and CLC
outcomes. The strengths of associative relationships are indicated by labeling
each arrow with a CAR ranging from -1.00 to -.50 and .50 to 1.00. A
relationship of perfect positive association is accorded a CAR of 1.00; a
relationship of perfect negative association is accorded a CAR of -1.00. A CAR
of .5 or -.5 signifies the equivalent of chance. This measurement is analogous to
the correlation coefficients used in regression analysis; however, true
measurement of correlation is not feasible given the small “n” of cases, and,
thus, relationships of association are employed to the same end. Where an
arrow connects a construct to a CLC outcome labeled with a positive CAR, the
presence of the personality construct associates with the CLC outcome. The
obverse of this stated relationship is also true. For an arrow labeled with a
negative CAR the absence of the personality construct associates with the CLC
outcome to which it is connected. Again, the obverse of this relationship is also
true. In the Model, only those CARs with coefficients greater than or equal to
.65 are represented:
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FINANCIAL
VIOLATION
A .78

B .78

C .85 D. 66 

SECURITIES
VIOLATION

INFLATE
COMPENSATION

A .68 B .89

A .77 B .85

C .90

C .80 D . 77

D .89



MARKET
MANIPULA TION
B .75
D . 90

MILITARISM

A
BRIBERY
A .75

POLITI CAL
INFLUENCE


ANOMISM

A . 65 B .6 5
C . 80

B

LABOR
LAW
A . 90 B .9





C . 80 D . 77

ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW

D
V
s

A .65 B . 75
D .7

RESIST
ENFORCEMENT



A .7 5 B .7 5

HOSTILITY

C .86

C

BAD
REPUTATION
A .7 5 B . 65
C .65

RESTATE
EARNINGS

ADVENTURISM



A .72
C .80

CONGRESSIONAL
SUBPOENA

 

A .77 B . 77
C .8 5 D . 77

DENY &
BLAME

LEGAL
DEATH

LEGAL
PENALTY

B .78
C .85 D . 66

B .8 5
C . 70 D .8 5

A .78 B . 78
C .85 D .83



D. General Observations and Caveats
Perfect explanation and prediction of human decisions made in complex
and dynamic situations characterized by uncertainty and stress transcend the
current state of science, as do attempts to predict exactly when, where, and how
future corporate scandals will erupt. It is important to stress the limited and
conditional nature of the causal significance of personality. Nevertheless,
heuristic testing of the CLC pretheory has generated several associative
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relationships between CEO personality constructs and CLC outcomes. These
relationships, presented in narrative format, are building blocks upon which to
continue development and testing of the theory.
1. “Ideal-Typic” CEOs and Associated CLC Outcomes
a. ABCD
The CEO who is a militarist and is anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic—
ABCD—is an authoritarian, even imperial, leader and an aggressive competitor
with prior military service and low self-esteem who will view the use of power
favorably both within the firm to establish hierarchies and in its business
strategy to defeat rivals, and will prefer to make decisions in isolation. He or
she will have little regard for law or legal authorities, will lack moral or ethical
qualms about violating obligations regarding finance or securities regimes, and
will know little of the substance of law generally and even less about corporate
law. He or she will not trust others and will regard stakeholders—employees,
investors, business partners—in solely instrumental terms: their worth to
him/her will be measured simply by whether they contribute to his or her grand
visions of wealth, power, and status, and failing any value he or she will express
a generalized animus toward them, particularly if they are of different social
groups than him or her. He or she will be an optimistic gambler whose belief
that he or she can assert his or her will upon events and bend others to his or her
aims will impel him or her to take risks and cut corners, and he or she will
resolve the tremendous anxiety and stress that accompanies this risky behavior
by trusting blindly and, in effect, rolling the dice that neither he or she nor his or
her firm will be caught when committing CLC violations.
The ABCD CEO is more likely than a CEO with any other personality
profile to preside over a firm that engages in fraudulent accounting,
misrepresentation of the firm’s financial condition, insider trading, and other
securities violations. This CEO creates a culture of lavish compensation
packages for executives that are indefensible by reference to the marketplace
while disregarding laws that protect other employees against discrimination, fair
employment practices, violations of pension and retirement benefits, and
reprisals for whistleblowing. Prior to discovery of its substantial and systematic
violations of law, the firm led by this CEO will earn a bad reputation with
employees, investors, lenders, customers, vendors, local communities, and
regulators for unethical and unlawful practices. These external stakeholders
may intuitively recognize and naturally resent the ABDC CEO’s decision to
discount their influence and interests; however, any anxiety and stress that
attend the prospects of developing a bad reputation are more than offset by the
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ABCD CEO’s optimistic hope that the profit from such a strategy more than
compensates the firm for the risk entailed in “going it alone.” Moreover, when
he or she fails to overcome risks that a less adventuristic CEO would not have
assumed and the firm stumbles publicly, Congress may well come calling.
However, this CEO will feel no independent compliance pull. His or her lack of
trust in the political and legal system, coupled with the belief Congress is “the
enemy,” will place the CEO in an adversarial relationship, and he or she will
likely refuse to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.
Congressional
committees, frustrated by the lack of voluntary compliance and by the inability
to attribute business failures to the assumption of understandable risk rather than
to illegality, will be compelled to subpoena him or her. This CEO’s gamble that
neither he or she nor his or her firm will be detected, or if detected, prosecuted,
or if prosecuted, convicted, will often be a losing bet, for this personality profile
is most closely associated with the imposition of civil and criminal legal
penalties.
Precisely how unbridled, aggressive ambition coupled with a lack of legal
or ethical foundation and a hostile, instrumental, risk-hungry approach translates
into these CLC violations, and the consequences that follow, is the stuff of
future research. Still, the preceding description readily evokes Jeffrey Skilling,
Sam Waksal, Albert Dunlap, Dick Cheney, and Bernard Madoff—ABCD CEOs.
b. (A/a)BCD
The (A/a)BCD CEO may view reason and persuasion, rather than power,
as appropriate methods for making and implementing decisions, and may prefer
to build coalitions and affiliations. His or her successes may be shared
successes. However, he or she will have little regard for law or legal authorities,
will lack moral or ethical qualms about violating legal obligations, and will
know little of the substance of law generally and even less about corporate law.
He or she will not trust others and will regard rivals and stakeholders—
employees, investors, business partners—in instrumental terms: their worth to
him or her will be measured simply by whether they contribute to his or her
grand visions of wealth, power, and status, and failing any value he or she will
express a generalized animus toward them, particularly if they are of different
social groups than him or her. The (A/a)BCD CEO’s wildly optimistic belief
that he or she can assert his or her will upon events to gain advantage over
competitors will impel him or her to take great risks, and he or she will resolve
accompanying anxiety and stress by trusting blindly and gambling that neither
he or she nor his or her firm will be sanctioned by regulators.
The (A/a)BCD CEO is the most likely personality profile to direct a firm
to violate antitrust laws, fix prices or production levels, commit industrial
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espionage, and manipulate the market. He or she is also most likely to preside
over the bankruptcy or liquidation of his or her firm as a result of having
engaged in practices made illegal under corporate law. Ignorance, it seems, may
spell not bliss but actually danger in a CEO, whose gambles that he or she can
conspire to restrain fair trade, that his or her firm will not post losses than cannot
be covered by earnings, and that the firm will remain liquid in the face of
demanding creditors and unwilling debtors, will prove fatal. When the firm and
its leaders are subjected to legal penalties, the (A/a)BCD CEO will deny
wrongdoing, withhold apologies or remorse, and blame others. As a superior
creature who regards the “little people” he or she employs or who hold the
firm’s shares or live as neighbors as mere objects meant to serve ends, and as
someone who does not feel any compliance pull whatsoever, the (A/a)BCD
CEO feels no empathy for those who suffer his or her decisions and must
displace the blame upon a lesser person better suited to bear it. Although
denying blame for our mistakes and casting it upon others may be a function of
simply being human—few of us are able to openly admit that we are imperfect
and that who we would like to be and who we are expected to be in social life
are not always achieved—and while denying wrongdoing may be a rational
defense that all but the clinically insane or the most honest offer to minimize
attendant political and legal costs, the (A/a)BCD CEO is least likely of all
personality profiles to accept any responsibility.
The present study cannot conclude militarism has a significant associative
relationship with the outcome “manipulate the market.” However, three CEOs
led their firms to commit this CLC violation, and two—Jeffrey Skilling and
Dick Cheney—are militarists. Moreover, four firms suffered legal death: Enron,
WorldCom, Sunbeam, and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities. Each of
their CEOs, save for Bernie Ebbers, is a militarist. Furthermore, two other firms
led by CEOs with the personality profile (A/a)BCD, namely ImClone and Tyco,
were able to escape legal death only by the astute planning of a merger partner
in the case of the former and by a rapid and sound reorganization plan instituted
by a new executive team and board in the case of the latter.
c. A(B/b)C(D/d)
The A(B/b)C(D/d) CEO is an authoritarian and nationalistic leader with
prior military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated from others but
has fierce ambition and competitive drive and regards the use of power as an
appropriate means of achieving goals. He or she will not trust others and will
regard stakeholders—employees, investors, business partners—in solely
instrumental terms: their worth to him or her will be measured simply by
whether they contribute to his or her grand visions of wealth, power, and status,
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and failing any value he or she will express a generalized animus toward them,
particularly if they are of different social groups than him or her. The
A(B/b)C(D/d) CEO is more likely than those with other personality profiles to
direct a firm to corrupt business practices by accepting or offering cash,
services, or gifts to influence business decisions. This CEO’s drive for power,
control, and the defeat of his or her rivals, coupled with a disregard for law and
legal authorities and moral sources of rules, will convince him or her that
corruption is a part of the human condition and that it is legitimate to gain
advantage over competitors by unlawful means, and he or she is unlikely to
experience sufficient anxiety or stress to dissuade him or her from doing so.
Neither the anomism nor adventurism constructs demonstrated associations of
sufficient strength for inclusion in the ideal-typic personality profile for bribery.
d. ABC(D/d)
The ABC(D/d) CEO is an authoritarian, nationalistic leader with prior
military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated but has fierce ambition
and competitive drive and regards power as an appropriate method of reaching
decisions within the firm. He or she will be a self-absorbed, amoral individual
who makes decisions in isolation and will not seek to build affiliations with
others unless they serve his or her goal of achieving and protecting wealth,
power, and status. He or she will not trust others and will regard stakeholders—
employees, investors, and even politicians—in solely instrumental terms: their
worth to him or her will be measured simply by whether they advance his or her
grand visions of wealth, power, and status, and if they do not he or she will bear
them an animus.
The ABC(D/d) CEO is more likely than CEOs with other personality
profiles to allow or require corporate or employee funds, facilities, or services to
be used to support political candidates or parties in violation of law. Despite his
or her hostility, in the case of powerful politicians who grant patronage in the
form of desirable laws, generous political oversight, and prosecutorial
discretion, he or she is willing to pay for their services, and this reflects the
perceived utility of the political influence purchased and the benefits accorded to
his or her pursuit of wealth, power, and status, rather than the intrinsic value of
the relationships. Adventurism appears theoretically irrelevant. Five CEOs—
Jeffrey Skilling, Bernard Ebbers, Richard Scrushy, Hank Greenberg, and Dick
Cheney—bought political influence; all are “hostile.” Perhaps the purchase of
political influence is valued even by CEOs who are self-absorbed and
disinterested in affiliations because they view the value of the relationship
secured by cash as form of insurance against unfavorable legal, political, and
judicial results, as a valuable enhancement to the firm’s public reputation, or as
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an advance payment on any potential future liabilities.
This CEO is also most likely to resist regulatory authorities in the
implementation and enforcement of corporate law: for the ABC(D/d) CEO,
cooperation as a rule, and cooperation with legal and regulatory authorities is
anathema. Because regulators directly threaten his or her wealth, power, and
status, the hostile, anomistic militarist will regard them as competitors in a zerosum game. In five cases of corporate scandal in the present study, CEOs
resisted enforcement, and all five express AC in their personality profiles.
e. AB(C/c)D
The AB(C/c)D CEO is an authoritarian and nationalistic leader with prior
military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated but has fierce ambition
and competitive drive and regards the use of power as appropriate means to
achieve ends. He or she is a self-absorbed, amoral individual who will not seek
to build affiliations with others unless they serve his or her goal of achieving and
protecting wealth, power, and status. His or her wildly optimistic belief that he
or she can assert his or her will upon events to gain advantage over competitors
will impel him or her to take great risks, and the AB(C/c)D CEO will be too fast
to assume them and too optimistic to gauge accurately the probable outcomes of
his or her decisions; the decision to violate environmental standards, which the
AB(C/c)D CEO is more likely to make than any other personality profile, will
be an ill-considered choice that takes into consideration neither the likely
probabilities of detection nor the costs and benefits of noncompliance to the
firm. In the ten cases of corporate scandal, only one CEO—Dick Cheney, who
is scored ABCD—engaged in environmental violations.
f. AbC(D/d)
The AbC(D/d) CEO is an authoritarian and nationalistic leader with prior
military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated but has fierce ambition
and competitive drive and values he use of power to achieve ends. He or she is
a self-absorbed individual who will not build affiliations with others unless they
serve his or her goal of achieving and protecting wealth, power, and status. He
or she will not trust others and will regard employees, investors, business
partners, and even politicians in solely instrumental terms: their worth to him or
her will be measured simply by whether they advance his or her goals, and if
they do not he or she will bear them an animus, particularly if they are of
different social groups than him or her. For the AbC(D/d) CEO, however, while
the business arena is for combat, law and legal authorities are important in
regulating its extremes, and he or she may well be knowledgeable about law
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generally and corporate law specifically and governed by independent sources of
moral restraint. Thus, while he or she may direct the firm to engage in corporate
illegality that inflates the financial health of the firm and wins wealth, power,
and status, his or her lack of anomism may attenuate the extent or severity of
any legal transgressions to which the AbC(D/d) CEO commits the firm. The
AbC(D/d) CEO is more likely than other CEOs to lead a firm that restates
earnings during his or her tenure as a consequence of violations of various
aspects of CLC. Of the ten CEOs studied, two have personality profiles that
include the constructs AbC—Hank Greenberg and Angelo Mozilo—but only
one was required to restate earnings as a result of the commission of legal
violations.
2. Personality Profiles
a. “The Outlaw”
A CEO with the personality profile ABCD—militaristic, anomistic,
hostile, and adventuristic—is a corporate disaster incarnate. “The Outlaw”607 is
a human predator who will demand inflated compensation, abuse employees,
violate environmental laws, buy political favors, and direct the commission of
serious financial and securities violations that will trash the good name of the
firm, trigger analyst inquiries, require restatements of earnings, incur the wrath
of Congress and the media, destroy evidence and obstruct justice, and lead the
firm down the scandalous road to falling stock prices, dwindling earnings, civil
and criminal penalties, and bankruptcy and dissolution. The Outlaw will deny
any wrongdoing and blame others for personal and corporate misfortunes and
show no remorse for his or her actions. Although he or she may forfeit some illgotten gains and lose some of his or her freedom for a while, the Outlaw will
become extremely wealthy in the process and may even live to ride again.
b. “The Rustler”
The personality profile aBCD—nonmilitaristic but anomistic, hostile, and
adventuristic—appears almost indistinguishable from The Outlaw at first blush,

607
The four personality profiles of the ten CEOs in the present study are assigned names drawn
from a set of stock characters common to American Westerns that are as stylized and precisely
defined as the characters of the Italian Renaissance Commedia dell’Arte or the Japanese Kabuki
Theatre. The universality of the characters, themes, and conflicts is part of what makes Westerns so
compelling as art and entertainment, and their use here is meant to invest the experimental profiles
with meaning and color. See Western Characters, TV ROPES http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.
php/Main/WesternCharacters (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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yet “The Rustler” is less aggressive, less competitive, more likely to work in
groups, and less in need of stroking to boost self-esteem than his or her cousin.
Whereas The Outlaw steals by daring daylight raids and seeks worldwide fame,
The Rustler works by stealth and in the dark and prefers to be nameless and
faceless as he or she grows the herd. However, the ultimate result to the firm of
hiring The Rustler as CEO is similarly destructive: The Rustler will quietly
violate antitrust laws, fix prices or production levels, commit industrial
espionage, manipulate the free operation of the markets, and so badly
mismanage the firm that it will suffer bankruptcy and dissolution. Of course,
The Rustler will deny responsibility and point the finger at others for the
downfall of the firm.
c. “The Rancher”
“The Rancher”—militaristic but non-anomistic, hostile but not
adventuristic—is committed to nothing more than the safety of his or her herd
and its value at market, and he or she is threatened in this by Outlaws and
Rustlers. He or she is ready, willing, and able to use force to protect the herd,
which he or she and his or her cowboys drive hard. He or she lives on the open
range, distrusts and dislikes cowboys and Indians he or she does not know, and
has little to do with townspeople except at market time. If the Sheriff or his
Deputy should call upon him or her for assistance, “The Rancher”—committed
to and reliant upon the rule of law and courts as the first line-of defense of his or
her stock—will offer his or her support, but he or she otherwise remains aloof
and out of the fray. As CEO, The Rancher will generate and expend significant
political and social capital, and take and pay bribes, to prevent and minimize
problems the firm might face. While it may have to restate earnings, the firm
will not engage in serious violations of the law under The Rancher, who will
fulfill his or her mission: to shield the firm against predators and husband it to
abundance.
d. “The Mayor”
“The Mayor”—personality profile ABCd—is a vainglorious individual
who abuses his or her office for personal gain without care for the townsmen or
the rule of law, and the only cause for which he or she will expend personal
resources is to ensure re-election. As CEO, The Mayor will violate financial
regulations, engage in bribery and buy and sell political influence, and obligate
the firm to restate earnings to reflect the damage done to shareholders. When
scandal erupts The Mayor will spend the significant political influence he or she
has purchased to resist enforcement and avoid legal penalties, but if the firm

2014

A THEORY OF CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE

459

does incur sanctions The Mayor will scapegoat underlings. Unseating The
Mayor as CEO is possible; bringing The Mayor to account for misdeeds is quite
another matter.
IV. CRITICISMS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A. Criticisms and Responses
1. Reductionism
Those with intellectual commitments to theories that regard other levels of
analysis as more fundamental to the explanation of the behavior of firms may
dismiss personality as little more than “a magic slogan to charm away the
problems that [their] intellectual tools don’t handle.”608 Others may take
exception to the claim that personality, rather than firm, industry, or national
culture, the powers and makeup of boards of directors or auditors, CMPs, the
availability of comprehensive and “toothy” legal regimes, or the courage of
whistleblowers, is central to explanations for firm decisions regarding CLC; for
these critics, personality constructs are “noisy” variables, and the reductionism
of PT will invariably be sacrificial of explanatory and predictive power.609
Indeed, the “perfect” model of CLC might well treat firm behaviors as
resulting from a combination of causes and in turn amalgamate insights and
variables from all pre-theories and all levels of analysis. However, such a model
would be so cumbersome and so difficult to conceptualize and apply that some
reductionism would be necessary to permit replication and falsification. Neither
the naïve view of CLC as the mere projection of personalities nor the belief
decision-making is entirely insulated from the effects of personality enjoys
empirical support. If firm behaviors could be explained solely by reference to
the personalities of CEOs, there would be no discernible pattern of behavior at
variance with predictions derived from the analysis of those personalities. The
data do not support this conclusion. Still, personality is not epiphenomenal to
CLC: although there may be circumstances in which all CEOs will decide
identically, decisions as to at least some of the most relevant outcomes appear to
be influenced by personality.

608

HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR:
IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 23 (1947).

A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES

609
CAMPBELL JONES, MARTIN PARKER & RENE TEN BOS, FOR BUSINESS ETHICS: A CRITICAL
APPROACH 4 (2005).
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2. Lack of Parsimony
Personality theories are difficult to test empirically, and researchers must
expend labor, time, and resources to acquire knowledge about the subjects of
investigation, as well as requisite training in psychobiographical research,
qualitative methodology, and formal modeling. Critics, however, should
concede that a theory attempting to offer relevant explanations and predictions
of CLC, a phenomenon of great complexity, will be similarly complex. If
parsimony, rather than explanatory and predictive power, is the measure of
success, there are grounds for concern. However, if the present theory harnesses
as much explanatory and predictive power as can be corralled at present, it
behooves those who would fault its lack of parsimony to develop the research
and experimental techniques that will enable collaboration in the field.
3. Ecologically Fallacious
Some may fault the present theory for presuming associative relationships
that obtain within a very small “n” of cases can be generalized to the universe of
potential CEOs. Indeed, there may be another set of personality constructs that
generates better explanatory and predictive power, and it is possible replication
studies will score decision-makers differently and reach contrary findings.
Generalizing inductively from a very small number of cases is inherently
problematic, for anomalous individual cases are more likely to drive findings
than they will in larger populations. However, because the data employed
herein nearly spans the universe of major corporate scandals over the last fifteen
years, it is not a sample in the scientific sense, and, thus, inferences need not
necessarily build upon skewed data. Moreover, the conclusions of the present
study are conditional and intended to explain a very limited number of contextdependent cases of corporate scandal and serve as points of departure for further
research.
4. Data Defects and Selection Bias
The data is not voluminous. In one case, a single primary source was used
to develop a CEO personality profile, and the potential for bias and other errors
is magnified. Moreover, psychobiographical research, always arduous, is
especially so when analyzing CEOs who, although they enjoy celebrity, do not
inspire nearly so much biographical work as do heads of state and entertainers.
Further, the cases chosen have been included specifically because the CEOs had
already been mired in corporate scandal. Many other CEOs about whom as
much has been written have not, and, although this is not guarantee against their
guilt, the presumption runs in their favor. Studies of other CEOs, including
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those who have not been publicly linked with violations of corporate law, will
be undertaken in future research to develop and refine the present theory.
B. Directions for Future Research
1. Experimental Research
Only four distinct combinations of the four personality constructs have
been identified in the personality profiles of CEOs who presided over corporate
scandals: ABCD, aBCD, AbCd, and ABCd. However, these four personality
constructs generate 24, or sixteen, possible combinations. Twelve combinations
of the four constructs exist theoretically within a sufficiently numerous
population but cannot as yet be identified, analyzed, and placed in a truth table.
When, as here, the historical record fails to exhaust all possible combinations of
personality constructs, it is impossible to specify necessary and sufficient
causality in respect of any particular outcome, unless the historical record can be
augmented either through the passage of time and the availability of additional
corporate scandals, or by the production of additional cases in an experimental
setting. Data associated with experimental profiles and derived from survey and
simulation research can be integrated with historical data and subjected to QCA.
2. Additional Dependent Variables and Intervening Variables
Investigation of associative relationships between personality and
additional CLC outcomes will expand the scope of the present study. Moreover,
future iterations of this research may reveal the substance and process of
decisions regarding CLC are in effect intervening variables to which greater
theoretical significance may be attributed.
3. Quantitative Analysis
Generation of simulated cases of CLC will allow introduction of
quantitative methods, including content analysis and pathways analysis, to
complement QCA. Multivariate statistical analysis—principal components or
best subsets regression analysis—may suggest one or more IVs can be dropped
from the theory without sacrificing explanatory power. More powerful theories
may be built by including additional IVs, and the scope may be extended to
additional DVs. Integration of variables drawn from other levels of analysis
may aid in determining the causal significance of personality-level variables
relative to inputs from the international political economy, the political and
economic character of states, and the nature of organizational-cultural units.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Why do CEOs rob corporations? Willie Sutton, were he alive, might look
around and reply, yet again, “Because that’s where the money is.”610 The
market value of the top twenty-five Fortune 500 firms is approximately $4
trillion. Yet, times have changed since 1934. The investor class has moved its
cash from banks into equity shares in public firms. The crooked class no longer
grabs its loot by brandishing weapons, informing bank tellers that “this here’s a
stick-up,” and shooting G-men on the way out; now it cooks the books, talks up
stock before selling short, and lies to Congress. Moreover, robbery today is far
bigger business than in the 1930s when career criminals like Willie Sutton
became famous for blasting their way out of banks with $20,000 in currency. In
the last fifteen years, rogue executives made away with $1 trillion in shareholder
assets and killed enough jobs to employ the city of Houston.
In response, prosecutors have claimed several celebrity CEOs as trophies
and Congress, eager to assuage defrauded voters, has imposed stricter—and far
more expensive—legal obligations upon public firms. Yet, despite the valiant
efforts of legal architects to deter corporate scofflaws, no one seriously believes
legislative package cobbled together will hand regulators the silver bullets
necessary to slay the seemingly immortal criminal class. Wherever the money
is, the crooks will flock.
For the same reason, CMPs, statements of new practices from overhauled
boards of directors, encomiums to ethical decision-making, and other
paraphernalia of the post-Enron “corporate ethics” era, while packed with
symbolic meaning, are too often worth no more than the paper upon which they
are printed or the air into which they are uttered. One need only read the
twenty-odd pages of Enron’s Code of Ethics, written long before that firm slid
into the abyss, to grasp this sobering truth. Managers understand, or quickly
learn, crime often pays, but CMPs will not pick up a check, and modification of
perquisites, bolstering of the independence of auditors, and public support for
corporate social responsibility initiatives eat at the bottom line.
Yet, if the status quo is intolerable, what then is to be done to save
managerial capitalism from itself? For the foreseeable future, firms will
continue to be the latter-day equivalent of banks—where the money is—for the
vast American middle class. Does the temptation caused by access to a great
deal of Other People’s Money invariably corrupt managers, and is law thus
epiphenomenal to firm behavior? Access to the vault is far easier to come by
circa 2014 for corporate executives with prestigious MBAs than it was for
Depression-era crooks with Thompson submachine guns. Is the solution

610

See SUTTON supra note 2.
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inherent in the content or the enforcement of the law itself? Is there a perfect
constellation of legal regime, CMPs, and ethics instruction that can
spontaneously induce a degree of corporate compliance sufficient to overcome
the urge to simply take the money and run? Instead of incarcerating Jeffrey
Skilling for twenty-four years, should we broadcast his public beheading on payper-view television from Enron Plaza in Houston, with the proceeds donated to
Enron’s creditors? If our faith in the ability of the academy to implement a
reformation of the ethics of adult students is weak, and if our taste for the blood
of white-collar criminals is underdeveloped, we must return to the beginning:
“Why do CEOs rob corporations?” If we ask again, emphasizing the third,
rather than the last, word, it may be possible to provide answers.
Some CEOs—but only some CEOs—rob corporations. They do this not
only because that is where the money is but because that is who they are. Other
CEOs dutifully discharge their fiduciary and civic responsibilities while
enriching their employees, their investors, and the communities in which they do
business for the very same reason: that is who they are. It is vexing that one
cannot readily explain or predict why any given CEO enters the robbers’ den or
honestly shepherds the firm. Yet, it is possible, if one learns to read the runes of
personality, to divine the general path a firm will follow under the leadership of
any particular CEO. Undertheorization, and not the inherent greed of mankind
or the incommensurability of law and business, is truly the bane of CLC.
Researchers must dedicate energies to the empirical study of the relationships
between rules and behaviors if the desiderata attendant to compliance—
fundamental fairness and efficiency in the operation of the markets,
maximization of shareholder wealth, just compensation of the managerial class,
elimination of political corruption, equality of opportunity, general promotion of
respect for law, and effective legislative oversight of national commerce—are to
be secured, in part, through the contributions of scholarship.
This program need not exclude any school of thought or methodology.
Although human agency is crucial and individual-level variables are
indispensable to explanations and predictions of CLC, the most sophisticated
model will incorporate insights from all pre-theories and variables from multiple
levels of analysis, including the nature of the international political economy,
the regulatory and judicial culture of the state, dyadic interactions with other
states and firms, the organizational cultures of firms, the dynamics of decision
teams, and even neuroeconomic inputs. No single method, paradigm, or
discipline will harvest all that is knowable about CLC. Each will inform the
others regardless of its pretensions. Still, if the present account of the
relationship is inchoate, the salience of personality to CLC is an existential
reality. Without an account of the linkages between rules and behaviors, any
attempt to enhance CLC by altering the existing regime will succeed only by the
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intervention of Fortune.
In other words, achieving substantial compliance with corporate law is not
merely a matter of the conjuration and codification of proper rules and
institutions. Rather, it is to the selection and training of the right people to
administer, interpret, and implement the normative content animating legal rules
and institutions to which all stakeholders must direct the bulk of their
attention.611 Because much of the variation in CLC is attributable to personality,
manipulation of the legal rules may well be a useless venture without
simultaneous manipulation of CEO personalities, either through training or,
more likely, by incorporating analysis of compliance propensities within the
matrix of considerations governing CEO selection by boards of directors or
shareholders. Firms should take seriously the personalities of those whom they
consider for the position most responsible for shaping the values, decisions, and
futures of the firm and its stakeholders. Hostile and adventuristic CEO
applicants, and to a lesser extent those who are militaristic and anomistic, may
well gut the firms that hire them, while CEOs with profiles that de-emphasize
these constructs may well provide the sound and steady leadership that navigates
legal shoals and stewards firms to good long-term results.
Unless and until neo-Marxists or Islamic fascists topple the state and
establish industrial communes or a waqf, corporations will always be “where the
money is” and will always attract criminals bent on robbery. However, firms
may also be fortunate enough to draw enlightened trustees who would safeguard
their wealth by implementing the most effective of legal strategies: specifically,
contesting, within established political and legal boundaries, every creation,
interpretation, and application of law that runs contrary to shareholders’
interests, but scrupulously—even monastically—adhering to the letter and spirit
of authoritative determinations of legal obligation once those determinations
issue. The vast majority of would-be CEOs will orient themselves on a
continuum between these poles. Accordingly, CLC is a primary constituent of a
corporate strategy that requires a firm not only to select industries and markets
in which to compete and methods to develop and sustain competitive advantage
but to decide whether and how it will live out the meaning of the following
creed: CEOs—not firms—decide whether or not to comply with law, and their
choices have profound implications for their firms, their communities, and their
nations. Compliance with law is an act not merely of corporate social
responsibility but of self- and national-preservation.
For, although both are created with a theoretically infinite lifespan, neither
611
“Virtue ethicists” suggest managers with the proper values, motivations, and attitudes—and
not simply those who reason from correct principles—are most likely to do what “virtue” requires of
a good manager in given circumstances. See, e.g., R.C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE:
COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS (1992).
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a corporation nor a nation is guaranteed its perpetual existence. Yugoslavia is as
dead as Enron, and unitary Iraq is as much on life support as is Sunbeam. Just
as rogue dictators—Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein—pried apart
latent fissures to fracture their nations and bury their peoples under rubble, so
are rogue CEOs—Jeffrey Skilling and Albert Dunlap—the proximate causes of
corporate legal tsunamis that extinguish firms and inundate stakeholders with
debt, unemployment, and despair. It is for further research to reveal suspected
parallels in personality and decision-making that explain these two sets of
rogues and the misery they inflicted upon others. It is enough for now to note
the most important lesson of the last fifteen years of political economic history
stands in stark relief against a backdrop of bloodshed and bankruptcy: in
business, as in war, decisions about legal compliance form part of a strategic
calculus and can pave a road to ruin.
Legal compliance is at the core of corporate strategy, and firms committed
to survival and prosperity must mind the bitter lessons of the recent past as they
sift through aspirants to their leadership. The most effective way to achieve
compliance is, quite simply, to have individuals comply with the law. Lest the
past become prologue, wise firms—no less than wise states—must, when
selecting the individuals at the apex of their decisional hierarchies, treat
personality seriously and delve deeper than Willie Sutton into the relationship
between personality and corporate legal compliance.

